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An Examination and Analysis of Bank Corporate Governance Regulation in The 
Gambia: A Grounded Theory Approach 
Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to carry out an empirical investigation of bank corporate 
governance regulation in The Gambia. The aim is to determine what contributions, if any, 
effective governance systems can make to the management of the needs of different 
stakeholder groups within the financial sector. Through the application of grounded theory 
methodology this research aims to build a substantive theory of corporate governance 
regulation within The Gambian banking sector. The substantive theory identified the main 
phenomena and as such outlined the model of corporate governance currently prevailing in 
The Gambian banking sector.  
The grounded theory methodology adopted for this research includes a three stage process 
of analysing data namely open coding, axial coding and selective coding. Firstly, through 
the application of comparative method in open coding semi structured interviews and focus 
groups discussions were conducted with senior bank executives, employees and 
customers, as well as regulators across The Gambian banking sector. Open coding process 
enables the development and identification of properties and dimensions. The interviews 
were informed by survey questionnaires designed to sensitise and gain access to the 
identified participants and subsequently guided the semi structured interview questionnaires 
and focus groups that followed.  Secondly, through axial coding, the open categories were 
incorporated into wider categories. The use of the paradigm model establishes the 
relationship among these categories. This led to the development of the human factor 
model of bank corporate governance regulation in The Gambian banking system. Finally, 
selective coding identified the core category through the verification of the second set of 
semi structured interviews and established its’ relationship with other sub categories.  
The substantive theory further explored Categorical Imperative theoretical framework 
leading to a more formal substantive theory that considers corporate governance issues of 
financial sector stakeholders. It concluded that there is no consistency between banks when 
it comes to corporate governance mechanisms and codes partly due to obstacles such as 
environment, culture and policies. Thus, regulatory compliance and ethics are therefore 
necessary to serve as a moral compass in the absence of a mandatory regulatory 
framework.  
Finally, this thesis also explored the phenomenon of corporate governance, grounded 
theory and Categorical Imperative in an unexplored context. Thus, providing a new 
approach to corporate governance understanding to inform and to improve corporate 
governance practice. The identification of the substantive theory will also help key 
stakeholders to address the challenges, thus, minimising the risk of bank failures and 
improve the corporate governance regulatory framework in The Gambia. Finally, this 
research also proposed an ethical code of conduct for The Gambia. The proposed code of 
conduct will influence future behaviour and subsequently improve the robustness of the 
banking system. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.0  Introduction 
This chapter introduces the topic, scope and establishes the purpose of this enquiry. 
This thesis aims to examine and analyse bank corporate governance regulation in The 
Gambia. This chapter will be structured as follows: firstly, the research aim and 
objectives will be spelt out followed by the research background and research 
questions before spelling out the structure of the thesis and finally drawing a 
conclusion. It is important to note that in the context of this research the use of the term 
financial institutions, financial sector organisations and banking sector all refer to 
commercial banks (retail or high street banks) specifically in The Gambia. These terms 
are often used interchangeably throughout this research.  
1.1  Research Aim and Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to carry out an empirical investigation of bank corporate 
governance regulation in The Gambia. The aim is to determine what contributions, if 
any, effective governance systems can make to the management of the needs of 
different stakeholder groups within the financial sector. Through the application of 
grounded theory methodology this research therefore aims to build a substantive 
theory of corporate governance regulation within The Gambian banking system. Using 
grounded theory methodology the research objectives are: 
 To examine the effect of corporate governance regulations relating to 
stakeholder interests in financial sector organisations in developing countries, 
with particular reference to The Gambia.  
 To examine the effectiveness of corporate governance systems in financial 
sector organisations in The Gambia.  
 To scrutinise the effectiveness of the provisions of their services to different 
stakeholders groups within the context of developing countries. 
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 To examine the extent to which a good governance system in financial sector 
organisations provides accountability of management to their stakeholders. 
1.2  Research Background and Motivation for the Study 
A number of factors explain why this thesis was conceived.  Firstly, The Gambia is a 
very small developing country – one of the poorest in the world with a total population 
of 1.8 million and a GDP of $914.3m in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). However, over the 
past 15 years it has experienced a significant growth in the financial sector (from four 
banks in 2000 to 13 banks in 2014). This potentially places it in a vulnerable position 
should a major financial crisis emerge for it simply lacks the resources and capacity to 
rescue the banks in a financial crisis. The impact and the consequences for the 
stakeholders and the economy could be severe. Commenting on the social implications 
of the 2007 banking crisis, Ross and Crossan (2012, p.215.) concluded that: 
governments across the world are currently cutting public spending in an extreme 
fashion and this is, partly, due to the banking crises. Therefore, poor governance 
in the banking sector is leading to massive social problems in the real world as 
governments cut services.  
Thus, there is an urgent need to learn from the 2007 financial crisis and its 
consequences in The Gambian context and to carry out additional primary research. 
Reinforcing the above, Alexander (2006, p.17) also added that:  
corporate governance of banks is largely concerned with reducing the social costs 
of bank risk taking and that the regulator is uniquely positioned to balance the 
relevant stakeholder interests in devising corporate governance standards for 
financial institutions that achieve economic development objectives, while 
minimising the externalities of systemic risk.  
This further highlights the importance financial institutions in economic development as 
well as the need for financial regulation because of the systemic risk that banking 
activities poses for the economy and society at large.   
Secondly, corporate governance regulation in The Gambia is an area that is not well 
researched.  The country lacks the academic and financial resources with which to 
support such research (Sawahel, 2009).  Thirdly, to date there has been no research 
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carried out in the field utilising grounded theory methodology which could provide 
useful insights and help drive future policy. 
Corporate governance rules and regulations are not currently part of the regulatory 
framework in The Gambian banking system. Therefore, financial institutions in The 
Gambia do not have to comply with any specific corporate governance rules and 
regulations as part of the regulatory process required by the Central Bank of The 
Gambia (CBG). Financial institutions in The Gambia are therefore, compelled to adopt 
corporate governance regulatory policies and requirements that are mainly internally 
generated or imposed on them by their parent company. As a result, there are no 
consistent or standardised corporate governance frameworks across the financial 
sector institutions in The Gambia. Commenting on the adoption of corporate 
governance codes Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazuraa (2004) concluded that legitimise 
pressures was a leading reason for code adoption. Enrione et al. (2006) added that 
maintaining legitimacy of law makers and regulators were the main drivers for 
institutionalisation of corporate governance codes. Furthermore, Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2008) also suggested that the reasons for adopting codes of corporate governance in 
civil law countries is to legitimate rather than improve corporate governance practices 
amongst national companies.  
1.3  Research Questions 
This research entails an empirical investigation of corporate governance regulation in 
the financial sector organisations in The Gambia. This research seeks specifically to 
investigate and answer four main questions:- 
 How do corporate governance regulations affect financial sector organisations?  
 How does the governance of financial sector organisations affect the services 
they provide to their stakeholders? 
 How effective is the corporate governance system within the financial sector 
organisation in The Gambia? 
 Can corporate governance in financial sector organisations provide 
accountability by management to stakeholders? 
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1.4  Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of nine chapters starting with chapter one Introduction - which lays 
out the research aims and objectives, background of the study including the rationale 
why the study was conceived and the research questions.  Finally, this chapter also 
provides an overview of the entire thesis. Chapter two Literature Review - establishes 
the theoretical underpinning of the study focusing on definitions of governance, good 
governance, corporate governance literature and research on corporate governance. 
This chapter will also discuss corporate governance regulation, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and ethics, accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust. In 
addition the chapter explores ethical theories and financial institutions, corporate 
governance theories, evaluation of agency and shareholder theory and an evaluation of 
stakeholder theory. The urgency and importance of proper governance of corporations 
is highlighted by the 2007 financial turbulence, including the credit crunch, demise of 
Lehman Brothers, payment protection insurance miss-selling and the Libor scandal just 
to name a few. Provoked by questionable business practices and scandals, the issue 
of corporate governance has gained increased prominence in countries round the 
world (Reed, 2002).  
Chapter three Corporate Governance Codes – reviews the models of corporate 
governance found in Africa, corporate governance regulation in The Gambia and the 
various corporate governance codes in the United Kingdom. A critical evaluation of the 
external influences on UK corporate governance and the Lamfalussy Report (2005). 
Most emerging countries in sub Saharan African including The Gambia are indeed 
former British colonies. As a result these countries tend to share the same British 
common law system. This therefore serves as an incentive for these countries to adopt 
the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance (Reed, 2002). Chapter four Research 
Methodology: Grounded Theory Approach – reviews the paradigms of inquiry for this 
research, the interpretivist paradigm and the constructivist paradigm. This chapter then 
discusses other paradigms of inquiry, theoretical framework of research and grounded 
theory research methodology. It also highlights the constraints on grounded theory 
approach, the difference between Glaser and Strauss, the framework for developing 
substantive data analysis and ending with a brief introduction to open coding, axial 
coding and selective coding.  
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The methodology is underpinned by an interpretivist (phenomenological) paradigm 
aimed at developing a substantive theory to further our understanding of theory as well 
as the empirical nature of The Gambia’s corporate governance regulation and ethical 
practices. The data collected for this research is analysed using grounded theory 
methodology, which is a process of reducing raw data into concepts that are 
designated to stand for categories. The categories are then developed and integrated 
into a substantive theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Howell 2000). This process is 
achieved by coding data, writing memos, and formulating diagrams. The data collected 
will be coded and analysed using the three coding methods of the grounded theory 
model of open coding, axial coding and selective coding.   
Chapter five - Research Methods provides an account of research methods and data 
collection process including - data sampling, data accessibility and challenges, data 
collection methods, interviews, focus group discussions and secondary data. Charmaz, 
(2011, p.14) suggested that “methods extend and magnify our view of studied life and, 
thus, broaden and deepen what we learn of it and know about it”. Howell (2013, p.194) 
also added that:  
no matter what philosophical position or paradigm of inquiry is used in a research 
project, it is always possible to use a combination of research methods when 
collecting data. The rationale for the balance between these methods will depend 
on the objectives of the research and the extent to which qualitative or quantitative 
techniques are to be utilised. 
Furthermore, Creswell (2009) added that the choice of methods turns on whether the 
intent is to specify the type of information to be collected in advance of the study or 
allow it to emerge from participants in the project. However:  
in grounded theory method terms, data collection tends to focus on interviews and 
the idea of ‘slices of data’ that are many and varied. In addition to interviews, 
grounded theory method coding can be applied to documents, focus groups – 
pretty much anything that is a text can be coded (Urquhart, p.69, 2013).  
The Grounded Theory coding process is divided into two chapters. Chapter six 
Analysis of semi-structured interview and focus group discussion – open coding. This 
chapter starts off by discussing the semi-structured interview process and questions. 
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This is followed by an analysis of semi-structured interview questions using open 
coding. The chapter then discusses the focus group interview process and questions. 
The chapter then analyses the focus group interview questions using open coding. 
Finally, the chapter names the open categories developed from the interview and focus 
group discussion. These open categories arise from and across various questions and 
responses during the interview and focus group discussion. Open coding is: 
designed to help analysts carry out the steps of theory building – conceptualising, 
defining categories, and developing categories in terms of their properties and 
dimensions – and then later relating categories through statements of 
relationships. (Strauss and Corbin, 2009, p.121).  
Chapter seven - Analysis of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion 
using axial and selective coding,  begins by evaluating the application of the paradigm 
model. The chapter then discusses the phenomenon, causal condition, context, 
intervening conditions, action/interactional strategies and consequences. Next the 
chapter focuses on selective coding. Finally, the chapter ends with a substantive theory 
of bank corporate governance regulation in The Gambia. According to Strauss and 
Corbin (1998, p. 123) axial coding is the: 
process of relating categories to their sub-categories, termed “axial” because 
coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking categories at the level of 
properties and dimensions.  
Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin (1998) also added that the purpose of axial coding is 
to reassemble data that were fractured during open coding. Thus, axial coding involves 
the re-structuring of the whole process by finding connections between the data 
(Howell, 2013). Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.116) defined selective coding as: 
the process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to the other 
categories, validating those relationships…the core category is the central 
phenomenon around which all the other categories are integrated.  
In other words selective coding is the process of integrating and refining categories 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Furthermore, selective coding illustrates how the 
phenomenon fits around a core category and involves the process by which emerging 
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categories are organised and unified around a core category according to Strauss and 
Corbin (1990). 
Chapter eight Relates Substantive Theory to Formal Theory - clarifies the process of 
formal grounded theory building. This is followed by an extensive examination of 
categorical imperative (CI) to corporate governance research. Next a review of 
corporate governance research utilising CI is carried out. The chapter then discusses 
the limitations of the literature linking CI and corporate governance. An exploration of 
the substantive theory within the framework of CI then follows. Finally, a more formal 
substantive theory is drawn.  Glaser and Strauss (1967) explaining substantive theory 
in terms of existing formal theory such as CI suggested that it is not meant to turn the 
substantive to formal theory; but to make it formal substantive theory. The application 
of grounded theory should ensure that the theory emerging from the study meets the 
requirements of good science in terms of generalisability, reproductively and rigour 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Howell, 2000). Finally, chapter nine identifies the 
conclusion of the thesis, contribution of the thesis and directions for future research.    
1.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the key purpose of this study and outlined its main aims 
and objectives. The study can now proceed to discuss the theoretical basis of the study 
and lay down the key definitions, justifying the need for this investigation, analysis of 
the primary data using grounded theory methodology. The application of grounded 
theory methodology enabled the researcher to build a substantive theory on corporate 
governance regulation within The Gambian banking system.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
REVIEWING THE LITERATURE 
2.0  Introduction 
The framework underpinning the literature review of this thesis is structured as follows. 
The first part of the literature review is what the researcher called the conceptual 
literature review which focuses on corporate governance literature; definitions of 
governance followed by an appraisal of the literature on good governance. This is 
followed by an examination of corporate governance literature (historical perspective). 
Next an evaluation of the literature on corporate governance (theoretical exploration) is 
then carried out. This chapter also examines the literature on corporate governance 
regulation, CSR and ethics as well as accountability, responsibility, transparency and 
trust. This chapter also covers research on ethical theories and financial institutions 
and corporate governance theories. Finally, an evaluation of agency, shareholder and 
stakeholder theories will also be appraised. This section will elaborate the key 
theoretical frameworks underpinning the study. It is important to note that these 
components are all interlinked hence forming the basis underpinning the entire thesis. 
The literature review on the methodology will be carried out in chapter four alongside 
the methodology. 
History has revealed that there is a never-ending evolution of theories or models 
of corporate governance. One of the reasons is due to the very essence of social 
consciences that is minimal and profit making took centre stage. All over the 
world, companies are trying to instil the sense of governance into their corporate 
structure. With the surge of capitalism, corporation became stronger while 
governments all over the world had to succumb to its manipulations and 
dominance (Masdoor, 2011, p.1).  
Corporate governance is therefore seen as a key driver of investor confidence and 
managerial decisions (OECD, 2004; Chalhoub, 2009). Monks and Minow (1996) added 
that corporate governance is of national importance because an effective governance 
system is a necessary precondition for commercial competitiveness. Conversely, 
Crossan (2009, p.327) argued that: 
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corporate governance is an area that has seen an increase in interest over the 
last ten years. This increase in interest is due to some large and public failings 
(such as WorldCom, Enron and Polly Peck) and these failings have led to a 
number of recent inquiries into corporate governance, resulting in the (new) 
combined code issued during 2006.  
The Cadbury Report (1992), and other reports, all list a number of key factors that their 
authors feel are relevant to achieving a proper level of governance within firms 
(Crossan, 2009).  
The need, urgency and the importance of proper governance of corporations is further 
highlighted by the 2007 financial turbulence including a credit crunch at Northern Rock 
and HBOS. Provoked by questionable business practices and scandals, the issues of 
corporate governance have gained increased prominence in countries round the world, 
(Reed, 2002). As a result, corporate governance has gained a much greater profile and 
is now a frequent topic in the financial press, mainstream academia and outside the 
academic domain (Crossan, 2009). Thus, the term corporate governance is now firmly 
part of modern business terminology and is widely used by commentators, 
businessmen and academics (Crossan, 2012). Ross and Crossan (2012, p.216) added 
that the recent crisis highlighted two major points: 
the extent to which a modern market economy is reliant upon an efficient and 
stable banking sector; and 
the degree to which the banking sector remains reliant upon tax payer funded 
support to prevent systemic market failure. 
As a result of the scale of both the banking crisis and rescue package, the tax payer is 
now a significant stakeholder in the banking sector (Crossan, 2012). These highlight 
the need for enhanced governance considering the financial and social implications of 
bank bailouts on wider society. 
2.1  Definitions of Governance 
The term governance has been clouded by a slew of slightly deferring definitions and 
understanding of what is actually meant by the term (World Bank, 2013). This suggests 
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that the complexity of governance is difficult to capture in a simple definition (Institute 
on Governance, 2014). However, Solomon (2007, p.1) suggested that: 
the term governance derives from the Latin word “gubernare, meaning ‘to steer’ 
usually applying to the steering of a ship, which implies that corporate governance 
involves the functions of direction rather than control. 
This particular approach emphasise the importance of direction over control, with no 
acknowledgement or reference to the maintenance of shareholder value or, the interest 
of stakeholders, contrary to governance research over the years. Furthermore, an 
element of control and a sense of direction are two important elements in corporate 
governance (Nwanji, 2006). World Bank (2013) added that the term governance can be 
defined as the process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make 
rules, and by which those rules are enforced and modified. The Institute of Directors 
take a more holistic approach to the concept of governance and understand that it is 
not exclusively to do with the control of management by external shareholders 
(Crossan, 2012). 
On close examination these views seems to differ on the concept of governance in 
relation to direction and control. Tricker (1984) and Solomon (2007) suggested that 
governance is more to do with direction. Conversely, the Institute of Directors appear to 
advocate the importance of control (by following a particular rule, standard or principle) 
over direction. One can argue that these views are incompatible. Surely, direction 
would involve some kind of control to an extent. This literature also revealed that the 
term governance is not simply restricted to corporations’ as such but also self-
governance, a state and organisations.  
McNutt and Batho (2005, p.656) argued that “governance at the employee level 
requires a code of ethics that is not just about right and wrong, but emphasises a 
contractual sense of duty to fellow employees as stakeholders of the firm”.  However, 
O’Reilly (2003) argued that governance is not, after all, about applying static rules. 
Instead, it is about understanding and dealing with the management of the ever-
changing environment within which it operates (O’Reilly, 2003). Fyfe (2003, p.14), by 
contrast defined governance as “relationship management and decision-making based 
on complex interplay of interest, differences, rights and obligations of a society’s public, 
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private and voluntary sectors, groups and citizens”. These definitions (as stated above) 
emphasises the complexity of governance in planning and implementing measures 
aimed at improving performance in an ever changing environment within which they 
operate. This could also imply that governance requires an understanding of the 
relationships between the various stakeholders and to make certain the best course of 
action is taken in response to a specific situation taking into account the interests, 
rights and obligations of the various stakeholders. 
Tricker (1984) further argued that the governance function is aimed at promoting 
accountability, supervision and controlling the actions of executive management in 
order to protect and enhance shareholder value. This line of argument highlight some 
key issues in relation to the term governance as highlighted in the corporate 
governance literature, amongst which include a sense of direction, accountability, 
overseeing and controlling actions of executives. 
2.1.1 Governance  
There are many competing definitions of good governance. Roberts, Wright and O’Neil 
(2007, p.967) defined good governance as signalling “presence – of the rule of law, of 
stability, of financial transparency, accountable state officials, human rights, of free 
media”. The Institute of Directors (2010, p.1) added that good governance is a “mixture 
of legislation, non-legislative codes, self-regulation and best practice, structure, culture 
and board competency”. Good governance is often paired with ‘democracy’ and 
assumed to involve not only a reformed state but also civil society and capital 
(Swyngedouw, 2005). Alternatively, Picou and Rubach (2006) suggested that firms with 
corporate governance procedures should be viewed as practicing good governance 
and being responsibly managed. Kester (1997) argued that the prices paid for 
corporations’ securities reflect investor’s expectation of manager’s actions and good 
governance. The term good governance is changeable in its meaning. Hence, there 
are no objective standards for determining good governance: some aspects include 
political stability, the rule of law, control of corruption and accountability (Nanda, 2006).  
The term good governance came into vogue in the 1980’s and 1990’s with the World 
Bank leading the charge. It has since then assumed that status of mantra for donor 
agencies and countries as a prerequisite for aid (Nanda, 2006). Griffin (2010) 
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suggested that the principles of good governance should be participatory, conducted 
as close to citizens as practicable, transparent, accountable, effective and coherent. 
Furthermore, Griffin (2010) argued that there are limits to good governance because 
the relationship between democratic norms (like good governance) and political power 
is no longer clear. 
There seems to be a general consensus that good governance leads to CSR and 
ethics. However, central to good governance is accountability and a strong legal 
framework as well as understanding the relationships between the various players 
(Fyfe, 2003). Rossouw (2005, p.95) argued that in the case of Africa, there are many 
impediments to good corporate governance high-up on the list including the following:  
lack of effective regulatory and institutional frameworks, lack of transparency and 
market discipline, insufficient incentives for SMEs to the join ranks of listed 
companies, and state owned enterprises often set a poor example of good 
governance as their boards (not appropriately structured and appointments made 
purely on political grounds) do not display either the competence or the 
independence that is required for good governance.  
Copp (2006, p.41) argued that good corporate governance has been: 
recognised by international financial institutions as an important component in the 
promotion of a more stable financial system and in the reduction of systemic risks 
associated with financial crisis.  
Tshuma (1999) suggested that liberalised financial markets need a robust regulatory 
framework as a result of growing economic and global interdependence and the 
consequent difficulties facing states in policy making and regulatory duties that 
transcend national borders. By contrast, some of these states are faced with 
inadequate global regulation and inadequate international economic policy co-
ordination (Tshuma, 1999).  
One can conclude that the term ‘good’ in this context is changeable in its meaning. It 
would therefore mean responsibly managed, presence – of the rule of law, of stability, 
of financial transparency, accountable state officials and human rights of free media 
(Roberts et al. 2007). Furthermore, other researchers perceive the term ‘good’ in this 
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context meaning: an expectation of management action (Kester, 1997). Nanda (2006) 
looks at the term good as: the rule of law, control of corruptions and accountability and 
finally, some aspects including political stability.  
2.1.2 Corporate Governance Literature 
The history of corporations can be traced back to the 17th century (Mueller, 2003). 
During this period there were no organised markets to transfer ownership claims. 
Hence, shares were only transferred to friends or relatives and control was therefore 
characterised by ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’ (Hirschman, 1978). Hirschman proposed that 
people faced with dissatisfaction either ‘exit’ (that is, leave the relationship), or ‘voice’ 
that is, attempt to change the relationship from within (Saunders, 1992). However, the 
emergence of corporations led to the development of organised markets for the 
exchange of shares (Pistor and Xu, 2002). The establishment of markets made trading 
of shares easier. This implies that shareholders increasingly relied on the ‘exit’ option 
to express pleasure or displeasure with management, hence, granting management 
considerable authority (Hirschman, 1978). Therefore, control by voice shifted to the 
Boards of Directors, selected by managers and approved by shareholders. As a result 
there could be an element of partiality (of Boards of Directors) towards managers as 
opposed to shareholders. This will inevitably deepen the notion of the principal agent 
problem and information asymmetric, thereby, further isolating the shareholders from 
any meaningful control through voice (Hirschman, 1978). 
Many believed that the doctrine of ‘legal personality’ as demonstrated in a court case 
between Salomon and Salomon back in 1897 is fundamental in the development of 
corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932). The limited liability restriction 
incorporated in the Company’s Act of 2008 protects corporate managers from unlimited 
liability responsibility in the governance of their corporations. This is because 
corporations are by definition a business entity with the legal rights to sue and be sued. 
Thus a corporation is a legal person with the same legal rights as an actual person.  It 
appears that given the limited liability protection, managers could potentially take on 
certain risks in the operations of their corporations that in normal conditions they would 
not have taken if their liability was unlimited and managing their own capital rather than 
other people’s resources (Smith,1827). This widens the gap between shareholders 
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(principals) and management (agents) as advocated in agency theory. This is because 
managers would have more knowledge and understanding about the operations of the 
business and access to information than shareholders. However Sternberg (2004) 
argues that it is the ultimate responsibility of shareholders to control (via voting rights) 
corporations in exchange for their capital contribution and risk exposure to the extent of 
the virtue of their shares.  
The British East India Company was one of the first corporations that came into 
existence, sometimes referred to as “John Company” (Braendle and Kostyuk, 2007).  It 
was a joint stock company granted an English Royal Charter at the end of 1600. The 
governance structure in its early years is similar to the corporate governance structures 
and mechanisms in today’s companies (Cadbury, 2002). The development of 
corporations as they are known today can be traced to the development of the Railway 
Network in Britain in the 1800s (Solomon, 2007). This was because a large amount of 
capital was needed to feed their growth and therefore a governance structure to protect 
stakeholders. This eventually led to the development of Joint Stock Companies Act in 
1844. 
Eventually, corporations were allowed to write broader and more comprehensive 
charters. This gradually gave birth to the Limited Liability Act of 1855 (Hopt and 
Leyens, 2004). In the US the managerial controlled corporation evolved at a similar 
time, following the civil war in the second half of the 19th century (Solomon, 2007). It 
was during this period that the doctrine of divorce of ownership and control emerged 
(Berle and Means, 1932). This later formed the basis of the ‘agency problem’. Cadbury 
(2002) argued that the ‘agency problem’ predated Berle and Means (1932). Cadbury 
pointed to Liberal Industrial Inquiry of 1926-1928 in the UK arguing that a significant 
problem was detected because management and responsibility were in different hands 
from the provisions of funds, the risk taking and financial rewards (Cadbury, 2002). 
Larner (1966 p.780) found that management control has “substantially increased 
among the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations since 1929, 58 per cent of their assets 
were management controlled. However, in 1963, 85 per cent of their assets were 
controlled”. This would imply that shareholders are increasingly relying on the ‘exit’ 
option to express pleasure or displeasure with management rather than voice due to 
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organised markets for the exchange of shares (Pistor and Xu, 2002). Contrastingly, 
Perrini et al. (2008, p.312) concluded that managerial ownership is beneficial “only in 
non-concentrated firms, suggesting that the controlling owner may use his/her position 
in the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders by appointing 
managers that represent and protect his interest”. Florence (1961) findings differ from 
Larner (1966 and 1971) which showed that two thirds of large companies were not 
owner controlled. Florence (1961) found no significant difference in the level or stability 
of profit rates due to management control, although management controlled firms did 
earn one half of one per cent point lower rate of return on equity than owner-controlled 
firms.  Conversely, (Kamerschen, 1968 p. 444) found that: 
profit rates to be significantly related to changes in control status from 1929 
through 1963. Profits rates were higher for firms which had experienced a change 
in control status; however, changes were almost variable from non-management 
controlled to management controlled.  
Vernon (1971) uncovers no evidence to suggest that control status has exerted a 
significant influence on profit rates of large commercial banks during recent years. 
Could the above difference in research findings be explained using the time lapse and 
the involvement of institutional investors rather than individual shareholders? There 
exists a 34 years’ time lapse (1929-1963) between the studies during which there was 
a World War (1939-1945) and the Wall Street Crisis in 1929 and the Great Depression 
in 1930’s. These events could have simply discouraged (using exit rather than voice) 
individual investors and explain the increase in management control.  
2.2  Research on Corporate Governance 
The current corporate governance debate can be traced back as far as the early 20th 
century according to Crossan (2011, p.293): 
when Veblen (1923) predicted a movement towards absentee ownership of firms 
in the USA. However, it was with the publication of Berle and Means’ (1932) The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property that the possible negative effects of a 
separation of ownership from control were fully discussed. 
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However, the exact meaning of corporate governance “is still open to much debate, 
where on one hand some see it as a proxy for shareholder power, others see it as just 
a set of basic legal guidelines that large public companies have to follow” (Crossan 
2012, p. 54). In terms of theoretical exploration the term corporate governance is 
relatively new, but the practice is ancient (Causey 2008). Smith (1827 p. 311) argued 
that: 
the directors of companies, however, being managers rather of other people’s 
money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private company 
frequently watch over their own. Negligence and profusion therefore must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.  
This clearly demonstrates an understanding of corporate governance issues without 
using the term itself. However, many will also argue that the notion of the ‘principal 
agent problem’ further highlight problems regarding the separation of ownership and 
control (Berle and Means, 1932). The term corporate governance: 
has a clear origin from a Greek word, “kyberman” meaning to steer, guide or 
govern. From a Greek word, it moved to Latin, where it was known as “gubernare” 
and the French version of “governer”. It could also mean the process of decision- 
making and the process by which decisions may be implemented (Masdoor, 2011, 
p.1).  
There are a number of other definitions of corporate governance in the literature but the 
main one, which is used by most researchers on corporate governance is that provided 
by Cadbury Report (1992 para. 2.5) on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, which describes corporate governance as: 
the systems by which companies are directed and controlled, boards of directors 
are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders' role in 
governance is to appoint the directors and auditors and to satisfy themselves that 
an appropriate governance structure is in place in the organisation. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, 
providing leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the 
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business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions 
are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meetings.  
This particular report laid the foundations of corporate governance principles and 
practices not only within the UK but the world over. Some countries have indeed 
adopted its main principles as part of their own corporate governance requirements. 
The notion of control in corporate governance as highlighted by Cadbury above is also 
acknowledged by other prominent authorities such as the Centre of European Policy 
Studies (CEPS, 1995) in their definition of corporate governance as the system of 
rights, processes and controls established internally and externally over the 
management of a business entity with the purpose of protecting the interest of all 
stakeholders. This is an inclusive view ensuring management control through 
processes and rights and the protection of all parties that are impacted upon. 
Parkinson (1994) defines corporate governance as the process of supervision and 
control aimed at ensuring the company’s management acts in accordance with the 
interests of shareholders. This is slightly different with the above definition with more 
emphasis on the protection and enhancement of shareholder interest and little or no 
emphasis on stakeholder’s interest. Cannon (1994) also elaborated on the importance 
of control by defining corporate governance as the sum of activities that make up the 
internal regulation of a business in compliance with the obligations placed on the firm 
by ownership, control and legislation. It incorporates the trusteeship of assets, their 
management and their deployment.  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principle of 
Corporate Governance (2004) provides a broader definition of corporate governance 
as a set of relationships between a company’s board, its management, shareholders 
and other stakeholders. This definition is designed to satisfy all its member countries. 
On the contrary, Lipton and Lorsch (1992, p.61) argued that “expanding corporate 
governance to encompass society as a whole benefits neither corporations nor society, 
because management is ill-equipped to deal with questions of general public interest”. 
This perhaps explain why certain authorities narrow their definition of corporate 
governance such as Metrick and Ishili (2002) defining corporate governance primarily 
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from the view point of the investor as both the promise to repay a fair return on capital 
invested and the commitment to operate a firm efficiently. 
Currently, there is no universally accepted definition of corporate governance (Ross 
and Crossan, 2012). This according to Ramaswamy et al. (2008) cited in Crossan 
(2012, p.54): 
is due to the focus on ‘corporate’ and not governance within much of the debate in 
this area; there is no doubt that if we see governance as a holistic concept that is 
interested in fairness, responsibility, transparency and accountability then the 
relevance to small and medium sized firms (SMEs) becomes apparent. 
Furthermore, Mallin (2007 p.11) added that:  
the development of corporate governance is a global occurrence and, as such, is 
a complex area including legal, cultural, ownership, and other structural 
differences. An aspect of particular importance is whether the company itself 
operates within a shareholder framework as its main objective, or whether it takes 
a broader stakeholder approach. 
Okike (2007 p.173) echoed similar sentiments arguing that whilst there is a case for 
adherence to global corporate governance standards. “Any Code of Best Practices 
adopted in Nigeria must reflect its peculiar socio-political, economic environment and 
provide the right assurance to prospective and existing shareholders”. This definition 
acknowledges the enhancement of shareholders’ value as the primary objective but 
more interestingly insisting on reflecting the peculiar socio-political economic 
environment. Clearly, this is contrary to decades of governance research focusing 
primarily on the control of executive self interest in settings where organisational 
control and ownership are separated. Furthermore, Yakasai (2001 p. 238) argued that 
the: 
unusual and unconventional nature of emerging economies ultimately affects the 
management of many limited liability companies, to an extent that it differs from 
the governance processes of modern Plc’s which are controlled (at least in 
principle) by owners through annual general meetings.   
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This further highlights the sentiments echoed by Okike (2007). It is therefore clear that 
literatures in corporate governance provide some form of meaning on governance, “but 
fall short in its precise meaning of governance. Such ambiguity emerges in words like 
control, regulate, manage, govern and governance. Owing to such ambiguity, there are 
many interpretations” (Masdoor, 2011, p.2). However:  
through the publication of various reports a number of key factors, that inform the 
current debate, have been identified. These key factors, that all the recent reports 
highlight, include: the independence of the main board, the structure of the main 
committees and the separation of the role of the Chairperson from that of the CEO 
(Crossan, 2009, p.330). 
The definitions found in corporate governance literature in general tend to share certain 
characteristics, one of which is the notion of accountability. A view shared by Oquist 
(1999) and Deakin and Hughes (1997) defining corporate governance as the 
relationship between the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and 
society’s conception of the scope of corporate accountability. This view is aimed at 
recognising the importance of accountability within the internal governance structure 
and at the same time emphasising the interest of diverse groups. Thus, more recently 
The Walker Report (2009, p.23) added that “the role of corporate governance is to 
protect and advance the interests of shareholders through the setting the strategic 
direction of a company and appointing and monitoring capable management to achieve 
this”. This reflects the capitalist approach to corporate governance adopted in the UK.  
Ross and Crossan (2012, p.221) suggested that improvements in corporate 
governance should “concentrate not on measuring risk but on identifying it, as the 
failure to correctly measure risk was partly to blame for the failure of banks including 
Northern Rock, HBOS and RBS”.  
2.3  Corporate Governance Regulation  
Crossan (2009, p.328) suggested that:  
the need for corporate governance regulation is due to the possibility of managers 
having different goals to those of the owners. Where the owners may still wish to 
maximise their own financial returns from owning shares in a firm, it is not certain 
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that the managers of the firm will maximise their own utility by maximising the 
returns to their shareholders.  
This is a classical principal agent problem, and corporate governance guidelines have 
to be in place to try to align the desires of the managers with those of shareholders 
(Crossnan, 2009)). Therefore, “it is more appropriate to consider the level of corporate 
governance as a measure of a manager’s ability to place his motives above those of 
his principals” (Crossan, 2007, p.95). One can therefore conclude that the factor that 
determines the likelihood of a firm aiming to profit maximise is the level of corporate 
governance within that firms management structures (Crossan, 2007).  
Khemani and Shapiro (1993, p.180) defined regulation as a “imposition of rules by 
government, backed by the use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the 
economic behaviour of individuals and firms in a private sector”. Hence, the 
introduction of corporate governance regulation/codes in most cases is driven by the 
desire for greater transparency, accountability and to increase investor confidence in 
markets round the world. This in most cases is as a result of financial scandals, 
corporate collapse, or similar crises as stated above. According to Tricker (2009 p.145) 
corporate governance regulation around the world was based on a “mixture of 
company law, corporate regulation (mainly filing and disclosure requirements), 
accounting standards, and for public listed companies the stock exchanges’ rules”.  
Ironically, corporate governance compliance in most cases is on a voluntary disclosure 
basis.  The UK Combined Code (2009) adopted a policy of comply or explain. It is 
argued that this provides a picture of a country’s attitude towards corporate governance 
for investors.  The US by contrast adopted a legislative approach as opposed to the UK 
by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) as a result of the corporate failures in 
2002-2003.The name Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was derived from the bill sponsored 
by Senator Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
calls for all public companies to adhere to three fundamental requirements. These 
include: “criminal and civil penalties for non-compliance; certification of internal auditing 
by external auditors; and finally increased disclosure of financial statements” (Webb, 
2008, p.6). This Act was intended to protect investors through disclosure, 
accountability, and accuracy requirements. It was labelled the biggest overhaul of 
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securities laws since the 1930’s by the New York Times (2002). Valenti (2008, p.410) 
found that in the post-SOX era, corporations have been “more sensitive to the 
concerns of governance advocates and have taken measures to ensure proper and 
complete oversight of financial matters” as stated above. This would imply that 
executives have less flexibility (legislation as oppose to the notion of comply or explain) 
for non-compliance and risk facing severe penalties as a result. Valenti (2008) added 
that this ensures proper and complete oversight of financial matters through enhanced 
disclosure, accountability, and accuracy which enhances investor confidence and trust.  
This Act was in fact once regarded as a compliance burden for public companies. 
Today, both public and private companies are increasingly viewing it as corporate 
governance best practice, with a quantifiable return on investment (Goins et al. 2009). 
Dvorak (2008, p.1) found that despite the SOX (2002) “Ethnic and racial minorities 
remain underrepresented on US corporate boards, comprising roughly a tenth of the 
big-company directorships, versus a third of the population”. The percentage of board 
seats minorities hold has barely budged since 2000. Webb (2008) found that firms 
found to be in violation of the SOX are not systematically worse when it comes to 
common measures of corporate governance. The research concluded that the financial 
structure and soundness of the groups of firms were found to be very similar contrary 
to Valenti (2008). This is an interesting contradiction implying that non-compliance of 
SOX (2002) did not necessarily mean that the entity is worse off systematically in terms 
of corporate governance measures and has no impact on the financial structure and 
soundness contrary to Goins et al. (2009) and Valenti (2008) as discussed above. 
Govekar (2008, p.291), comparing the 1905 insurance scandal and the 2002-2003 
corporate failures found that “both came from a similar set of circumstances which 
began decades before the actual scandals” a view supported by an earlier research by 
Conrad (2003). Conrad (2003) suggested that different cultural and technological 
conditions can manifest themselves in three trends namely: free marketism; speedy 
new technologies; and epic Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO). These three trends are 
“clearly present in both the 2002-2003 corporate failures and the insurance industry 
100 years earlier” (Govekar, 2008, p.291). Hence, managers and scholars should take 
note of the three trends that foreshadow scandals and meltdowns to avoid future 
scandals, with their unavoidable legal backlash in the future (Govekar, 2008). Following 
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the various corporate failures in 2002-2003 the US enacted the SOX (2002) while the 
UK introduced the Combined Code (2003) to protect and safeguard the interest of 
various stakeholders.  Braendle and Noll (2004) argued that codes are aimed at 
improving efficiency which in turn positively correlates and increases a company’s 
performance. 
However, it is important to note that it’s extremely difficult to correlate corporate 
governance code against a company’s performance. Werder and Talaulicar (2003) 
argued that this is due to the fact that the impact of the code on company performance 
can hardly be isolated. Therefore, it is not possible to clearly prove the possible effects 
of acknowledged corporate governance principles on company performance. This 
contradicts Braendle and Noll (2004) as stated above. Although the UK adopts a 
voluntary code for listed companies, adherence is nearly mandatory due to listing 
requirements. Fama (1971) suggested that “companies would face a discount of their 
shares’ issuing price in case of arbitrary deviations”. Hulsse and Kerwer (2007) 
commenting on the demise of standards suggested that the voluntary rules are the 
characteristics of the new global governance. Hence, it is possible given their voluntary 
nature to avoid decision making deadlocks by structuring participation and decision 
making exclusively in a way that suit management and their expected outcome.  
Financial scandals have plagued the history of corporate governance, amongst which 
is the demise of the Maxwell Corporation in 1991 due to fraudulent transactions 
including illegal use of pension funds (Nwanji, 2006). Polly Peck also failed in 1990 due 
to inadequate internal control mechanisms including theft and false accounting 
(Financial scandals have plagued the history of corporate governance, amongst which 
is the demise of the Maxwell Corporation in 1991 due to fraudulent transactions 
including illegal use of pension funds (Nwanji, 2006). Finally, Barings Bank in 1995 also 
failed as a result of the actions of Nick Leeson and inadequate internal controls and 
supervision (Nwanji and Howell, 2004). Considering the losses incurred by companies 
and the public at large as a result of these scandals, governments were forced to act 
by passing legislation/codes aimed at restoring confidence and curbing corporate 
power through enhanced regulation. This is aimed at ensuring accountability and 
transparency in markets the world over. Berle and Means (1932) commenting on the 
significance of corporate power argued that modern corporations can equally compete 
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with the modern state both politically and economically. While the states seek to 
regulate corporate activities, corporations on the other hand make every effort to avoid 
such regulation. 
A review of the argument above by Berle and Means (1932) seems to suggest the 
need for more stringent rules and regulations. These will therefore facilitate and allow 
the state to combat and control corporate power to ensure and preserve the integrity 
and reputation of the efficiency of the capital markets. This is because corporations 
have proven to be a superior means of attracting capital, organising labour, stimulating 
ideas, and providing efficient systems of production and distribution. Hence, sustaining 
confidence and trust in the performance of that corporate system is a matter of 
enormous public concern (The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and 
Private Enterprise, 2014). 
Furthermore, Turner (2006) argued that the American financial market’s capacity to 
raise capital is dependent on investor confidence and market transparency. These 
clearly highlight the need for more effective governance of corporations giving the 
history of financial scandals normally caused by inadequate regulation and ineffective 
corporate governance systems and procedures. On the contrary, Cadbury (1992, para 
7.2) argued that no system of corporate governance can provide total proof against 
fraud or incompetence. However, Hulsse and Kerwer (2007) commenting on the 
demise of standards with particular reference on the voluntary standards of global 
governance, suggested that standards seem to follow a life cycle starting with highly 
effective rules based on expertise, then become legitimate and eventually the standard 
quality goes down and the effectiveness decreases. Given that state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) dominate African markets, “the solution might lie in corporate governance 
reform within SOEs so that a precedent can be created of state run enterprises in 
which good corporate governance is being practiced” (Rossouw, 2005, p.96). 
2.4  CSR, Corporate Governance and Ethics 
There appears to be a general consensus that good governance leads to CSR and 
ethics. However, central to good governance is accountability and a strong legal 
framework as well as understanding the relationships between the various players 
(Fyfe, 2003). There is uncertainty as to how CSR should be defined in the academic 
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world as well as the corporate world. Jackson and Hawker (2001) argued that they 
have looked for a CSR definition but failed to come across one. This according to 
Dahlsrud (2006) is because any attempt to develop an unbiased definition is 
challenging because there is no standard methodology to verify whether it is unbiased 
or not. This would imply that even if there is one agreed definition, it will still require 
CSR practitioners to apply it for the confusion to be eradicated.  
The Business for Social Responsibility (2003) defined CSR as ‘achieving commercial 
success in ways that honour ethical values (integrity, honesty, responsibility, caring and 
self-discipline)  and respect people, communities and the natural environment’. Whilst 
the Commission of the European Communities (2003) defined CSR as the ‘concept 
that an enterprise is accountable for its impact on all relevant stakeholders. It is the 
continuing commitment by a business to behave fairly and responsibly while 
contributing to economic development improving the life of the work force and their 
families as well as the local community and society at large’. Finally McWilliams and 
Siegel (2001, p.118) defined CSR as “actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the firm and which is required by law”.  
An evaluation of the literature above on the various definitions of CSR leads one to 
conclude that CSR is ultimately concerned with learning the effects of corporate 
organisations on society, their social responsibility obligations within society as a result 
and ultimately allowing corporations to be accountable for these responsibilities 
(Grewal and Darlow, 2007).This is due to inadequate legislation governing the activities 
of corporations because both the law makers and the markets lack detailed knowledge 
of corporate activities (Stone, 1975). Others argue that CSR represents significant 
challenges in both cost and time in carrying out the process. Thereby making the whole 
process of product development more complicated and undermine the ability of smaller 
companies’ to comply with CSR activities (Grewal and Darlow, 2007).    
CSR, good corporate governance and ethics also feature heavily in corporate 
governance literature. Ethics can be defined as a system of moral principles governing 
the appropriate conduct for a person or a group. The issue of ethics are aimed at 
maintaining moral standards and hence, minimise the need for stringent regulation. 
Ethical values in the management of corporations will eventually form the basis of good 
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governance and ultimately enhance CSR (Oquist, 1999). Oquist (1999, p.125) argued 
that “ethics and integrity must be widespread among the citizenry and especially strong 
in public and private leadership positions for good governance to prevail”. Spiller (2002, 
p.150) argued that “numerous investors are especially interested in business ethics as 
a consequence of its positive effects on financial performance”. Conversely, Mittal et al, 
(2008, p.1437) argued that “there is little evidence that companies with a code of ethics 
would generate significantly more economic value added (EVA) and market added 
value (MVA) than those without codes”. This is because the social responsibility 
information (SRI) is not quantified financially and is not focused on product 
improvement or fair business practices (Teoh and Shiu, 1990). 
Dominguez et al. (2009, p.198) argued that corporations are “required to implement 
ethical codes in order to recover investors’ trust reduced as a consequence of the 
recent financial turbulence”. It is argued that a greater number of female directors do 
not necessarily lead to more ethical companies contrary to several past studies 
(Dominguez et al, 2009) to the economic success of corporations and their long term 
sustainability (Armstrong, 2003). Enhanced transparency and market discipline can 
also enhance good corporate governance and further drive the quest for good 
governance in Africa (Armstrong, 2003). Rossouw (2005, p.95) however suggested 
that “good corporate governance can enhance corporate responsibility and improve the 
reputation of companies, which in turn can attract local and foreign investors”. It is also 
seen as a deterrent to corruption and unethical business practices that damage Africa’s 
business image (Rossouw, 2005). Thus, over the past decade, a growing number of 
companies have recognised the business benefits of CSR policies and practices 
(Mittal, Sinha and Singh, 2008). Proponents of CSR claims that CSR leads to improved 
financial performance, enhanced brand image and reputation, increased sales and 
customer loyalty, increased productivity and quality, among other benefits (Rossouw, 
2005; Mittal et al 2008). Companies are also encouraged to expand CSR efforts due to 
pressures from customers, suppliers, employees, communities, activist organisations 
and other stakeholders (Mittal et al 2008). Partners in Change (2000) found that 85 
percent of the companies surveyed mentioned that business has a role to play in social 
development with emphasis on community development.  
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Academic literature has highlighted that corporate governance and CSR are strongly 
and intricately connected (Jones and Thomas, 1995; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Knox and Maklan, 2004; Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005; Van den Berghe and Louche, 
2005; Aguilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp, 2006; Mitchell, 2007; Aras and Crowther, 
2008; Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath, 2008; Huang, 2010; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; 
Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Jamali and Neville, 2011; Low and Ang, 2013; Rahim 
and Alam, 2013; Young and Thyil, 2013). The convergence of CSR and corporate 
governance “has changed the corporate accountability mechanism. This had 
developed a socially responsible corporate self-regulation, a synthesis of governance 
and responsibility in companies of strong economies” (Rahim and Alam, 2013, p.607). 
Sacconi (2010, p.5) concurred and views CSR as “extended corporate governance 
wherein CSR extends the concept of fiduciary duty from mono-stakeholder setting to a 
multi-stakeholder one in which the firm owes all its stakeholders fiduciary duties”. This 
view is supported by Jensen (2002) and Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi 
(2007). Bagic, Skrabalo and Narancic (2004) opine that several events have been 
important drivers of this intersection for example, global civil societies urge to include 
the excluded social costs of production, hidden environmental cost and lack of 
confidence in the institutions of the market economy. Furthermore, Jamali et.al. (2008) 
found three bases for this relationship namely; (1) corporate governance as a pillar for 
CSR; (2) CSR as an attribute of CG and (3) corporate governance and CSR as 
coexisting components of the same continuum.  
Both CSR and corporate governance have to do with the direction of companies and 
with the translation of that into corporate strategy (Van den Berghe and Louche, 2005; 
Jamali and Mirshak; 2007; Young and Thyil, 2013). Furthermore, corporate governance 
and CSR are two concepts that draw vigour from the same sources: transparency, 
accountability, honesty and trustworthy (Dunlop, 1998; Lerach, 2002; Seligman, 2002; 
Van den Berghe and Louche, 2005; Robertson, 2009; Rahim and Alam, 2013). Van 
den Berghe and Louche, (2005. p. 427) also suggested that:  
given the increased expectations towards business in society and taking into 
consideration the increasing mistrust caused by corporate failures, corporations 
need to move towards responsible corporate governance that can balance the 
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legitimate interests of all stakeholders involved and emphasises ethics and 
sustainable growth. 
It is clear that good governance requires responsibility with regard to the wishes of all 
stakeholders (Kendall, 1999). Thus, companies with good corporate governance 
usually consider the maintenance of stakeholders, customers and society’s trust to be 
of vital importance in ensuring mutual sustained development (Huang, 2010). As a 
result, corporate responsibility reporting is now a mainstream expectation of companies 
with more than 80% of the world’s 250 largest companies now report on corporate 
responsibility (KPMG, 2008).  
Teoh and Shiu (1990) argued to the contrary that the SRI in annual reports has no 
significant impact on institutional investors’ decisions. This is because the SRI is not 
quantified, not in financial form, and is not focused on product improvement and fair 
business practices (Teoh and Shiu,1990) ). Others argued that the relationship 
between corporate governance and CSR is still far from clear (Harjoto and Jo, 2011). It 
is likely, therefore, that “the businesses that are inclined to engage in CSR initiatives 
tend to be those that are already financially successful and can afford the added CSR 
overhead” (Mittal et.al. 2008, p.1442). Rahim and Alam (2013, p.607) added that:  
the convergence of CSR and corporate governance has not been visible in the 
companies of weak economies, where civil society groups are unorganised, 
regulatory agencies are either ineffective or corrupt and the media and non-
governmental organisations do not mirror the corporate conscience. 
Furthermore, most previous empirical studies control for neither endogeneity nor 
causality, and thus empirical research on the relationship between corporate 
governance and CSR is typically silent about the direction of causation (Jo and Harjoto, 
2011). 
As a result of the recent corporate crisis, several codes have focused on the role 
played by directors on planning and monitoring of corporate codes of ethics 
(Dominguez et al, 2009). US President, George Bush commenting on corporate crisis 
in 2002 suggested that we need men and women of character who know the difference 
between ambition and destructive greed, between justified risks and irresponsibility, 
between enterprise and fraud. Those who sit on corporate boards have responsibilities 
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(Financial Times, 2009). Furthermore, Fukuyama (1995) argued that prosperous 
countries tend to be those where business relations between people can be conducted 
informally and flexibly on the basis of trust. The term trust in this context implies a firm 
belief in someone or something. Risk is not only inherent in monetary investment, but 
also the investment in social relations (Giddens, 1991).  
The vulnerability of the UK economy it is argued could be attributed to targeting high 
profits and short term horizons a characteristic of UK financial institutions (Hutton, 
1995); which he argued originates in the financial system. The power of corporate 
bodies seems to be dominating society and setting the agenda for society’s values 
(McCann et al, 2003). Hence, governments have been drawing up plans aimed at 
enhancing governance of corporations ensuring control, accountability, transparency, 
broader ethical considerations, and adequate disclosure of financial information. This is 
aimed at restoring confidence in the various markets.  
Jennings (2006) suggested that investors should look out for the seven signs of ethical 
collapse namely: pressure to meet numbers, fear and silence, sycophantic executives 
and an iconic CEO, a weak board, conflicts of interest, over-confidence and social 
responsibility is the only measure of goodness. However, there is a general consensus 
that central to good governance is accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust 
(Crossan, 2009; Rahim and Alam, 2013). That being said, other partnerships require 
not only good governance up front but a strong legal framework as well (Fyfe, 2003). 
An evaluation of CSR, corporate governance and ethical literature above suggests that 
corporate governance has embraced CSR principles and ethics at the core of their 
strategies (Rahim and Alam, 2013). Corporate governance insists that corporate 
management finds ways to relate various stakeholders of the business to reach the 
economically optimal levels of investment in a firm-specific human and physical capital 
(OECD, 2004).  
2.5  Accountability, Responsibility, Transparency and Trust  
An evaluation of the literature on governance, regulation, CSR and ethics seems to 
suggest the need for accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust if the 
financial markets are to regain public trust and investor confidence (Labelle, 2009). 
Roberts and Scapens (1985, p.447) defined accountability as “giving and demanding of 
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reasons for conduct”. Wolfensohn (1999) added that corporate governance is all about 
promoting corporate fairness, transparency and accountability, whilst Kaur and Mishra 
(2010) suggested that corporate governance recently gained momentum the world over 
due to corporate failures, unethical business practices, insufficient disclosure and 
transparency.  Others argue that adherence to the above notions (accountability, 
responsibility, transparency and trust) will significantly reduce the probability of adverse 
media coverage, damaging litigation or unfavourable regulatory changes which could 
undermine shareholder value (Holland, 2002). Waddock and Bodwell (2007, p.20) 
defined responsibility as “a process or a system involving development of vision, 
explicit articulation of values, implementation into strategies and management systems 
and continual improvements”. It is important to note that areas of responsibility are not 
only limited from the organisational and legal points of view, but also from the ethical 
point of view (Enderle, 1987).  
Transparency and Accountability Initiative (2014, p.1) defined transparency as “a 
characteristic of governments, companies, organisations and individuals that are open 
in the clear disclosure of information, rules, plans, processes and actions”.  Griffin 
(2010) added that transparency is an important prerequisite for accountability because 
it enables evaluation after the event, whereas, accountability enables appraisal before 
or during decisions. Accountability is not only restricted to corporations but applies to 
all decision making institutions, including governments, private sector and civil society 
organisations. Therefore, these organisations must be answerable to a public who may 
not be present during decision making (Griffin, 2010).  
Yandle (2010) argued that the 2008 financial crisis was a result of sudden breakdown 
of assurance mechanisms – the generators of trust (independently determined credit 
rating, international accounting standards and credit default swaps) - rather than 
actions taken or not by misguided central bankers. While Barker (2009) suggested that 
the fundamental threat facing the banking industry despite the losses, power struggle 
and increased regulation is the destruction of trust. Yandle (2010, p.343) suggested 
that “trust is the most fragile human sentiment (rooted in individuals) and practically all 
markets transactions depend on some degree of trust”. Yandle also argued that without 
trust transacting parties cannot afford enough police and regulators to induce honest 
behaviour among ordinary people.  
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Fakuyama (1995) defined trust as a mechanism or social norm that facilitates 
economic growth to occur beyond the limits of small groups. Yandle (2010) also 
suggested that the financial crisis will lead to permanent expansion of regulations, 
thereby, replacing market driven trust devices. Forster and Nilakant (2005) commenting 
on the role of trust in privatisation focusing on the transformation of the electricity utility 
in The Gambia. They concluded that “organisational factors such as trust generation 
may be as critical as economic factors in ensuring the success of deregulation and 
privatisation in less developed countries” (Forster and Nilakant, 2005, p.348).  
Trust it is argued involves an assumption or expectation that vulnerability will not be 
taken advantage of by the other (Forster and Nilakant, 2005). However, in April 2010 
two Northern Rock executives were fined and banned over false mortgage data. The 
case was part of FSAs (Financial Services Authority) effort to facilitate ‘credible 
deterrence’ by holding individuals and institutions accountable for their actions (Yandle, 
2010). It is clear from the above literature that with trust comes responsibility. It is 
therefore suggested that failure to fulfil the responsibility incumbent on executives as a 
result of the trust should be held accountable for their action, thereby promoting the 
ethos of transparency. Gordon Brown commenting in the Financial Times (2009, p.5) 
suggested that “combined failure of corporate governance, of responsibility, and 
accountability by banks and bankers, of credit rating agencies and domestic and 
international regulatory authorities were the reasons for the recent financial crisis”. 
Furthermore, he suggested that any solution must incorporate the principles of 
transparency, sound banking, responsibility, integrity, global standards and 
supervision.   
2.6  Ethical Theories and Financial Institutions 
Most developing countries have no effective governance system, based on law and 
regulations, the minimal financial sector organisation mechanisms available are riddled 
with corruption, mismanagement, and ineffective provisions of services/delivery to the 
public (World Bank, 1997). The individual is left to care for himself and his family with 
no government support of any type. The issue of corruption and mismanagement of 
financial sector financial systems could be viewed from ethical theory as well as 
regulatory theory. Ethics will address the issues relating to moral value from a Kantian 
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Ethical perspective. The focus of management of financial sector organisations is the 
provision of services to the society as stakeholders therefore; stakeholder theory has 
ethical issues, which require relevant ethical theory. Artigas (2006) suggested that 
philosophical ontologism based on the concept of good as oppose to evil help us define 
the banking business from the point of view of ethics. Davies (2001) added that the 
internal audit of the bank’s operations should conform to the operating principles and 
business ethics code pertaining to internal auditors. 
Codes of ethics are now prevalent in large corporations around the world (Schwartz, 
2002). The prevalence of codes should continue to increase as governments, industry 
associations, and special interest groups increasingly call for the establishment of 
corporate codes of ethics (Schwartz, 2002). There are currently thirteen 13 banks in 
The Gambia comprising of 12 commercial banks and one Islamic bank. The Gambia 
has a distinct historical legacy. The small river state with a population of 1.8m is a 
developing country that is 90 per cent Moslem in religion, a former British Colony, with 
the legacy of colonial legislation and institutions (World Bank, 2014).  The Gambia 
operates a dualistic model of banking (CGB, 2014). It consists of conventional and 
Islamic banking set up partly due to the British colonial legacy (World Bank, 1997). 
Both systems run parallel to each other with an established legacy as well as 
respective market segment partly due to cultural diversify and ties with Islamic and 
Western world (World Bank, 1997).  
Currently, there is no specific ethical code of conduct in The Gambian banking system 
from a regulatory point of view (CGB, 2014). As a result, some banks in The Gambia 
have developed their own ethical banking code as part of their internal governance 
mechanisms. The Arab Gambia Islamic Bank (only Islamic bank) for example follows 
the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Finance Institutions (AAOIFI) 
ethical framework (CGB, 2014). AAOIFI was established to provide industry-wide 
standards for accounting, auditing, governance and ethics for central banks, Islamic 
financial institutions and others from the international Islamic banking and finance 
industry (Mathenge, 2013). All Islamic banks are encouraged to adopt the AAOIFI 
ethical framework but it is not mandatory (Mathenge, 2013).   
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Given that the economy cannot successfully function in the absence of ethics and 
morals, the necessity of introducing ethical code is frequently advocated (Hazard and 
Geoffrey, 1995). Thus, the application of the code of ethical principles would establish 
a defensive mechanism in the area of ethical values because the codes requires more 
stringent moral standards and involves sanctions for the breach of the principle 
(Mathenge, 2013). However, given The Gambia’s dualistic banking model due to the 
British colonial legacy, cultural diversity and ties with Islamic and Western world (World 
Bank, 1997). Any propose code of conduct for The Gambia will therefore need to 
recognise the different ethical practices amongst banks and how the codes will 
influence behaviour. Muhammad and Jolis (2001) suggested 13 basic ethical principles 
in banking. Schwartz (1998) came up with six proposed set of universal moral 
standards which takes into account global codes of ethics and the Interfaith 
Declaration. An evaluation of the basic ethical principles in banking and the universal 
moral standards suggests that there are commonalties between the two (Schwartz, 
2002). The commonalities between the two standards are as follows: 
 Trustworthiness (including notions of honesty, integrity, reliability, and loyalty);  
 Respect (including notions of respect for human rights); 
 Responsibility (including notions of accountability) 
 Fairness (including notions of process, impartiality and equity) 
 Caring (including the notion of avoiding unnecessary harm) and 
 Citizenship (Including notions of obeying laws and protecting the environment).  
The six standards, based on their universal nature and fundamental importance, would 
necessarily be required to take priority over other values (Schwartz, 2002). Thus, an 
argument can be raised that these standards are universal in nature, “in that they can 
be considered of fundamental importance regardless of time, circumstance, cultural 
beliefs, or religious convictions” (Schwartz, 2002, p.30). In this respect, these core 
moral standards are suggested as forming a normative basis by which to construct a 
code of ethics for corporate codes of ethics (Schwartz, 1998; 2002). This researcher is 
proposing that The Gambia banking system should adopt this universal code of ethics 
as part of the regulatory framework. Table 2.1 focus on proposed ethical values,  
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Table 2.1: Proposed ethical values, principles and expected behaviour 
Values Principles Examples of how this will influence 
behaviour in The Gambian banking 
system 
Honesty Be honest to stakeholders Avoid misleading advertising and 
falsifying statements 
Integrity Stick to values despite 
financial loss 
Avoid bribery even if contract lost 
Reliability Fulfil commitments  Fulfil all contractual obligations 
Loyalty Avoid conflicts of interest Don’t accept gifts  
Respect Respect the rights of others Do not engage in sexual and religious 
harassment  
Responsibility  Take responsibility for 
actions  
When misconduct takes place, take steps 
to ensure it is not repeated  
Fairness  Treat stakeholders fairly  Avoid anti-competitive activities  
Caring  Avoid unnecessary harm 
  
 Employee community involvement 
Citizenship  Obey the law and protect 
the environment 
 
  
Follow the law of the country  
 
Source (Adapted): Schwartz (2002, p. 32) 
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principles and how this will influence changes in behaviour within The Gambian 
banking system. The proposed universal code of ethics for The Gambia would 
recognise the different ethical practices, cultural beliefs and religious convictions 
amongst banks (Schwartz, 1998; 2002).  
The application of Immanuel Kant’s theoretical framework, which he called CI, is also 
explored to deal with the issues of financial sector stakeholders (Nwanji, 2006). A 
normative claim  is the idea that stakeholders have intrinsic moral rights in relation to 
the management of corporations, particularly financial sector organisations are 
primarily derived from non-consequentialist or deontological ethical theory. The 
arguments in support of the stakeholder concept are rooted in the theories of Kantian 
duties and rights. The idea that a person, by virtue of being a person, possesses 
intrinsic moral rights can be traced to Kant’s theory.Brady (1999) suggested that during 
the past 100 years the dominant philosophical opinion is divided into two distinct 
categories namely teleology and deontology. Understanding the two distinct categories 
above requires one to have a basic understanding of the word ethics. Aronson (2001, 
p. 248) defined ethics “as the study of standards for determining what behaviour is 
good and bad or right or wrong”. It is suggested that ethics in one form or another, is 
grafted onto the corporate body as a preventative or remedial measure to help combat 
corruption, promote obedience to laws and procedures, and increase trust between 
citizens and institutions (Garofalo, 2003).There are different types of ethical theories 
that exist primarily because various philosophers adopted different perspectives 
regarding the benchmark upon which ethical judgements should be based (Aronson, 
2001).  
The focus of this study however, will be centred around the notion of teleology and 
deontology with emphasis on consequentialism. Deontology can be defined as the 
study/theory of moral obligation. In other to understand Kant’s deontology one needs to 
understand his notion of “goodwill”. It means acting out of respect for the moral law, i.e. 
for the sake of duty (Kant, 1964). Macdonald and Beck-Dudley (1994, p. 615) 
suggested that “deontological approaches to ethics attempt to establish the content of 
duty without considering the consequences of particular ways of acting”. Teleological 
approach, by contrast is centred firstly, around the need to identify the sort of goods 
human actions ought to protect and realised, before evaluating actions as right or 
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wrong according to their effects/consequences (Macdonald and Beck-Dudley, 1994). 
Helms and Hutchins (1992) insisted that the moral value of a particular behaviour 
should be separated with the outcome because the certainty of the outcome is 
questionable at the time of the decision to act.  
It is important to appreciate the contribution of Kant’s insistence on absolute demands 
of duty. Indeed one of the deep seated moral convictions is that there are ways of 
treating people that can never be allowed regardless of the circumstances. Criminal 
law it is argued is centred around absolutist to a degree in that murder is always and 
everywhere forbidden for instances (Macdonald and Beck-Dudley, 1994). Garofalo and 
Geuras, (1999) addressed several technical matters in relation to Kant’s CI. Garofalo 
(2003) later sets out three formulations namely: firstly, do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you. Secondly, treat human beings as ends in themselves and 
never as means only. Finally, to paraphrase, each rational and autonomous being must 
be considered a legislator in a kingdom of ends.  
Commenting on the Kant’s CI, Wicks (1998) argued that it forms the basis for 
developing a moral theory which applies to all rational beings. Furthermore, the norms 
created by this notion are both universal in scope and necessarily binding. 
Furthermore, Kant claims that we need to work for a pure notion of ethics and that the 
fundamental moral duty of all rational beings is to act in accordance with norms that are 
generated by, and consistent with the CI (Wicks, 1998). Grisez (1983) objected to 
Kant’s moral philosophy arguing that it is entirely too permissive, allowing morally 
horrendous maxims to pass muster. Furthermore, critics argue that it commands us to 
do as we should be done by but failed to answer/address the question of how we 
should be done by.  
Rallapalli et al (1998) suggested that there are two main categories of deontological 
theories namely the rule and act deontology. The rule deontology it is argued should 
follow a specific predetermined standards/rules. Hence, one’s behaviour is either 
ethical or unethical not as a consequence of the one’s action but in comparison to the 
standards initially set out. Act deontology argues that human beings act ethically 
according to their norms, but limited to a specific behaviours which suggests that there 
are exemptions to the rule (Rallapalli et al, 1998). Aronson (2001) argued that people 
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are required to behave towards others in a particular manner because they are human. 
It is therefore, incumbent for one to consider their rights and dignity regardless of the 
consequences. Hence, the concern is the morality inherent in the action itself (White, 
1998). Philosophers disagree about precisely what teleology affirms (Gaus, 2001).  
Teleological approaches to ethics tend to morally evaluate actions by evaluating their 
consequences (Garofalo, 2003). Hence, right actions being right because they tend to 
have good consequences and vice versa (Macdonald and Beck-Dudley, 1994). Thus, 
from a teleological perspective, evaluations of consequences as good or bad provide 
the premises for inferring the norms of right acting. Gaus (2001) suggested that a 
theory is teleological if it justifies the right, moral duty, or obligation, on grounds that it 
promotes what is good. Thus, an act is defined as moral if it is deemed to produce a 
greater degree of good or evil than any other alternative, and is immoral if it failed to do 
so (Aronson, 2001). Another view addressing this point is the argument by Helms and 
Hutchins (1992) who perceives teleological perspectives to ethics as emphasising the 
outcome/consequence, as oppose to the initial intent of the individual behaviour. 
Ethical research theories seem to suggest that there are many more classifications of 
teleological theories in the literature.  
This research however, will only focus on the three main categories namely ethical 
egoism, act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Ethical egoism considers an act moral 
or immoral purely on the basis of achieving its objectives. It is important to note that 
ethical egoism may consider the interest of others but not as the main goal. It considers 
others as medium through which the ethical egoist’s welfare could be maximised 
(Shaw and Post, 1993). An act is therefore deemed ethical only if the results of the act 
are more advantageous than those of any other alternative behaviour (Hunt and Vitell, 
1986). Quinton (1989) viewed utilitarianism as two principles namely: the 
consequentialist principle and hedonist principle. Consequentialist principle tends to 
classify an act as right or wrong purely as to whether the consequences are good or 
bad. The hedonist approach seems to suggest that only pleasure is basically good and 
only pain is basically bad. Frankena (1973) looking at the ethical view of hedonist 
suggested that what is right or wrong is basically determined to create the greatest 
overall weighing of good over evil.   
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Regan (1980) considers act utilitarianism to be an evaluation of behaviour in relation to 
its potential to produce the greatest amount of good for the largest number of people. 
One can therefore conclude that the act utilitarianism seem to advocate the principle of 
utility. That is by attempting to evaluate which option is expected to result in the highest 
level of good as opposed to the evil in the universe (Frankena, 1973). Act utilitarianism 
is therefore considered as independent of any rules. However, rules may serve as a 
guide in act utilitarianism but not necessarily form part of the ethical decision. Rule 
utilitarianism according to Rallapalli et al (1998) assume that individuals conform to 
rules and act in ways that gives the highest degree of good for the largest number of 
people. In this case, it is desirable to depend on a set of rules for a swift action 
(Quinton, 1989). These rules it is noted must be chosen, upheld and modified/replaced 
as required on the sole basis of their utility. The maxim of utility remains the only 
criterion and applies in terms of rules instead of specific evaluations (Aronson, 2001).   
Ethics of virtues (and vices) tend to elaborate on the process of personal moral 
character development. Garofalo (2003) suggested that the morality of an act is 
determined by the character traits that it demonstrates. Thus the object of moral 
evaluation is not the act itself but the character of the actor. Thomas (2001, p.101) 
commenting on the ethic of virtues “proposes that managers add an attention to the 
virtues and the vices of human character as a full complement to moral reasoning 
according to a deontological focus on obligations to act and a teleological focus on 
consequences (a balance tripartite approach)” a point also echoed by Whetstone 
(2001). The author argued that an interactive tripartite approach is a more effective 
system aimed at meeting the complicated requirements of an applied ethic, a point also 
echoed by Garofalo (2003).  
Conversely, Donaldson and Werhane (1999) argued that some philosophers were 
indeed less eager to accept the human nature method mainly because they believed 
that consequentialism and deontology exhaust all possible modes of ethical reasoning. 
It is important to note that these three ethics perspectives have distinct differences in 
terms of primary focus and in relation to what constitutes a right action. In terms of 
primary focus consequentialist teleology tend to focus on consequences; cost versus 
benefits – of the act. While deontology focuses on duties: moral obligations – re the 
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act. In other words, it does not look beyond the act itself in assessing its moral worth 
(Brady, 1999). 
Lastly, virtue ethics focus on character development – for the person. In relation to 
what constitutes a right of action consequentialist teleology promotes the best 
consequences in which happiness is maximised (Donaldson and Werhane, 1999). 
Deontology advocates for the right action to be in accordance with the moral principle 
required by God, natural law or rationality. A right action in relation to virtue however, is 
one that a virtuous agent is disposed to make in the circumstances in order to flourish 
or live well (Thomas, 2001). To fully understand what constitutes a virtuous act Aristotle 
(1976) set out three conditions. The first condition is that the act must fit its appropriate 
purpose. Secondly, the act must be virtuous and finally, the act must result in a steady 
state of character disposition not a one off or impulsive act. Thomas (2001, p.104) 
summarised a virtuous act as “a rational act based on a wise, purposeful assessment 
of the factual situation, chosen for a pure motive and consistent with a steady 
disposition of the actors’ character”. Critics of the virtue ethic points out its cultural 
relativism in that different people and cultures can consider different character traits as 
virtues (Hursthouse, 1997; Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; Velazquez, 2000). On a final 
note, one can argue that ethical problems are thus resolved most effectively by 
employing the teleological, deontological and virtues points of view simultaneously. 
Woller (1998) suggested that people are neither entirely deontological nor entirely 
teleological in their moral points of view, because human behaviour is motivated by 
principles of right and wrong and the concern for consequences (See appendix I – the 
Four Major Approaches to Ethics).  
Commenting on financial institutions from a stakeholder point of view Brady (1999, 
p.318) argued that neither profit, nor stock price, nor size, nor power can “alone serve 
as the criterion for an organisation well run”. Furthermore, he added that “where 
organisations come to gain public respect and community approval, they have 
accomplished far more than a return on their investment” (Brady, 1999, p318). 
Friedman (1962, p.133) suggested that “there is one and only one social responsibility 
of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition, without deception or fraud”. The dominant egoism paradigm 
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(Adam Smith) argued that the purpose of organisations is to maximise shareholder 
value (Crocker, 2005). Further coverage on shareholder and stakeholder theories as 
well as commentary on the key issue of accountability, responsibility, transparency and 
trust can be found later in the literature review. 
2.7  Corporate Governance Theories 
At this juncture it is important to point out the distinction between a theory, model and 
paradigm. There are no universally agreed definition for these three terms amongst 
lawyers and corporate governance academics. According to Ziolkowski (2005, p.138) a 
model is an:  
 abstract representation of an event, object, or a set of facts. It does no more than 
formalise the facts and their relations in accordance with some (generally 
noncontroversial) schema; this can be achieved at different levels of abstraction. 
Whereas a model can appeal to a theoretical perspective or position for 
justification, this is not possible for a theory.  
Models are logical representation of features in a system.  Thus models explain 
features of importance in a simplified depiction of a system and are able to illustrate 
how interactions between elements or part of a system may take place to produce a 
particular outcome (Ziolkowski, 2005). A theory lays out the foundation for what there is 
in a particular academic domain, its development and how it is to be studied and 
explained. Moreover, a model can appeal to a theoretical perspective or position for 
justification. This is not possible for a theory, which is itself the very core of the relevant 
perspective and position (Ziolkowski, 2005). 
There are many theories influencing corporate governance for example resource 
dependency theory, managerial and class hegemony, psychological and organisational 
perspectives and system theory (Nwanji and Howell, 2007). Clark (2004) detailed the 
various theories that played a critical role in the development of corporate governance. 
However, the main theories influencing the development of corporate governance can 
be classified into four, namely; agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory 
and transaction cost economies theory (Sun et al. 2001 and Sun 2002). For the 
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purpose of this thesis, theories highlighted here are in relation to public corporations 
and should be viewed in that light. 
It is generally accepted that there are many disciplines that influenced the development 
of corporate governance and the theories that have fed into it are quite diverse (Mallin, 
2007). It is also important to note that the evolution of corporate governance should be 
viewed simultaneously with the legal system, capital markets and ownership structures 
that exist in that particular country. Common law countries like the UK and US tend to 
provide better protection for shareholder rights. Civil law countries such as France tend 
to have less effective legal protection for shareholders with an inclination towards an 
enhanced right towards stakeholders. Ross and Crossan (2012, p.215) commenting on 
the banking crises in the UK and Germany concluded that: 
 while corporate governance in banks would appear to have been a significant 
factor in the recent banking crisis, based on the performance data, it cannot be 
said that a corporate governance approach based on either shareholder 
capitalism (UK) or stakeholder capitalism (Germany) is more at fault than the 
other. 
This is a clear illustration that both the UK and German corporate governance 
structures were not adequate to prevent the banking crisis. A view shared by the 
Walkers Report in 2009. “The findings also suggest that the stakeholder/shareholder 
debate may not be as important as previously claimed and that regulators need to find 
good governance rules, regardless of theoretical underpinnings” (Ross and Crossan, 
2012, p.215).  
2.8  Evaluation of Agency and Shareholder Theory 
The agency theory identifies the relationship that exists between the principal (owner of 
wealth) and the delegation of work to the agent (management). Roe (1994) suggested 
that corporate governance fundamentally deals with agency problems caused by the 
separation of ownership from management. In a corporation the owners of the wealth 
are considered the principal and the directors as agents. The principal dilemma with 
this relationship is the overriding challenge by the principals to ensure that the agents 
act in their best interest. A problem that can exist in private companies, joint ventures, 
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not-for-profit organisations, professional institutions and governmental departments 
(Tricker, 2009). Another problem faced by agents is how to balance the different 
interest that exists between long term shareholders and short term activist institutions. 
Crossan (2010) added that most firms in the UK (and around the world) are small firms, 
over 99.9% of all firms in the UK are classified as SMEs and thus, the idea of 
separation of ownership from control is not a relevant issue.  
Main et al (2008) argued that agency theory predicts that an optimal contract will tie the 
agent’s expected utility to the principal’s wealth. Hence, the agency theory predicts that 
CEO compensation policies will depend on the changes in shareholder wealth. Tricker 
(2009) argued that the arrival of joint stock, limited liability Companies in the mid-19th 
century significantly increased the number of principals and their agents. This it argued, 
drastically changed the nature of the relationship both in terms of power and group 
dynamics. This eventually meant that the shareholders are no longer homogeneous 
(Berle and Means, 1932).  They argued that the separation between the shareholders 
and directors increased which eventually led to a power shift to the directors’ power 
that is often abused by maximising their own self-interest at the peril of shareholders. 
This ultimately led to change in relation and group dynamics. It is therefore argued that 
the agency theory focuses on the corporate governance practices and behaviour as a 
result of the divorce of ownership from management.  
As stewards of other peoples wealth there should be an existence of trust for the 
relationship to work. With the existence of asymmetrical access regarding the status 
quo it is understandable that shareholders feel “isolated” to some extent. Significant to 
the development of this theory refer to the work of Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen 1983. Blair (1996) argued that managers must be monitored and adequate 
checks and balances must be in place to avoid abuse of their power. The cost of 
monitoring and disciplining aimed at preventing abuse is referred to as the agency cost. 
McKnight and Weir (2008) found that the changes in board structures that have 
occurred in the post-Cadbury period have not, generally affected the agency costs. 
This conclusion implies that a range of mechanisms is consistent with firm value 
maximisation. Furthermore, they found that having a nomination committee did 
increase agency cost. This therefore suggests that there is cost associated with certain 
governance structures (McKnight and Weir, 2008). 
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Every theory has its own flaws and the agency theory is no exception to this. The 
agency theory is criticised as relatively narrow in theoretical terms because corporate 
governance complexities in relation to contracts between shareholders and agents is 
indeed naïve and too simplistic in reality. This is because board behaviour is influenced 
by the group dynamics, interpersonal behaviour, relationships and political intrigue and 
not down to simple contracts. It is argued that statistical methods cannot explain 
boardroom reality (Demb, 1993). Furthermore, researchers also argued that the theory 
is based on unsubstantiated moral standards that individuals maximise their personal 
utility (Demb, 1993). It is important to note that while analysis made on this theory 
helps to enlighten our understanding of the nature and problems that may arise as a 
result of separation of ownership and control. Just like any other theory it is by no 
means perfect and flawless. 
The shareholder theory argues that corporations have a limited scope of 
responsibilities (Friedman, 1970). These primary responsibilities include obeying the 
law and maximising shareholder interest. Berle and Means (1932) and Friedman 
(1962) defines the primary objective of a firm as the maximisation of shareholder 
wealth. This particular theory is fundamental in the development of corporate financial 
theory and enjoys widespread support in the academic finance community (Danielson 
et al. 2008). Reed (2002) argued that the justification of the model is based upon two 
foundations. These foundations he argued include the libertarian base approach which 
is underpinned by strong property rights claims. Secondly, he argued that the 
shareholder model might be rooted in utilitarian analysis which argues that by 
concentrating shareholder interests, corporations will maximise societal utility. This 
theory is more compatible to the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
However, the logic goes back to Smith, but elaborated in detail in neo-classical 
economics (ibid). Furthermore, Crossan (2009, p. 328) argued that: 
shareholder theories of corporate governance (Jensen and Mecking, 1976; 
Charkham, 1994; Sykes, 1994; Hutton, 1995; Kay and Silberston, 1995) suggest 
that the aim of the firm is to maximise profit in order to maximise shareholder 
return. Therefore we would expect to see a link between a firm aiming for a 
maximum level of profit and that firm demonstrating good corporate governance.  
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In contrast, Gregg (2001) described the relationship between shareholders and 
management as one of collaboration and co-ordination secured by contracts. 
Shareholders are suppliers of risk capital which enable firm’s to exist and operate as 
going concern, hence, the need to protect and enhance shareholder interest. However, 
the shareholder theory is criticised for favouring short term profit maximisation at the 
expense of other stakeholders (Handy, 2002). The shareholder theory is also criticised 
for encouraging short term managerial thinking and condoning unethical behaviour.  
Others criticised managers for being easily manipulated by the owners through the use 
of stock options and other interest alignment mechanisms (Yamak and Suer, 2005). 
Post (2003) also criticised the 19th century shareholder theory as based upon 
numerous factual and legal inaccuracies and fictions when evaluated in the context of 
the modern era. Furthermore, he argued that requiring management to serve 
shareholder interest alone is morally untenable.  Kaler (2002) suggested that the 
simple truism that legality is no guarantee of morality because the law being relied 
upon may itself be immoral.  
Proponents of the shareholder theory suggested that critics of the theory are misguided 
yet understandable (Danielson et al. 2008). They argued that the critics are misguided 
because wealth maximisation is inherently a long term goal. Jensen (2002) suggested 
that the firm must maximise the value of all future cash flows and does not support the 
exploitation of other stakeholders. It is also argued that the shareholder theory provides 
a better framework than the stakeholder approach in protecting the interest of both 
current and future stakeholders. Thus, stakeholder theory is not superior to the 
shareholder theory from an ethical argument (Danielson et al. 2008). It is also 
suggested that if a firm is forced to allocate a portion of its economic surplus to 
employees or to customers, these stakeholders will benefit in the short term. However, 
these policies could stifle future innovation, hurting shareholders, stakeholders, and 
society in the long run (ibid). They argued that the views of critics are understandable 
because proponents of shareholder theory exhort managers to maximise the firms 
current share price as oppose to long term wealth maximisation (Lasher, 2008). 
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2.8.1  Evaluation of the Stakeholder Theory 
The focus of the stakeholder theory is to take account of a wider group ‘residence’ who 
may have an interest and or affected by the running of the business. Freeman (1984, 
p.46) described stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”. Nwanji and Howell (2007) argue 
that stakeholder theory is distinct in that it is a theory of management that includes 
morals and values as an explicit part of organisational management. In contrast to the 
shareholder theory which focuses primarily on enhancing and protecting the interest of 
shareholder. Clarkson (1995) argued that the interests of all stakeholders have an 
intrinsic value and no particular interest should be allowed to dominate the interest of 
other stakeholders. Therefore managers are assumed to have a duty to all 
stakeholders including shareholders (Yamak and Suer, 2005). Furthermore, Post 
(2003) suggested that refinements and clarifications about who qualifies as a 
stakeholder make the stakeholder theory both workable and a very useful way to 
improve corporate governance contrary to Friedman (1970).   
It is also argued that the enhancement of shareholder value would be severely 
constrained without properly addressing the needs of its stakeholders. Reed (2002) 
suggested that any fiduciary obligations to shareholders aimed at maximising wealth 
could be subject to the constraint of respecting obligations owed to other stakeholders. 
Reed (1999) argued that in order to be compelling, the stakeholder theory must 
undertake various elementary tasks amongst which include: 1) providing an account of 
what stakes are and who has them; 2) circumscribing corporate responsibility to 
stakeholders and finally 3) determining how to evaluate the claims of competing 
stakeholders. Reed (1999) argued that the assumptions of these tasks can be 
grounded in a variety of normative theoretical perspectives including communitarian 
ethics, social contract theory and the ethics of fiduciary relationships amongst others. It 
is also argued that the stakeholder theory does not firmly or explicitly root itself in any 
theoretical traditions. Hence, it operates at the level of individual principles and norms 
which provide minimal formal justifications (Reed, 2002).  
Blair (2005) suggested that the stakeholder theory has no conceptual foundation and is 
too broad. Aoki (2004) added that the stakeholder theory makes the burden of 
designing effective governance structures difficult to control.  From a similar 
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perspective, Grandori (2004) argued that the stakeholder’s view is a ‘universalistic’ 
non-contingent statement unable to explain systematic variations in governance 
structures.  Lee and Yoo (2008, p.63) in a study of competing rationales for corporate 
governance in France found that “while the adoption of the shareholder model is 
necessary for resource acquirement from the global capital markets, resource 
allocation in the cooperative innovation systems reinforces the stakeholder model”. 
This finding is perhaps not surprising considering the civil law system of law operating 
in France, which tends to give more protection to certain stakeholder groups unlike the 
common law system which emphasises the protection of shareholder rights.  
Proponents of this theory suggest that the interest of shareholders is best served by 
maximising value which eventually benefits the society as a whole (Jensen, 2001). 
Thus stakeholder theory leads to the maximisation of stakeholders’ wealth, but without 
any significant involvement in the management of the company (Freeman 1984 and 
Blaire 1995). Webley (1999) pointed to the fact that the Interfaith Declaration of 
International Business Ethics recognises reliable reporting to shareholders as a primary 
obligation of a corporation and an important component of ethical business behaviour.  
Owen (2003) suggested that stakeholder conflict, rather than harmony, permeates 
much economic activity. Such conflict is invariably resolved in favour of the 
economically powerful shareholder group. Hence, one can argue that there is no 
meaningful corporate governance processes designed to give power to stakeholder 
groups other than shareholders. Jensen (2001) argued that the challenge faced by 
boards and management is striking the trade-off between the interests of its 
stakeholders and the firm’s overall aims and objectives. Phillips (2003) suggested that 
the most fundamental challenge faced by the stakeholder theory is establishing a 
rationale for managerial attention to stakeholders resembling the justification for 
maximising shareholder wealth. Phillips (2003) argued that failure to maximise 
shareholder wealth as a result of satisfying other stakeholder’s amounts to stealing 
which is a violation of moral property rights.  
Nwanji and Howell (2007) suggested that adopting the stakeholder model will give rise 
to opportunistic directors and managements acting in their own self-interest by claiming 
that their actions actually benefit some stakeholder groups. The governance and 
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monitoring structures required in the shareholder and stakeholder theories are indeed 
different. The shareholder theory also referred to as the Anglo-American model 
operates on the basis of enhancing shareholder value and a monitoring system based 
around the board including executives and non-executive directors ratified by the 
shareholders. Nwanji and Howell (2008) suggested that the shareholder theory really 
came to light through the work of Nobel Prize Economist Friedman (1970). A view that 
captures the existence of corporations in which Friedman argued that there is only one 
social responsibility for businesses, which is to use its resources effectively while 
engaging in activities designed to maximise profits as long as it stays with the rule of 
law. 
The debate surrounding the stakeholder and shareholder theory has been the centre 
piece of corporate governance literature in an effort to determine the model that is best 
for corporations. Nwanji and Howell (2007) suggested that influences such as 
increased institutional investors, globalisation of capital markets, stakeholder 
expectation and shareholder activism have all contributed to the importance of 
corporate governance, a point also echoed by Fera (1997), Mills (1998) and Omran et 
al (2002).  Recently, in light of the credit crunch both Tesco; Marks & Spencer and Next 
all faced heavy shareholder activism during their Annual General Meetings (Financial 
Times, 2009).    
The stakeholder theory referred to as the German’s model operates on the basis that 
certain stakeholder groups such as employees should have their rights protected and 
enshrined in law and be allowed to sit on company board alongside other directors 
(Ross and Crossan, 2012). This is borne as a result of beliefs and values about the 
fitting relationship between employees, firms and the state. Basically, this theory 
suggests that contrary to the agency theory, directors can be trusted. Jensen (2001) 
argued that there is no universally agreed measure on how to measure the various 
objectives for all stakeholders concerned in the operation of companies. Jensen 
advocated the use of ‘enlightened value maximisation’ which takes into account the 
long term viability of the firm. This the author further argued will solve the issue of 
multiple objectives which form the basis of the stakeholder theory.  
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Others opine that the different stakeholder expectations and objectives are indeed 
irreconcilable (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005). Some literature argues that the stakeholder is 
a societal view of corporate governance and hence, is probably better off as a 
philosophy rather than a theory. However, advocates of the theory suggest that 
company directors be accountable to all stakeholders in return for limited liability for 
their actions and debts. A view supported by Nader and Green (1980) and Mitchell and 
Sikka (2005) who argued that corporations have huge political, economic and 
technological powers which can determine thriving towns, corrupt or help overthrow 
foreign governments, develop technologies that take or save lives because these 
corporations are unaccountable to their constituents.  The Turnbull (1997) Report 
highlighted the benefits of a broader stakeholder view. Contrary to the Hampel Report 
(1998) which suggested that directors are accountable to shareholders.  
2.9  Conclusion 
According to Crossan (2011, p. 301):  
it may be the case that we cannot expect corporate governance to work if we see 
it as just a set of rules and that we need a shift in our attitudes towards universally 
accepted ethical standards of corporate governance… It is clear that a change of 
this nature requires changes to business and accounting education, accounting 
bodies, codes of practice, and regulations.  
Clearly, these issues are complex, and it could be argued that there is no conclusive 
and reliable advice concerning corporate governance regulations (ibid). The 
introduction of corporate governance regulation in most cases is driven by the desire 
for greater transparency, accountability and to increase investor confidence in markets 
round the world (Labelle, 2009). This in most cases is as a result of financial scandals, 
corporate collapse, or similar crises. Ironically, corporate governance compliance in 
most cases is on a voluntary disclosure basis. 
An evaluation of corporate governance literature and theories suggests that there are 
many disciplines and theories influencing the development of corporate governance 
(Sun, 2002). The main theories influencing the development of corporate governance 
can be classified into four, namely; the agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder 
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theory and the shareholder theory (Sun et al. 2001 and Sun 2002). It is also important 
to note that the evolution of corporate governance should be viewed simultaneously 
with the legal system, capital markets and ownership structures that exist in that 
particular country. Roe (1994) suggested that corporate governance fundamentally 
deals with agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from management. 
The agency theory is criticised as relatively narrow in theoretical terms because 
corporate governance complexities in relation to contracts between shareholders and 
agents are indeed naïve and too simplistic in reality. It is also argued that statistical 
methods cannot explain boardroom reality (Demb, 1993).   
The introduction of corporate governance in most countries is driven by financial 
scandals and corporate collapses. It is believed that the Cadbury Report (1992) laid the 
foundation of UK corporate governance and for many other countries round the world. 
A critical review of corporate governance literature suggests that corporate governance 
is of national importance and an effective governance system is a required precondition 
for commercial competitiveness (Monks and Minow, 1996). Corporate governance 
literature also revealed that the term governance is not simply limited to corporations 
as such but also people, the state and organisations. Fyfe (2003, p.14) defined 
governance as “relationship management and decision-making based on complex 
interplay of interest, differences, rights and obligations of a society’s public, private and 
voluntary sectors, groups and citizens”. This definition emphasizes the complexity of 
governance in planning and implementing measures aimed at improving performance 
in an ever changing environment within which they operate.  
The term good governance is changeable in its meaning (Nanda, 2006). Hence, there 
are no objective standards for determining good governance: some aspects include 
political stability, the rule of law, control of corruption, and accountability (ibid). 
However, there seems to be a general consensus that good governance leads to CSR 
and ethics. An evaluation of the literature above on the various definitions of CSR leads 
one to conclude that CSR is ultimately concerned with learning the effects of corporate 
organisations on society, their social responsibility obligations within society as a result 
and ultimately allowing corporations to be accountable for these responsibilities 
(Grewal and Darlow, 2007). An evaluation of the literature on governance, regulation, 
CSR and ethics seems to suggest the need for accountability, responsibility, 
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transparency and trust if the financial markets are to regain public trust and investor 
confidence (Labelle, 2009). It is important to note that areas of responsibility are not 
only limited from the organisational and legal points of view, but also from the ethical 
point of view (Enderle, 1987). Griffin (2010) argued that transparency is an important 
prerequisite for accountability because transparency enables evaluation. The Cadbury 
Report (1992 para. 2.5) defined corporate governance as the “system by which 
companies are directed and controlled with boards of directors ultimately responsible 
for the governance of their companies”. It is believed that this particular report laid the 
foundations of corporate governance principles and practices not only within the UK but 
the world over. Some countries have indeed adopted its main principles as part of their 
own corporate governance requirements. 
Shareholder theory argues that corporations have a limited scope of responsibilities. 
This particular theory is fundamental in the development of corporate financial theory 
and enjoys widespread support in the academic finance community (Danielson et al. 
2008). Clarkson (1995) argued that the interests of all stakeholders have an intrinsic 
value and no particular interest should be allowed to dominate the interest of other 
stakeholders. Blair (2005) suggested that the stakeholder theory has no conceptual 
foundation and is too broad. Nwanji and Howell (2007) suggested that adopting the 
stakeholder model will give rise to opportunistic directors and managements to act in 
their own self-interest by claiming that their actions actually benefit some stakeholder 
groups. However, advocates of the theory suggest that company directors be 
accountable to all stakeholders in return for limited liability for their actions and debts. 
Finally, an evaluation of corporate governance codes is explored in the next chapter 
aimed at exploring corporate governance codes including the voluntary code adopted 
in the UK and legislative approach in the US. The chapter will also examine models of 
corporate governance found in Africa as well as corporate governance regulation in 
The Gambia.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
3.0  Introduction 
The framework underpinning the corporate governance codes is structured as follows. 
The first part of this chapter is aimed at exploring the models of corporate governance 
found in Africa. This will be followed by a review of corporate governance regulation in 
The Gambia and stakeholder code of conduct. It is important to note that corporate 
governance regulation with particular emphasis to The Gambia is an area that is not 
well researched. This was one of the primary reasons why the researcher embarked on 
this study.  Crossan (2009, p. 336) argued that:  
all listed firms should be required to publish their own corporate governance code 
of practice and to what extent that the firm has complied with its own rules. This 
would allow shareholders to understand the governance of the firms they own 
shares in (or that they are considering purchasing shares in) and to decide for 
themselves if they are happy with the proposed conduct of the managers of the 
firm towards governance issues.  
This presents a unique opportunity for firms to demonstrate that their own corporate 
governance codes go beyond the recommendations. It would also allow shareholders 
to make more informed choices concerning the ownership of a firm’s shares (ibid). 
Alexander (2006, p.33) also suggested that an:  
efficient corporate governance framework should rely less on a strict application of 
statutory codes and regulatory standards, and more on the design of flexible, 
internal compliance programmes that fit the particular risk level and nature of the 
bank’s business.  
The regulator is therefore compelled to play an active role with bank management in 
designing internal control systems and risk management practices that seek to achieve 
an optimal level of protection for shareholders, stakeholders and the economy. 
Khadaroo and Shaikh (2007) conducted a study of corporate governance reform in 
Malaysia and concluded that the corporate governance reform was regulations based. 
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Deo, Irvine and Abraham (2007) also studied the role of corporate governance rules 
and regulations in assisting banks to maintain their legitimacy and public image during 
times of crisis.  
An evaluation of the literature on corporate governance codes in the UK will also be 
carried out. The researcher also intends to cover the external influences on UK’s 
corporate governance and finally, the Lamfalussey Report (2005) will be appraised.  
The biggest commercial bank in The Gambia is the Standard Chartered Bank. 
Currently there are 13 banks within the industry of which one is an Islamic Bank and 
thirteen conventional commercial banks (CBG, 2013). The Central Bank is state owned 
and the board members are appointed by the Head of State in association with the 
Department of State for Finance.  
The management of the Central Bank is said to be “independent of government 
control,” but is it really independent? When all senior appointments are made by the 
Head of State not based on qualifications but political affiliation and loyalty. How does 
being a public organisation affect the governance mechanism, the institutional ethics, 
and the organisational code of conduct of such organisations? The governance 
structure of these selected financial sector corporations will be the focus of data 
collections through semi-structured interviews and focus groups (see chapter five). 
3.1  Models of Corporate Governance found in Africa 
The researcher felt that it was rational to conduct an evaluation of corporate 
governance models found in Africa and review both the UK and US corporate 
governance requirements.  It is worth noting that most emerging countries in sub 
Saharan African including The Gambia are indeed former British colonies. As a result, 
most of these countries shared the same British common law system. This therefore 
serves an incentive for these countries to adopt the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance (Reed, 2002).  
Furthermore, an evaluation of corporate governance models found in Africa enabled 
the research to develop a balanced perspective, awareness and an appreciation of the 
variety of corporate governance systems within the sub Saharan region. In addition, 
lessons learnt in other countries in the development of corporate governance 
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frameworks and good practice can also be shared. This will be of enormous help to 
The Gambia considering that it is yet to develop a corporate governance model or 
framework as part of the regulatory requirement.  An evaluation of both UK and US 
systems are both necessary because these two nations appear to lead the race 
(setting the benchmark) in relation to the development and advancement of corporate 
governance policies across the world (Nwanji, 2006). 
Commenting on the adoption of corporate governance codes Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazuraa (2004) concluded that legitimating pressures were leading reasons for code 
adoption. Enrione et al (2006) added that maintaining legitimacy of law makers and 
regulators was the main driver for institutionalisation of corporate governance codes. 
Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) also suggested that the reason for adopting codes of 
corporate governance in civil law countries is to legitimise rather than improve 
corporate governance practices amongst national companies. According to Rossouw 
(2005) the dominant model of corporate governance that emerges in African national 
codes is an inclusive model of corporate governance. The inclusive model adopted in 
most African countries ensures that corporate boards are not merely accountable to 
shareholders but also responsible. It is important to note that despite its political and 
economic power in Africa Nigeria does not commit explicitly to an inclusive model of 
governance (Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria, 2003). Rossouw (2005, p.97) 
argued that “without exception, all these codes recommend a unitary board structure 
and advocate a self-regulatory approach, where companies are encouraged to adopt 
the spirit of good governance”.  
It is also suggested that in order for these voluntary codes to succeed as an effective 
governance mechanism, there has to be an adequate legal and regulatory framework 
in place. Ahunwan (2002) suggested that governance problems in Nigeria are deeply 
rooted in a socio-economic and political context characterised by religious tensions, 
ethnicity, poverty, history of military rule and human rights abuses. These therefore 
imply that passing formal laws does little to ensure that shareholder rights are 
protected.  Hence, one can argue that Nigeria needs to address the above issues 
including ownership structures and ineffective legal system for any meaningful reforms 
to be successful. 
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South Africa was the first country to introduce an inclusive model of corporate 
governance in Africa (IoD of South Africa, 1994) which was later incorporated in the 
Kings Report of Corporate Governance in 2002. The reasons for adopting these 
inclusive corporate governance models for Africa are as follows: (1) long term 
sustainability, (2) respect for local community and society at large and finally (3) the 
need to earn a license to operate from all stakeholders of a corporation (Rossouw, 
2005). The reasons why most African countries adopt the inclusive corporate 
governance model are because the African value system advocates values such as co-
existence and view of society in equilibrium (consensus), amongst others. 
The two fundamental reasons why most African countries adopt a voluntary system 
include the following: inadequate legal and regulatory framework and the need to 
broaden the scope of corporate governance reform.  This is because vast numbers of 
companies in Africa are not listed. Hence, mandatory requirements for listed 
companies would leave a majority of companies outside the remit of corporate 
governance reform. From an ethical view point one can argue that the way a company 
treats its stakeholders reflects its ethical standards. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
companies with ethics as a priority are more likely to be sensitive to stakeholders. The 
Malawian code (Corporate Governance Task Force, 2001) enables employees to enjoy 
a privileged status as a stakeholder group and allows them the opportunity to 
participate in corporate decision making. Whilst, the Tanzanian code gives this 
privilege to the community (Steering Committee on Corporate Governance in Tanzania, 
2000).  
Commenting on the development of corporate governance regulation Siddiqui (2009) 
suggested that the institutional based system of corporate governance is better suited 
to Africa. This he argued, is due to Africa’s low level of knowledgeableness and 
refinement of the stock markets and the investors, controlling power of bank financing 
and a high degree of debt to equity ratios. Most businesses in Africa are SMEs 
(Siddiqui, 2009). Hence, banks play a more important role as stakeholders and board 
members due to minority stakeholders lack of time, limited know how and resources to 
understand complex business issues (Siddiqui, 2009). The above arguments suggest 
that Africa’s lack of advanced markets is a major factor that makes the stockholder 
model of corporate governance inappropriate. The stockholder model they argue is 
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based on long term benefits. However, given the socio-political and economic instability 
prevailing in many developing countries, this makes it harder to predict future prospects 
(Parades, 2005; Siddiqui, 2009). Parades (2005, p.36) also argued that “emerging 
economies lacked experienced investment bankers, lawyers, security analysts, 
accountants and effective judicial systems required to monitor the markets”.  
Many of these emerging countries were former British colonies and shared the same 
British common law system.  This therefore serves as an incentive for these countries 
to adopt the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance (Reed, 2002). The Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate governance has three basic claims according to Siddiqui 
(2009, p.255): - 
firstly, liberalisation will result in increased corporate growth and profits; secondly, 
sustained macro-economic growth will facilitate overall level of opportunities, and 
benefits society; and finally, ensure increased transparency in corporate dealings 
and provide greater investor protection. 
As evaluation of the literature above highlights the importance of liberalisation of 
financial markets, sustained economic growth, transparency and adequate legal 
frameworks if corporate governance is to be a success in Africa (Reed, 2002). 
3.2  Corporate Governance Regulation in The Gambia 
The paucity of literature on the regulation of corporate governance in the banking 
sector in The Gambia generates several problems.  The typical work in this area relies 
on sources such as country specific information and studies by international institutions 
such as the World Bank that collects a relatively limited amount of information 
regarding The Gambia.  While such information enables comparisons with other 
countries to be made, such information is limited, superficial and lacks contextual 
nuances. For example, studies that make generalisations on categories which apply to 
The Gambia e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, former British Colonies, developing countries 
and Islamic countries.  Care has to be taken to avoid committing an ecological fallacy 
i.e. ‘the attempt to conclude information, concerning an individual from related 
characteristics observed at an aggregated level’ (ZDS, 2014). To avoid this it is 
necessary to be familiar with those aspects of The Gambia that distinguishes it from 
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other members of a larger aggregate group. This means being aware of the country’s 
geography, its modest resources and its history, culture and institutions.  Therefore, it 
is important to be aware of the country’s path dependency especially in relation to 
banking and the regulation of corporate governance.  Path dependency refers to a 
dynamic process whose evolution is governed by its own history (David 2007).  The 
Gambia has a distinct historical legacy. The small river state with a population of 1.8m 
is a developing country that is 90 per cent Moslem in religion, a former British Colony, 
with the legacy of colonial legislation and institutions (World Bank, 2014).   
The current regulatory framework consists of the Banking Act 2009, Money Laundering 
Act 2003, Central Bank Act 2005, Anti-Terrorism Act 2002, the Insurance Act 2003 and 
the Financial Institutions Act 2003 and Companies Act 1955 (CBG 2013). These Acts 
are designed to improve the regulation and monitoring of financial institutions. The 
Money Laundering Act 2003 guarantees the confidentiality of companies reporting 
suspect transactions (See Appendix II – The Structure of Banking and Financial 
Regulation in The Gambia). It is hoped that these Acts will lay the required foundation 
for a legitimate and transparent system of regulation and corporate governance. This in 
turn, boosts foreign investor confidence in The Gambia’s regulatory environment 
because the majority of banks are foreign owned. Guha (2006) also added that The 
Gambia have improved property rights and made it easier to start companies and 
simplified business regulation. However, weak institutional capacity and corruption still 
pose problems on a more practical level (EIU ViewsWire 2003). The Central Bank of 
The Gambia (financial institutions regulator) in 2004 increased the capital adequacy 
requirements for commercial banks operating in the country in an attempt to bolster the 
stability and quality of the banking system. All commercial banks will be required to 
adhere to the new minimum capital requirement of D600m (US $2M).  
The poor quality banking institutions in Africa has resulted in heavy losses for 
depositors and expensive bailouts for respective governments (EIU ViewsWire 2003). 
However, The Gambia’s banking sector is relatively healthy: non-performing loans as a 
percentage of banks’ total loan portfolio dropped from 11% in 2001 to 5.5% in 2003 
(EIU ViewsWire 2003). This is mainly due to the fact that there are no official limits to 
the level of interest commercial banks can charge customers. Agu (2004) found that 
                             
56 
commercial banks in The Gambia have not performed as efficiently as they could, due 
to the heavy regulatory framework.   
Vittas (1991) found that the high interest spreads in developing countries may be a 
consequence of monetary regulations such as reserve requirements, high inflation, 
high loan losses and high cost and profit due to operation inefficiency and 
uncompetitive behaviour. Worrell (1996) contends that the wide spreads can be due to 
small volumes of business, which necessitate a higher mark-up because of 
diseconomies of scale. Howard and Haynes (2001) argued that reserve requirements 
impose an implicit tax on financial intermediation since they constrain the bank’s ability 
to extend credit and may reduce their profitability.  
A feature of sub Saharan African development in the last four decades has been the 
rather limited role played by the financial market in the mobilization of essential 
resources to facilitate growth enhancing investments (Aryeetey and Nissanke, 2004).  
Crosse and Hampel (1980) contends that both big and relatively small banks have 
demonstrated that the greatest savings in cost are to be found not in machines alone 
but in a more efficient organisation of management. However, Heffernan (2005) stated 
that banking in poor countries is more labour intensive and much less computerised. 
Banks and branches are small, so economies of scale are not as high they might be 
elsewhere.  Furthermore, Government restriction and regulations tend to raise bank-
operating costs. Guha (2006, p.6) added that:  
in spite of these advances, Africa ranks as the world’s worst regulated region. 
Most appointments are senior ministries or Central Banks (regulatory body) levels 
in Africa tend to be political appointments driven by political allegiance rather than 
an appointment based on expertise, skills and experience. 
This therefore implies a potential regulatory shortcomings or failures if the process of 
regulation is not closely monitored. The International Finance Corporation (2006) a 
private sector arm of the World Bank suggested that Africa is making progress in 
cutting red tape and improving business regulation (See appendix III – The Focus and 
Level of Analysis of the Literature Pertaining to Regulation of Corporate Governance in 
The Gambia). 
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3.3  A Review of Stakeholder Code of Conduct 
Corporate governance is often defined narrowly in terms of agency problems between 
owners and managers (Aoki, Jackson and Miyajima, 2008). The corporate governance 
regime of Germany, France and Japan are based on the stakeholder model whereby 
consideration is given by management to key stakeholders when running the company 
(Sudarsanam and Broadhurst, 2010). Corporate governance is also viewed as being 
embedded within various institutional rules and beliefs that shape how these 
stakeholders interact in corporate decision making (Aoki et al, 2008). Commenting on 
the 2007 financial crisis Ross and Crossan (2012, p.215) concluded that:  
base on the performance data, it cannot be said that corporate governance 
approach based on either shareholder capitalism (UK) or the Stakeholder 
capitalism (Germany) is more at fault than the other.  
These findings also suggest that the stakeholder/shareholder debate may not be as 
important as previously claimed and that regulators need to find good governance 
rules, regardless of theoretical underpinnings (Ross and Crossan, 2012). Nwanji and 
Howell (2007) argued that the stakeholder theory is distinct in that it is a theory of 
management that includes morals and values as an explicit part of organisational 
management. German company boards are two-tier, whereby companies are 
comprised of both a supervisory and a management board (Von Rosen, 2007). The 
supervisory board (oversees the direction of the business) are appointed by 
shareholders and the management board (concentrates on business operations) 
appointed by the supervisory board (Velte, 2014). Cromme Code (2002, p.5) states 
that in “making their decisions, the management and supervisory boards are obliged to 
act in the best interests of the shareholders and of the enterprise”. Thus, in Germany 
significant influence is placed on industrial relations as a result of "co-determination”, 
whereby employee have a legal right to be informed about company activities (Von 
Rosen, 2007).  
Furthermore, within Germany financial institutions and in particular banks also have a 
considerable influence on German boards as in the case of the Japanese system 
(Porter, 1992; Charkham, 1994; Miyajima, 1999; Hellwig, 2000; Miyajima and Aoki, 
2002; Sigurt, 2005). This influence can be attributed to four factors:  
                             
58 
 (1) the importance of bank credit in corporate finance, particularly for capital-
intensive manufacturing; (2) significant direct share ownership by banks in non-
financial companies; (3) proxy voting by banks on behalf of customers who leave 
their shares on deposit with them; and (4) nomination of bank managers as 
directors to the supervisory boards of non-financial companies (Sigurt, 2005, 
p.357)..  
Ross and Crossan (2012) suggested that the German dual board structure promotes 
greater integration of stakeholders and clear management accountability. The authors 
argued that this is reflected by shareholder representatives being present on the 
supervisory board and by the supervisory board deciding the composition of the 
management board. Therefore, the task of the supervisory board is to “advise regularly, 
and supervise the management board in the management of the enterprise. It must be 
involved in the decisions of fundamental importance to the enterprise” (Cromme, 2002, 
p.7).Company boards in Germany and France also includes representation from 
lenders, suppliers and workers unions (Ross and Crossan, 2012). It is the belief that 
each stakeholder group contributes to the success of the corporation, and without their 
contributions, there will be no profit for the shareholders (Nwanji and Howell, 2007, 
p.352).  
This apparent strength could also be its major weakness because companies may find 
it difficult to establish mutually agreeable goals to satisfy all stakeholders. Secondly, 
this lack of clarity can create a principal-agent problem allowing directors to act in ways 
that protect their self-interest instead of long term interest of the company (Ross and 
Crossan, 2012). Stiglbauer, Fischer and Velte (2012) commenting on the financial 
crisis and corporate governance in the financial sector in Germany concluded that 
cooperation between management boards and supervisory boards, as well as 
monitoring by supervisory boards, must be improved. Furthermore, the authors also 
added that improvement is also necessary for corporate governance reporting and the 
implementation of the pay for performance principle. The Economist (2005) suggested 
that Co-determination (by workers and managers) is providing a hindrance these days 
when speed and flexibility are essential to global competition. Thus, an evaluation of 
the literature above suggests that the system of corporate governance in Germany has  
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Table 3.1: Corporate Governance: Shareholder value perspective vs Stakeholder 
value perspective  
Area of focus 
Shareholder value 
perspective 
Stakeholder value 
perspective 
Dominant factors: Anglo-American Model Japanese-German Model 
Emphasis on:  Profitability over responsibility Responsibility over profitability 
Organisational 
purpose: 
To serve the owners (of 
shares) 
To serve a variety of 
stakeholders 
Organisation seen as: Instruments for profitability 
Joint venture of resource 
providers 
Measure of success: Share prices and dividends 
Satisfaction among 
shareholders 
Major difficulty: 
Keep principal’s interests 
dominant 
Balance stakeholder interests 
Corporate governance: Independent outside directors Stakeholder representation 
Social responsibility: 
An individual not a firm’s 
obligation  
Both individual and 
organisational 
Society best served by: 
Pursuing self-interest 
(efficiency) 
Pursuing joint-interests 
(cooperate) 
Market nature: Pro-open market orientation  
Balance of domestic and 
international  
Strategy focus: Productivity and efficiency 
Survival and employment 
growth 
Financial markets: Efficient capital markets Bank centered relationships  
Source: Bhasa (2004); De Wit and Meyer (2004) quoted in Simeon (2009, p.93). 
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three core characteristics which distinguishes it from the Anglo-Saxon model: (1) 
concentrated ownership, (2) a dual-board structure and (3) extensive worker 
representation on the supervisory board (Sigurt, 2005).  Furthermore, Table 3.1: 
Corporate Governance: Shareholder value perspective vs Stakeholder value 
perspective outlines the Anglo-American and the Japanese German models of 
corporate governance. 
Japan is also well known as a stakeholder model of corporate governance, where 
employee interests play a predominant role (Aoki, 1988; Dore, 2000; Yoshikawa and 
Phan, 2001; Araki, 2005; Jacoby, 2005). This idea of the firm as a community of people 
is manifest in a number of human resource management practices geared to mobilise 
long term commitment to the enterprise (Aoki et al, 2008). The Japanese main bank 
also play a central role in monitoring management (Miyajima, 1999; Miyajima and Aoki, 
2002, Sigurt, 2005). Hence, the reason why various labels have been used to describe 
the system of governance in Japan, such as bank-based, relationship-oriented, 
network, insider, stakeholder or coordinated model of corporate governance (Aoki et al, 
2008). In sum, Japanese corporate governance involves a number of inter-related 
elements that are argued to display institutional complementarity (Aoki, 1994). 
However, the corporate governance legal framework has changed in Japan recently. 
Now Japanese firms can choose from a wide menu of market-based options, such as 
the holding company structure, the US type of board (committee system), stock 
options, and acquisitions through share swaps (Aoki et al, 2008). Thus, the traditional 
Japanese firm also faces gradual but increasing pressure to modernise itself even if 
corporate governance for these firms will remain different from larger hybrid firms (Aoki 
et al, 2008). 
3.4  Corporate Governance Codes in the United Kingdom 
The Gambia like many other former British colonies tend to follow the same systems of 
governance including the functions of the executives, legislature and judiciary 
functions. The Gambia is also a signatory to the Commonwealth Association for 
Corporate Governance (CACG). Furthermore, The Gambia follows the same common 
law (set through judicial precedent) approach just like in the case of the UK, unlike 
France and Germany which tend to follow the civil law (Act of Parliament) approach. 
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This is the main reason why the researcher decided to review the UK corporate 
governance codes (voluntary) as opposed to the US (legislative) even though The 
Gambia’s current regulatory framework is based on the legislative approach.  
Initially, the introduction of corporate governance in the UK was driven by financial 
scandals and corporate collapses just like many other countries. The Cadbury Report 
of 1992 laid the foundation of UK corporate governance regulation and many other 
countries round the world including The Gambia. The UK’s Combined Code (1998) 
embodied the findings of a trilogy of codes: the Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury 
Report (1995), and the Hampel Report (1998). This trilogy went on to form the basis of 
a coherent corporate governance strategy for the UK.   
The history of the UK’s corporate governance codes can be divided into two major 
phases. The first phase began with the introduction of the Cadbury Report (1992). The 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance was initially set up in 
1991 following the financial scandals and collapses of Polly Peck and Coloroll amongst 
others (Nwanji, 2006). This Committee was set up in response to various company 
collapses and to rebuild the general lack of confidence in the financial reporting of 
many UK companies (Mallin 2007). Shortly after the committee’s inception the country 
was hit by two other financial scandals in the name of BCCI and Maxwell.  The 
committee delivered its report in 1992 which became known as the Cadbury Report. 
This Committee was set up by the Financial Reporting Council under the stewardship 
of Sir Adrian Cadbury. See table 3.2 for the key recommendations of the Cadbury 
Report (1992).  
The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (2009) argued that this report 
resulted in greater transparency and accountability in boardroom proceedings (CIPD, 
2009). While, others suggest that this particular report facilitates more checks and 
balances to protect the rights of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders and to 
avoid illegitimate use of power by the executives in corporate decision making. Jones 
and Pollitt (2002) also lamented that the Cadbury Report (1992) was unique amongst 
its successors due to its high quality process of investigation resulting to the doctrine of 
self-regulation (voluntary). Its recommendations were also adopted and incorporated 
into many other national Corporate Governance Codes the world over as well as the   
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Table 3.3: The Greenbury Report (1992):  Key Recommendations 
 
Executive Remuneration:  
 The establishment of a remuneration committee consisting entirely of 
independent non-executive directors to determine to directors remuneration 
(paras 4.8 & 4.11) 
 The remuneration committee chairman should attend the company’s annual 
general meeting to answer shareholder questions (para 5.27); 
 Remuneration should be link to long term corporate performance (para 
6.23-34)  
 Information on share options, including SAYE options should be given for 
each director in accordance with recommendations of the Accounting 
Standard Board’s Urgent Issues Task Force (para 5.13 – 5.16); 
 
Board Appointments: 
 The appointment of a nominations committee to oversee new appointments 
to the board 
 
 
Table 3.2: The Cadbury Report (1992):  Key Recommendations 
 
Separation of the role of chairman and chief executive  
The Board of Directors Guidelines 
 These  relate to  
- The board’s composition and establishment  
- The functions of key board committees e.g. the remuneration and 
nomination committees 
 
Non-executive directors:  
 NEDs to be appointed to 
- the board of  directors 
- the audit committees  
to ensure greater control of financial reporting 
 
A  Code of Best Practice.  
 The Boards of all UK listed companies are expected to comply with this 
code. Hence, the famous ‘comply or explain policy’ system of corporate 
governance adopted in the UK. 
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OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999).   However, critics of the 
Cadbury Report (1992) argued that the report’s forcefulness on the significance of non-
executive directors would lead to the European two tier supervisory board via the back 
door and lacked legally enforceable sanctions unlike the SOX. Milne, (2007, p.1) 
commenting on the Germany’s two-tier governance system argued that: 
lack of outsiders leaves an elite group of German non-executive directors, often 
sitting on each other’s boards, to run most of German’s top companies. The fact 
that the supervisory boards contain workers’ representatives in addition to 
directors chosen by shareholders further dilutes investors’ influence.  
Furthermore, Jones and Pollitt (2002) compared the conduct of an influence on the 
investigations leading to the Higgs Review (2003) and the Cadbury Report (1992) 
found that the quality of the process of the investigation had a very significant effect on 
the outcome, the content and the subsequent effectiveness of the report’s 
implementation. Nwanji (2006) suggested that, it is also very difficult to argue the 
extent of non-executive director’s ‘true impartiality’ towards the organisation given the 
fees they charge for their services. 
3.5  Evaluation of the Greenbury Report (1995) 
The Greenbury Report (1995) on director’s remuneration followed the Cadbury Report 
1992. This report was in response to shareholder concern in relation to executive 
remuneration (see Table 3.3 for the key recommendations of the report). The 
Greenbury Report (1995) was triggered by British Gas shareholder revolt over the pay 
of the then Chief Executive in 1994. More recent examples include shareholder revolts 
at Barclays, Aviva and the MG Rover Group in Longbridge (UK) where the ‘Phoenix 
four’ paid themselves $41m (The Guardian, 2010b). The remuneration of directors still 
ignites a significant debate in the media and society at large at both the size of 
directors’ remuneration, the weak link between executives’ pay and their companies’ 
performance, inconsistent and often incomplete disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports (Financial Times, 2009). Given recent issues concerning corporate 
remuneration:  
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 this debate is as relevant and possibly more so today as it has ever been. 
Theoretically, as the ownership of a firm becomes more diverse, the management 
of the firm will have more discretion and opportunity to act in accordance with their 
own interests at the expense of those of the shareholders (Crossan, 2011, p. 
293).  
Carcello (2009) argued that management compensation is often influenced by reported 
corporate financial performance. Hence, the incentive for senior management to mis-
state the firm’s financial performance. Considering the recent financial crisis and the 
issues surrounding executive remuneration, it is difficult not to conclude that the 
managers of large firms act as if they do own and control the firm and that these 
managers often appear unaware that they are employed by the shareholders of the 
firm (Crossan, 2011). A number of high-profile examples of managers receiving high 
rewards for poor performance includes RBS and the Co-operative Bank more recently 
(The Guardian, 2010c).  Hence, shareholders are now calling for a clawback clause in 
bonuses contracts.  
Beasley et al (1999) and Bourke (2007) found that 83% of financial frauds involve the 
CEO and/or Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Geiger and North (2006) also echoed similar 
opinion arguing that CFOs exercise a substantial degree of influence over a firm’s 
reporting financial results. Two of the largest frauds in US corporate history was 
committed by Jeff Skilling of Enron and Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom (Carcello, 2009). 
Both were charged and convicted of a fraud-related offense for explicitly or implicitly 
‘pressuring subordinates to mis-state the firm’s financial reports (Carcello, 2009). It is 
therefore thought that a lack of effective oversight provided by the governing bodies 
engaged to monitor the actions of management may be at the heart of the problem 
(Bourke, 2007). With the continued growing public, media and directors concern 
regarding the remuneration of ‘fat cats’. This led to calls for companies to conduct an 
annual referendum on executive pay. Opponents argued that this would fly in the face 
of the principle that boards are responsible to decide how to remunerate its managers 
(Guerrera, 2008). Furthermore, the author argued that the “vibrancy of capitalism is 
underpinned by entrepreneurial spirit nurtured only by promising large rewards to the 
winners of the corporate race” (Guerrera, 2008, p.2).  
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One can therefore argue that the “say on pay” campaign is merely an attempt by left 
wing investors to protect and promote their interest at the expense of management and 
other stakeholders. Ultimately, it is incumbent on the remuneration committee to weigh 
performance related pay in the long term against the need to attract and retain top 
employees. It is therefore evident that something had to be done to remedy the 
situation. This very issue has resurfaced yet again more recently in the banking crisis 
which led others to question the notion of ‘reward for failure’ while others are calling it 
privatising profit and socialising losses (Financial Times, 2009). Hence, the Greenbury 
Report (1995) was aimed at strengthening accountability and enhancing the 
performance of directors. Boyer and Ortiz-Molina (2008) conducted a study on CEO 
turnover in US firms and found that ownership reduction and departure decisions are 
more likely following external CEO appointment than internal appointments. 
The ultimate aim of this report is to ensure that the “independent non-executive director 
embedded within the remuneration committee report fully to shareholders every year 
regarding the remuneration of directors and the company’s remuneration policy” 
(Greenbury Report 1995, para 4.4). Interestingly, the duality of CEO and Chairman of 
the Boards positions, average number of directorship held by audit committee 
members and the percentage of outside company (block holders) ownership positively 
relate to incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. Abbott et al (2004) and Bourke 
(2007) suggested that independent directors, nominating committees and engaging 
auditors negatively relate to the incidence of fraud. A view suggested by Chan and Li 
(2008) provides that boards with audit committees and expert independent directors 
tend to enhance firm value.   
The Greenbury Report (1995) is therefore aimed at aligning shareholder interest with 
that of directors to ensure that rewards are linked to performance of the company and 
directors (Greenbury Report 1995, para 6.16). However, a study of acquisitions 
conducted by Li and Aguilera (2008, p. 492) found that the likelihood of target non-
executive director turnover depends on “factors that determine the performance of 
directors in their monitoring, advisory and social roles pre-acquisition and during the 
acquisition process”. 
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The Greenbury Report (1995) supersedes the Cadbury’s Report (1992) concerning 
executive pay. Chizema (2008) found that state ownership, the firm size and 
institutional ownership are positively and notably linked with the revelation of individual 
executive compensation. Whereas, the firm’s age and size of the supervisory board are 
negatively and extensively linked with individual revelation of executive compensation. 
Nowland (2008) found that the introduction of codes in certain East Asian countries 
lowered the analyst forecast errors and indirectly affected the company disclosure 
practices as a result of its impact on board independence 
3.6  Evaluation of the Hampel Report (1998) 
The Hampel Report (1998) was set up to review the implementation of the Cadbury 
and Greenbury Committee recommendations. This report merged the two previous 
reports and recommended the creation of a ‘Combined Code of Best Practice 1998’. 
This report became the blue print for UK listed companies and annexed to the listing 
requirements. It also drew attention on the need to improve communication with 
shareholders and ensuring the right balance between implementing controls and 
allowing firms to find their own ways of applying these corporate governance principles. 
 
Table 3.4:   The Hampel Report (1998):  Key Recommendations 
 
Approach to Corporate Governance:  
 Self-regulatory approach rather than legislative approach 
 Governance of companies should not resort to ‘box ticking’ 
 
The Board: 
 The unitary board rather than two tier boards  
 The effective non-executive directors need to make up at least one third of 
the membership of the board 
 
Reporting: 
 Company annual reports should include a narrative account of how they 
apply the broad principles set 
 Companies should be ready to explain their governance policies, including 
any circumstances justifying departure from the best practice 
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Hence, the code suggests corporate governance must contribute to both business 
prosperity and accountability.  
Historically, the UK paid more attention to the latter to the detriment of the former and it 
was time to redress the balance (Hampel Report, 1998). Generally, the notion of 
safeguarding the interest of shareholders and to protect and promote stakeholder 
interest was the practice applied by who is responsible for the governance of 
corporations (Nwanji, 2006). It is interesting to note that contrary to modern supporters 
of stakeholder theory, the Hampel Report (1998) again puts shareholder interest first. 
The Hampel Report (1998) stated that the directors of the board as a board are 
accountable to the shareholders. The key recommendations of the Hampel Report 
(1998) are shown in table 3.4. 
3.7  Evaluation of the Combined Code (1998) 
The UK Combined Code (1998) herein referred to as the ‘first Combined Code’ herein 
mark the start of the second phase of UK Corporate Governance policies. It was 
incorporated into the Stock-Exchange Listing Rules as part of the Yellow Book’s 
Continuing Obligations (Parkinson and Kelly 1999). The Combined Code (1998) was 
made up of recommendations by the Cadbury, Greenbury and the Hampel Reports. 
The Combined Code (1998) requires all UK listed companies to report on how they 
applied the Combined Code in their annual report to shareholders. The Combined 
Code (1998) solidify standards of good practice on matters such as company 
accountability, robust internal controls to safeguard shareholder interest, director 
remuneration, board composition and audit committees in relation to shareholders. The 
philosophical notion of ‘comply or explain’ advocated by this code contradicts the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 which requires company directors to 
abide by the law or face a potential jail term.  
One of the requirements installed in the Combined Code (1998) requires robust internal 
controls including financial, operational, compliance and risk management (Combine 
Code 1998 part D.2.1). The Committee was set up by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). This report is aimed at providing 
guidance to directors on implementation of the internal control requirements of the 
Combined Code. The Turnbull Report (1999) reaffirms that the board of directors are 
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ultimately responsible to ensure that the company has an adequate system of internal 
control. Furthermore, the report makes it incumbent on companies to report the 
effectiveness of their internal control procedures in the annual reports. It is important to 
note that this report was revised in October 2005. There were few substantial changes 
one of which require the board to notify shareholders in the annual report, of how 
‘significant failings or weaknesses’ in the internal control procedures have been dealt 
with. According to Krishnan (2005) and Zhang et al. (2007) internal control weaknesses 
are more likely if the audit committee has less financial expertise.  
 
Table 3.5:   The Myners Report (2004):  Key Recommendations 
 
Trustees:  
 The chair of the board should be responsible for ensuring that trustees 
taking investment decisions are familiar with investment issues and that the 
board has sufficient trustees for that purpose investment. 
 Trustees should comply with the Institutional Shareholder Committee 
statement of principles on the responsibilities of institutional shareholders 
and agents, and ensure that the principles are incorporated into fund 
managers’ mandates 
Funds 
 Funds with more than 5,000 members should have access to in-house 
investment expertise equivalent at least to one full-time staff member who is 
familiar with investment issues 
 Funds should contract separately for actuarial, strategic asset allocation 
and fund manager selection advice and these contracts should be opened 
to separate competition. 
 
3.8  Evaluation of the Myners Report (2001) 
The Myners Report (2001) on institutional investment followed the Turnbull Report of 
(1999). This committee was set up by the Treasury with particular emphasis on the 
legal requirements for trustees in relation to institutional investments. This report was 
aimed at promoting more effective shareholder engagement. Thereby, improving 
standards and greater shareholder activism to protect and promote shareholder value.  
It is also hoped that pension fund trustees would adopt the ‘comply or explain policy’ to 
promote transparency and accountability as advocated by the Combined Code of Best   
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Table 3.7:   The Higgs Report (2003) on Role on Non-executive Directors 
 
Non-Executive Directors should: 
 Comprise half of the company’s board  
 Have the right knowledge, expertise, experience and skills to make a 
positive contribution to the organisation  
 Be evaluated annually on their performance 
 Be limited to not more than two three year terms on the company’s board 
  Have a meeting without the chairman and the executives directors at least 
once a year; 
 
  
 
Table 3.6:   The NAPF Report (2007):  Key Findings & Recommendations 
 
Findings:  
 Since the Principles were first published, and even since HM Treasury 
undertook its review in 2004, trusteeship has become more complex – the 
result of a harsh financial environment and an increased regulatory burden. 
 There has been an increase in compliance across all 10 Principles, but 
progress has not always been even. But there are no significant ‘market 
failures’. 
 There has been a step change in trustees’ knowledge and understanding. 
 The Principles remain relevant, but are in need of refreshing to ensure they 
continue to reflect best practice and take account of legislative, regulatory 
and market developments since 2001. There is also scope to simplify and 
consolidate the Principles. 
Recommendation: 
 Targeted help and support are needed to tackle areas of under-compliance, 
notably trustee self-assessment and small schemes. 
 The Principles should continue to be based on the voluntarist approach but 
with additional comply or explain reporting for schemes with assets in 
excess of £250 million in place of a mandatory Independent Compliance 
Review. 
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Practice (1998). The government carried out a review in 2004 to examine the extent to 
which Myners principles have been effective in bringing about behavioural change. It 
found that the principle had been generally acknowledged as the standard of best 
practice in investment decision making. However, progress lagged in some key areas 
according to the government. Hence, the Government launched a proposal to revise 
the principles aimed at strengthening the problem areas. The Myners Principles for 
Institutional Investment Decision Making Review of Progress (2004) key 
recommendations related to Trustees and funds (see Table 3.5). The National 
Association of Pension Funds (2007) reviewed the Myners Report (2004) and 
concluded that governance standards of pension schemes in the UK continued to 
improve overall and trustees’ compliance with principles also improved significantly.  It 
also recommended bringing the principles in line with the current best practice and 
replacing the ten principles with six.  Table 3.6 outlines key findings and 
recommendations of the report (NAPF 2007, p.1). 
3.9  Evaluation of the Higgs Report (2003):  On the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors 
The Higgs Report (2003) followed the Myners Report on institutional investment 
(2001). The focus of the Higgs Report (2003) was on the role and effectiveness of non- 
executive directors. It is also intended to assist companies draw on a broader pool of 
talents with different but complementary skills, experience and perspectives to enhance 
board effectiveness.  It is important to note that Higgs did offer its support to the 
Combined Code. This review was the UKs in response to the corporate governance 
failures in the US including Enron, WorldCom and Tyco which have highlighted the 
importance of effective and independent non-executive directors in bringing about 
improvements in corporate governance (Li and Wearing 2004).  
The focus of this report was to amend the Combined Code following the Hampel 
Report (1998) to ensure that non-executive directors take on more proactive, 
demanding and important roles in the governance of company boards. The Higgs 
Report (2003) recommends regarding non-executive directors are outlined in table 3.7. 
The primary recommendations also require the role of the chair and chief executive to 
be separate, audit and remuneration committees, audit and liability and finally to foster 
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a closer relationship between shareholders and non-executive directors amongst 
others.  
A study conducted by Main et al (2008) on UK remuneration committees found 
concerns with legitimacy push remuneration committees towards and institutional 
isomorphism (similarity) in process and practice. Moreover the CBI (2003) found that 
87% of company chairmen disagree that NED’s chairing the nomination committee 
would actually strengthen the independence of the board. Further, 82% agree that the 
role of senior independent director would undermine the position of chairman. One 
would expect company chairmen and women to resist independent director’s influence 
in order to remain more influential (power and politics) in corporate decision making. 
However, the nature of resistance was quite astonishing.  
Following the widespread criticism of the Higgs review (2003), the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) 2003 and Jones et al (2003) concluded that contrary to Higgs Review 
there is no reason why the chairman should not be allowed to chair the nomination 
committee. Furthermore they suggested a no limit policy on re-appointment of non-
executive directors; however, companies outside the FTSE350 companies should not 
be compelled to meet the Cadbury requirement on independent directors. Contrary to 
the findings of the CBI (2003) as stated above the Government and the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) express their support to the Higgs report. 
However, after months of debate, the FRC’s amended proposals were met with 
resounding acceptance (Tassell, 2003). These changes were included in the new 
Combined Code (2003) for implementation in the company reports from November 
2003 (FRC, 2003). A good practice suggestion from the Higgs Report was eventually 
published in the 2006 Combined Code. 
3.10  Evaluation of the Smith Review (2003) 
Smith Review (2003) on the audit committees made clear the importance of the audit 
committees to companies. The review made it clear that  “the audit committee should 
act independently without any influence from the executives to ensure that shareholder 
interest is protected in relation to financial reporting and internal control” (Smith, 2003 
para 1.5) 
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Table 3.9:  The Tyson Report (2003) Recommendations on Recruiting 
Executives 
 
 Recruitment: companies demonstrate more transparency and 
professionalism in the recruitment of company directors 
 Training: Once recruited directors to be given proper and adequate 
induction and training 
 Diversity: Annual censuses to measure diversity of boards aimed at 
encouraging the development of underrepresented groups. 
 Wider Catchment: Use of a wider catchment area in the recruitment of 
independent directors, including those just below the board level, in 
unlisted companies, consultants and non-commercial sectors. 
 
 
It is incumbent on audit committees to ensure that the company has adequate systems 
of control but not the monitoring (Smith 2003). Both the Higgs Review and the Smith 
Review reported simultaneously on 20th January 2003 (Higgs, 2003; Smith, 2003) while 
the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues (CGAA, 2003) reported on the 
29th January. Some of the proposals called for by Sir Robert Smith (2003) are outlined 
in Table 3.8. 
 
 
Table 3.8:  The Smith Review (2003) Recommendations on Audit Committees 
 
 At least one member of the audit committee should have recent, relevant 
and significant financial expertise 
 The entire audit committee be independent 
 Companies required to further strengthen the audit committee role within 
the company 
 A report from the audit committee be included in companies annual reports 
 The audit committee chairman attend the AGM to answer shareholder 
questions 
 
                             
73 
3.11  Evaluation of the Tyson Report (2003) 
The Tyson Report (2003) focused on the recruitment and development of non-
executive directors.  Table 3.9 identifies the Reports key recommendations. The Higgs 
Review and the Tyson Report (2003) have reignited the debate surrounding board 
independence, lack of female directors and the potential positive contribution of female 
participation to UK corporate governance.  
The Tyson Report (2003) also recommended that board composition should be more 
diversified and balanced. The business case for diversity on boards has four key 
dimensions according to the Davies Report (2011) namely: improving performance, 
accessing the wider talent pool, being more responsive to the market and achieving 
better corporate governance. Research conducted by McKinsey & Company (2008) 
found that performance increases significantly once a critical mass of females on the 
board is attained. The suggested critical mass appears to be at 30% below which no 
significant performance was observed which appears to contradict the Davies Report 
(2011) suggesting that companies on the FTSE 100 should aim for 25% female board 
representation by 2015.  
Mallin (2010) suggested that female directors are more independent as they do not 
belong to the ‘old boys’ network’ and therefore more likely to ask questions of 
management rather than echo the prevailing management ethos (Selby, 2000). Kang 
et al (2010) also suggested that female directors provide strong oversight and control 
over risk taking decisions, a view supported by Adams and Ferrera (2009) while 
Galbreath (2011) argued that women have a superior understanding of customer 
behaviour.  
The Davies Report (2011) may have been triggered by a report by the Equality and 
Human Right Commission (2008) which suggests that at the current rate of change it 
will take more than 70 years to achieve gender balanced boardrooms in the UK largest 
100 companies.  
The Davies Report (2011) sought to identify obstacles to female progression to 
boardroom level and make recommendations to achieve gender equality. The Report 
was commissioned by the government following concerns in relation to poor 
representation of women on boards which appears to suggest that there may well be a 
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systematic bias against female appointments requiring redress. (For full 
recommendations of the Davies Report (2011):- see David, 2011 Women on Boards, 
Department for Business and Innovation). Moreover, Li and Wearing (2004) used the 
term ‘glass ceiling’ suggesting a transparent barrier which women face as they attempt 
to achieve promotion to higher levels of organisations. Thus, it allows them to see 
where they might go, but stops them getting there (Nicolson, 1996). Brewis and 
Linstead (1999) argued that the glass ceiling has been viewed as an invisible, implicit 
but impenetrable barrier which prevents women from reaching senior positions a 
barrier that blocks the vertical mobility of women (Baxter and Wright, 2000). Women 
who do break through the glass ceiling are paid less than their male counterparts (Li 
and Wearing, 2004). Moreover, Li and Wearing (2004) also identified three key factors 
as contributing factors explaining lack of women in top positions namely: work-family 
conflict, competence/experience (Anker,1997) and networking.   
Oakley (2000) suggests that barriers created by corporate practices tend to favour 
recruitment, retention and promotion of males over females. Li and Wearing (2004) 
also added that cultural and behavioural factors can work to the disadvantage of 
women and these include stereotyping, preferred leadership style, tokenism and the 
old boys’ network. In fact, the segregation of occupation on the basis of workers’ 
gender is one of the most important and enduring aspects of the labour markets 
globally (Anker, 1997). On the contrary, companies which recognise and attempt to 
overcome gender discrimination, are more likely to recruit the best available 
managerial talent and hence, be more successful (Burke, 1997).    
Furthermore, supporters of gender equality question whether board recruitment is in 
practice based on skills, experience and performance. As a result, gender equality 
advocates are now calling for an imposition of quotas as in Norway (Hamil et al (2011). 
However, it is argued that this may lead to tokenism. Farrell and Hersch (2005) posit 
that the announcement of an appointment of a female to the board did not lead to an 
increase in the value of the firm and was not in itself considered to be a value creating 
activity. Opposition to the quota system argued that appointments should be made on 
merit and not gender (Hamil et al. 2011). Adams and Ferrera (2009) posit that the 
average effect of gender diversity on firm value was negative. An outcome explained 
by the possibility that female members were over monitoring and stifling companies’ 
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entrepreneurial activities (Hamil et al. 2011). Based on the evaluation above one can 
conclude that extant evidence appears to be contrary and requires further research.  
3.12  Evaluation of the Combined Code (2003) 
The Combined Code (2003) hereby referred to as the second Combined Code 
integrated the main points of Higgs and Smith reviews. Back (2003) suggested that 
corporate failures highlight flaws in the governance systems in directing corporations 
and boards to effectively manage the company’s affairs and meeting the required goals 
and objectives of their stakeholders. The Combined Code (2003) requires that ‘undue 
reliance’ must not be placed on particular individuals. Table 3.10 (a) outlines the key 
points of the 2003 Combined Code and subsequent versions discussed below. 
The FRC 2005 announced a review of the implementation of the Combined Code 
(2003) which was eventually superseded by the Combined Code (2006). This follows 
consultation in 2005 which yielded a number of changes to the Combined Code (2003). 
The FSA made some minor modifications to the UK Combined Code 2003. The 
principal modifications of the UK Combined Code (2006) are shown in table 3.10 (b).  
In 2006 the FRC undertook a review of the Combined Code (2006) and found that the 
Code had a beneficial impact and contributed to higher overall standards of 
governance. The ‘comply or explain’ approach was criticised initially because 
companies provided poor quality explanations for non-compliance (CIPD, 2009). 
3.13  Evaluation of the Combined Code (2008) 
The Combined Code (2008) was issued following a review on the effectiveness of the 
code which was undertaken in 2007. The Combined Code 2008 supersedes and 
replaces the Code issued in June 2006. There have been two major changes to the 
provisions of the 2006 Code. At this stage both the Combined Code (2006) and (2008) 
are in effect (see table 3.10(c)). The Combined Code (2006) applies to companies with 
accounting periods starting on or after November 2006. The Combined Code (2008) 
applies to companies with accounting periods beginning on or after 29 June 2008.  In 
May 2010, the FRC issued a new edition of the Code which applies to financial years 
beginning on or after 29 June 2010. This follows a review of the Code carried out 
during 2009 and consultation on a draft of the revised Code that ended in March 2010.   
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Table 3.10 The Combined Code  (2003) 
(a) The Combined Code  (2003) 
 The chairman should provide leadership to Non-executive Directors (NEDs) 
and ensuring that shareholder views are communicated to the board 
 A ‘formal and rigorous’ assessment of boards, individual directors and the 
performance of various committees.  
 NEDs consist at least half of large company boards 
 Both the audit and remuneration committee be formed entirely with 
independent directors 
 Chairmanship of FTSE100 company be restricted to one per person 
(b)  The Combined Code  (2006) 
 Where the Chairman is considered independent on appointment, then 
he/she should be allowed to serve but not the chair the remuneration 
committee. 
 To provide a ‘vote withheld’ option on proxy appointment form to enable 
shareholders to indicate that they wish to withhold their vote. 
 To recommend the company to publish the details of proxies lodged at a 
general meeting on their website where votes are taken on a show of hands 
(c)  The Combined Code  (2008)  
 The removal of the restriction on an individual chairing more than one FTSE 
100 company (A.4.3) 
 The company chairman of a listed company outside of the FTSE 350, allowed 
to sit on the audit committee where he or she was considered independent on 
appointment (C.3.1). 
(d)  The Financial Services Bill  (2009) 
 Effective regulation and supervision of firms 
 Effective monitoring and managing systemic risk by creating a Council for 
Financial Stability 
 To ensure banking remuneration is fair and transparent and link to effective 
risk management and finally  
 Enhance support and protection for consumers of financial products.   
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This review is carried out in light of the current difficult economic conditions for 
businesses.  
In February 2009, Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister asked David Walker to review 
corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities in light of the 
critical losses and failure throughout the banking system (Financial Times, 2009). The 
pendulum will swing – and should swing – towards an enhanced role for government in 
saving the market system from its excesses and inadequacies (Summers, 2008). It is 
important to note that there are various influences since 1998 that led to the 
development of corporate governance in the UK. Company Law Review (2002) 
included various aspects of corporate governance. Some of the corporate governance 
aspects in this review include the codification of directors’ common law duties and audit 
requirements.  The Company Review Bill was published in 2005. This was aimed at 
encouraging shareholder engagement, ensure more effective regulation and promote 
long term investment environment.  
Institutional investors and their representative groups also act as a professional ‘group 
voice’ for their members. These groups include; the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) amongst others. Other 
institutional investors and groups representing them also offer their views on issues of 
corporate governance. These organizations include:- 
 CalPERS (California Public Employees’ Retirement System) Global Corporate 
Governance Principles, (1997) went on to develop corporate governance 
principles for France, Germany, Japan, UK, US, and global guidelines, which 
tend to build on OECD Principles.  
 Teacher Insurance and Annuity Association – College Retirement Equities Fund, 
Policy Statement on Corporate Governance, (2000); and 
 The Hermes Principles, Hermes Pension Management Limited, (2002). 
3.14  Queen’s Speech – Financial Services Bill (2009) 
The Queen also set out her government’s continued effort to reform and strengthen 
regulation of the financial services industry to enhance greater protection for savers 
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and taxpayers. The purpose of the bill was to strengthen and reform financial regulation 
in the UK, support improved corporate governance, and safeguard and empower 
consumers. It also intended to rebuild the financial system to ensure that it is fairer and 
works more effectively for consumers (Number10, 2009). The main benefit of this bill is 
as follows greater efficiency (see table 3.10 (d) ). 
The Banking Bill was introduced to Parliament in October 2008 and received the Royal 
Assent in February 2009 and now an Act of Parliament (Opsi, 2009). The Banking Act 
2009 gives the Bank of England the statutory mandate with regard to financial stability 
and introduces a bank resolution and insolvency framework. The Banking Act 2009 
was initially triggered by the debacle surrounding the failure of Northern Rock but 
subsequent events led to the reform process and provided the government with a 
sufficient array of tools to confront a troubled bank (Campbell and Lastra, 2009).  
The banking crisis of 2007 highlighted the need for a debate on the issue of bank 
safety and protection of depositors. It is important to note that the financial services 
underwent a significant reform in 1997 leading to the passing of the Financial Service 
and Market Act 2000. This Act created the FSA and a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services 
Authority. Despite these changes, Goh (2010) argued that hindsight shows that 
financial services regulation in the UK failed spectacularly at its first real test. 
Furthermore, he argues that it became increasingly clear that the FSA and other 
regulators had suffered ‘collective intellectual failure’ failing to spot the iceberg before it 
was too late (Goh, 2010). As a result, the coalition government is suggesting radical 
changes to the UK regulatory framework. These include abolishing the FSA and 
transferring the majority of its powers back to the Bank of England with the remaining 
powers transferred to the Consumer Protection Agency as well as the creation of 
Financial Stability Council. It remains to be seen whether these new changes will 
prevent future financial crisis in the UK.  
3.15  The Turner Review (2009)  
The financial crisis of 2007 revealed the inherent fragility of the UK banking sector and 
the flaws in domestic financial regulation. It is clearly evident that there is a need for a 
drastic overhaul of domestic financial regulation and supervisory arrangements (Hall, 
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2009). Lord Turner was asked by the Chancellor to review the causes of the 2007 
financial crisis, and to make recommendations on the changes in regulation and 
supervisory approach necessary for an effective and robust banking system for the 
future. The Turner review (2009) aimed to ensure banks keep more capital to protect 
themselves against risk, closer supervision of credit rating agencies, and tighten up on 
irresponsible pay scales.  
The review also paved the way for the FSA to radically change its approach to 
overseeing the banking sector. Thus, initiating a new European banking regulator to 
handle pan-European banks. This review looks into how Britain, and the rest of the 
world, should respond to the financial crisis aimed at creating a stable and effective 
banking system. The review contains 28 recommendations. The entire 
recommendations are available online (FSA, 2013).  
Despite these recommendations Bruner (2011) argued that the principal challenge 
facing the UK policymakers is the need to re-conceptualise the more shareholder 
centric UK Corporation in the financial setting as a means of curbing risk-taking in 
banks. Furthermore, it is also suggested that policy makers in the UK and US seem to 
advocate the need to empower the very stakeholder group whose incentives are most 
skewed toward the kind of excessive risk talking that led to the financial crisis in the 
first place (ibid).  
Pistor (2009, p.333) commenting on sovereign wealth funds, banks and governance in 
the global crisis argued that: 
every crisis can be taken as symptom of governance failure. The immediate 
reaction tends to be an attempt to fix the problems that gave rise to the most 
recent crisis. By definition, such a regulatory approach lags behind actual 
developments on the financial marketplace, thereby inadvertently sowing the 
seeds for the next corporate governance failure.   
This appears to suggest that corporate governance regulations tend to be reactive and 
lacked the ability to prevent and foresee future crisis. It also highlights the importance 
of corporate governance failure on global finance and the increasing important role of 
sovereign wealth funds as a shareholder of banks. The financial crisis and the 
subsequent bailouts have demonstrated governments perceive finance as public good 
                             
80 
and will respond to threats to the financial system accordingly (Pistor, 2009). Finally, as 
the global economy recovers following the worst financial crisis in 60 years, there is a 
danger that complacency will set in and banks will return to the pre-crisis modes of 
behaviour (Hall, 2009). If this is allowed to happen history will repeat itself and trust will 
be difficult to restore in the financial sector. In addition, over-regulation and stifling of 
innovation and entrepreneurial activity should also be avoided (Hall, 2009), but the 
world has to accept that, the interest of citizens require that state-subsidised risk taking 
be substantially reduced. 
3.16  The Walker Report (2009) 
In light of the experience of critical loss and failure throughout the banking system, Sir 
David Walker was asked by the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, to review corporate 
governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities. The recent financial crisis 
had a profound effect on taxpayers and regulators across the world. The financial crisis 
of 2007 has indeed reminded society that there is a tangible link between business 
activities in the financial services sector and the real economy (Leblanc 2009; Hamil et 
al 2011). 
The UK House of Commons, Treasury Committee (2009) established to investigate the 
financial crisis concluded that the bonus driven remuneration structures encouraged 
reckless and excessive risk taking and the design of bonus schemes was not aligned 
with the interest of shareholders and long term sustainability of the banks, a view 
supported by Leblanc (2009). Lambert’s (2008) echoed similar sentiments when he 
blamed the financial crisis on a serious misalignment between the interests of 
managers and shareholders... a number of investment banks overlooked basic risk 
controls in their drive to increase profits. 
This pattern of behaviour had been exacerbated by the remuneration structure which 
encouraged some employees to take spectacular short term risk, confident that if 
things worked out well they will reap significant rewards, and if they did not they would 
not suffer the consequences. The irony here is that the compensation package did not 
penalise executives when their risky decision making damaged shareholder value. 
Walker (2009) subsequently, raised concerns about executive remuneration, 
recommending that banks should reduce its impact upon short term performance. 
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These revelations appear to question the effectiveness and implementation of the 
Greenbury Report (1995) on director’s remuneration. Hence, governments are 
reviewing their corporate governance rules and past regulation to ensure greater 
support and protection for consumers of financial products.  
The Walker Report (2009) finally came up with 38 recommendations aimed at 
enhancing corporate governance with the view to reducing the likelihood of a similar 
catastrophe occurring in UK economy again. Furthermore, there was a genuine attempt 
to address the systemic threat posed by granting bonuses that encourage excessive 
risk taking.  
As anticipated by Lord Turner, the Walker Review was published a few months after 
his own review. The Walker Report (2009) will ultimately provide his recommendations 
to HM Treasury on corporate governance and the management of risk in the UK 
banking industry. Although the Walker Report (2009) mainly focused on banks, 
however, the report applies to all institutions, not just banks. Its recommendations 
influenced the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) discussed below. The Walker 
review also concluded that the Combined Code did not fail and suggested that the 
‘comply or explain’ approach should remain.  
However, the media reaction to Walker’s Review publication was mixed. Hall (2009) 
highlighted the following weakness in the Walker Report (2009): 
 No cap on bonuses was proposed, and ‘clawback’ of bonuses was only 
sanctioned in cases of misstatement or misconduct, not subsequent poor 
performance; 
 On pay disclosure, there is no requirement that individual high earning bankers 
be identified, only the numbers of employees earning above a certain threshold 
be published and 
 Chief Executives not barred from becoming Chairmen. 
It is important to note that concerns have also been raised in relation to the potential 
damage that might be done to UK financial services if similar proposals are not 
implemented in competing jurisdictions. Some also raised fears in relation to the likely 
difficulty in filling non-executive positions as a result of increase burdens imposed by 
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the Report. On the contrary, others complained about the extension of the remit of non-
executive directors into areas traditionally preserved for management alone (Hall, 
2009). Either way Sir David Walker has to balance the public interest against potential 
threats to domestic finance industry profitability. 
3.17  The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) formerly the Combined Code was aimed 
at setting out standards of good practice in relation to board leadership and 
effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations with shareholders. It was 
intended that a new code will be published in 2012 to be applied to financial years 
beginning or after October (FRC, 2010). The Combined Code was updated in 2010 to 
incorporate the findings of the Walker Report (2009) and was renamed the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010). This code emphasises that it is the board’s 
responsibility to consider long term success of their company. It is therefore prudent to 
suggest that the purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, 
entrepreneurial and prudent management aimed at delivering long term success of a 
company (FRC 2010). In addition, The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) tasked 
shareholders with holding the board to account and recommends that shareholders 
have an annual opportunity to provide feedback on the performance of directors prior to 
the AGM.  
As a result, shareholders have been more outspoken in their objections to executive 
remuneration following the financial crisis.  For example 47% of shareholders failed to 
back the remuneration report in 2010 AGM (Guardian 2010). Figures from Pensions & 
Investment Research Consultants available on (PIRC 2010) the UK government 
advisory group suggest that the number of companies with 10% or more opposition to 
remuneration reports jumped from zero in 2000 to 65 in 2009. According to the 
Guardian (2010a, p.12) a disgruntled shareholder got a round of applause when he 
reportedly told the board of British Airways ‘you do seem to be feathering your own 
nests at the expense of the shareholders you are supposed to serve’. It is also argued 
that no code or legislation, no matter how well written, can guarantee the conduct of 
directors (Hamil et al 2010). 
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However, history has demonstrated that new “unethical practices evolve to take the 
place of current unethical behaviour that is continually being uncovered and monitored 
(Hamil et al (2010). Self-interest and the lust for power and wealth (in some individuals) 
mean that surprise corporate failures are still likely to occur in the future” (Hamil et al 
2010, p.58). This seems to suggest that future corporate failures cannot be ruled out 
completely despite the introduction of codes or legislations and that government’s and 
regulators will have to revisit corporate governance codes and legislation continuously 
as new issues emerge. The entire recommendations of The UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010) are available at the FRC web site (FRC 2012). 
3.18  Stewardship Code (2010)  
The Financial Reporting Council published the Stewardship Code in July 2010 to 
encourage engagement between institutional investors and companies to help improve 
long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance 
responsibilities (FRC 2010). The Code set out good practice on engagement with 
investee companies to which the FRC believes institutional investors should aspire and 
operates on a 'comply or explain' basis. The FSA therefore requires UK authorised 
asset managers to report on whether or not they apply the Code (ibid). 
For many years critics of UK corporate governance have urged those who own equity 
in listed companies to forsake their traditional bias in favour of passivity and act as 
responsible and engaged ‘owners’ (Cheffins, 2011). In a 2009 speech, Lord Myners 
described institutional investors who currently dominate share ownership in publicly 
quoted UK companies as ‘absentee landlords’. Walker (2009) also argued that a more 
productive and informed relationship between directors and shareholders should assist 
directors better manage company’s affairs more effectively.  
The irony here is that it will be extremely difficult for institutional investors and other 
shareholders to have any meaningful impact or curtail decisions of the board without a 
binding vote. The Coalition Government is currently working on legislation which will 
give shareholders legally binding votes. The standoff in relation to lending more to 
small businesses between Royal Bank of Scotland and the Lloyds Banking group 
against the government (major shareholder in two banks) have demonstrated 
institutional investors’ lack of power and influence. Furthermore, Cheffins (2011) 
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argued that, the Code is unlikely to foster substantially greater shareholder involvement 
in UK corporate governance due to sustained fragmentation of share ownership 
occurring over the last 20 years.  This is mainly because the:  
proportion of shares held by ‘mainstream’ domestic institutional investors has 
dropped markedly and shareholders who are not the Stewardship Code’s main 
targets – primarily overseas investors, hedge funds and private individuals – now 
collectively dominate share registers. The Stewardship Code’s impact will, in all 
likelihood, be compromised accordingly (Cheffins, 2011, p.4).  
It can be argued that the flexibility offered by the notion of ‘comply or explain’ creates 
risks that those to whom the Code applies will fail to treat compliance as a priority and 
will offer little or no explanation to justify non-compliance.  Furthermore, shareholders 
may not have the necessary expertise to ascertain whether or not the company is 
losing its way and generate well informed solutions (Skypala, 2009). Moreover, fund 
managers acting on behalf of institutional investors tend to focus on trading decisions 
and are neither incentivized nor resourced to act as owners (ibid).  
On the contrary, proponents of the Stewardship Code argued that the code will be a 
catalyst for improved engagement between shareholders and companies and create a 
stronger link between governance and the investment process. The disclosures made 
by institutional investors under the code will also help companies to understand the 
expectations of their major shareholders. Based on the analysis above, one can 
conclude that the fragmentation of share ownership in the UK stands out as a potential 
major stumbling block to activism by the ‘mainstream’ institutional investors the 
Stewardship Code targets (Cheffins, 2011). Full recommendations of the Code can be 
obtained at the FRC website (FRC 2011).  
3.19  The Vickers Report (2011) 
In June 2010, George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of 
State for Business, Vince Cable, announced the creation of the Independent 
Commission on Banking (ICB) chaired by Sir John Vickers. The Commission’s primary 
duty was to review the structural and related non-structural reforms to the UK banking 
sector aimed at enhancing financial stability and competition, and to make 
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recommendations.  The Independent Commission on Banking subsequently published 
its interim report in April 2011 and its final report in September 2011. In its final Report 
the Commission recommended that its reforms be implemented no later than the start 
of 2019. The underlying principle leading to the creation of this Commission was to 
safeguard consumer banking from riskier wholesale activities and address the notion of 
moral hazard. The need to protect the tax payers from future financial crisis and bail 
outs was highlighted by JP Morgan’s multi-billion dollar derivatives losses known as 
‘Whategate’. Soon after this came the ‘Liborgate’ scandal costing Barclays £290m in 
fines. In July 2012, there was a money laundering scandal at HSBC followed by 
Standard Chartered’s settlement over allegations that it had broken embargoes with 
Iran. 
Critics of the report argue that the 2019 deadline to implement the Vickers’ proposal 
was still a long way off for UK banks and even longer for them to make a real 
difference in the market. Others argue that the reform was about separating the two 
functions (retail and investments banking - operational separable) rather than cleaning 
up the corporate culture of investment banks (Khalique 2012). If the recommendations 
are fully implemented by the Government, the investment banks would have to fund all 
its liabilities in the market at market rate instead of through its deposits. Hence, this 
may lead to higher cost of capital for banks, increase cost of lending for UK businesses 
thereby putting them at a disadvantage with their overseas competitors. The 
introduction of tougher regulation could ultimately damage UK banks’ ability to compete 
globally (Goff, 2011). Access to other financial products may be limited as well. It 
remains to be seen as to whether or not investors will be willing to lend money to 
investment banks without assurances that it might have some support from its 
government if needed or even from its parent company (Khalique 2012). As a result, 
creditors will have to choose which legal entity of the bank to deal with and if it falls 
inside or outside the ring fence. Subsequently, the entity of the bank outside the ring 
fence will suffer increased cost of funding if its rating is lower. It is therefore inevitable 
that banks with significant investment divisions will be hit hardest because they have 
more to restructure. It is therefore paramount that the public perception of UK banks 
tainted by the scandals such as ‘Liborgate’ and subprime mortgages should not be 
allowed to impact future legislation beyond what is reasonable.  
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Banks and some business groups argue that hitting the industry with additional cost at 
a time when their businesses are already under pressure could undermine lending and 
recovery (Goff, 2011). There may also be an incentive for banks from outside the 
European Economic Area (EEA) that wish to operate retail banking in the UK to set up 
headquarters in another EEA state and passport in, thereby avoiding any UK ring-
fencing requirements (Harvard Law School 2011). There is also the risk that ring-
fencing may have an adverse effect with regulators focusing overly on risks within the 
ring-fenced sector whilst missing developments elsewhere in the market that could 
potentially cause disruption (Harvard Law School 2011). 
Goff (2011) suggested that ring fencing UK retail operations may actually encourage 
banks to take greater risks with activities inside the fence, such as mortgages and 
corporate and personal loans because they are likely to be bailed out.  
Proponents of the report argue that it will protect consumer clients and, therefore, the 
taxpayer from the effects of another collapse caused by risky or shady practices 
(Khalique, 2012). Others argue that the recommendations will strengthen the European 
single market because the biggest distortion to this market is the perceived implicit 
government guarantees HM Treasury (2012). It is also suggested that the reforms will 
encourage more competition and could lead to an emergence of a stronger challenger 
to the big four in the UK (The Telegraph, 2011). As a result of the suggested changes 
by the Vickers’ Report (2011) investment banking outside the ring-fence will be allowed 
to collapse without worries about financial contagion. Furthermore, increasing loss 
absorbency coupled with ring-fencing could substantially reduce the perceived 
government guarantee across the banking sector.  
One can therefore conclude that the recommendations are aimed at providing 
continuity of service to those more vulnerable customers, while allowing the banks 
activities outside the ring fence to fail in an orderly fashion. Another dilemma facing 
regulators is the fact that many banking products contain elements of both commercial 
and investment banking packaged together, e.g. loans and credit default swaps. In the 
future, banks will have to reconsider and restructure their product structures across the 
board to comply with the ICB’s recommendations. Ultimately, these products will need 
to be offered by two separate entities thereby potentially increasing costs for small 
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businesses (Harvard Law School 2011).   The main recommendations of the Vickers’ 
Report (2011) are:  ring-fencing UK banks’ retail banking operations, higher capital 
requirements for UK retail banks, preferential status for insured deposits in a bank 
insolvency and measures to increase competition in the UK banking sector. The full 
recommendations of the ICB (2011) are available on line 
(http://bankingcommission.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/ICB-Final-
Report.pdf).  
3.19.1 ‘External’ Influences on UK Corporate Governance  
Reports by European Union (EU) company law experts had significant implications for 
its member states including the UK. Zattoni and Cuomo (2008, p. 1) found that “the 
issuance of codes in civil law countries is prompted more by legitimating reasons than 
the determination to improve the governance practices of national companies”. 
Bauwhede and Willekens (2008, p. 101) found that “ceteris paribus the level of 
corporate governance disclosure is (1) lower for a company with higher ownership 
concentration, (2) is higher for companies from common law countries; and (3) 
increases with level of working capital accruals”. Brenner and Schwalbach (2009, p.1) 
found that CEO pay is “always less generous under stricter anti-director rules and a 
stronger rule of law furthermore, director liability rules are associated with more 
generous pay schemes”.  
Li and Samsell (2009) found that trade is more common for rule-based states in 
comparison to relation-based states. Furthermore, countries with large gaps in 
governance environment tend to trade less. However, positive effect on trade flows 
exists between two highly rule-based countries and not two highly relation-based 
countries. Tricker (2009) argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) also made its 
influence felt in the UK. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) as 
revised in 2004 also made a significant contribution to the development of corporate 
governance globally.   
The Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) coordinates corporate governance 
activities between the World Bank and the OECD. It is aimed at bringing various 
corporate governance groups including countries, banks, and professional groups 
amongst others with a view to form a common initiative. The International Corporate 
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Governance Network (ICGN) aims to facilitate international dialogue on corporate 
governance issues with institutional investors, academics, and financial intermediaries 
amongst others. It is important to note that the ICGN principle (2005) advocates similar 
sentiments to that of the OECD building on the OECD Principles (2004). The 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) as the name suggest is 
aimed at Commonwealth countries. The CACG mainly covers 15 principles detailing 
board’s role and responsibilities. The Basle Committee provides guidelines enhancing 
corporate governance within the banking industry. 
3.19.2 The Lamfalussy Report (2005) 
The Lamfalussy Report (2005) was initially developed in 2001 and later reviewed in 
2007 aimed at developing the financial services industry regulations used by the EU. 
Lamfalussy Committee called for a four-level approach to European regulation to allow 
the EU to respond rapidly and flexibly to developments in financial markets in order to 
achieve greater market integration and improved competitiveness (Europa 2005). 
Following the review in 2007 the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the EU 
concluded that the arrangements were broadly working well, but some improvements 
need to be made (See appendix IV - The Four Level Approach to European 
Regulation). 
3.20  Conclusion  
Alexander (2006, p.17) argued that:  
corporate governance of banks is largely concerned with reducing the social costs 
of bank risk taking and that the regulator is uniquely positioned to balance the 
relevant stakeholder interests in devising corporate governance standards for 
financial institutions that achieve economic development objectives, while 
minimising the externalities of systemic risk.  
This highlights the importance financial institutions in economic development as well as 
the need for financial regulation because of the systemic risk that banking activities 
pose for the economy and society at large.   
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According to Rossouw (2005) the dominant model of corporate governance that 
emerges in African national codes is an inclusive model of corporate governance. The 
two fundamental reasons why most African countries adopt a voluntary system are: 
inadequate legal and regulatory framework (Rossouw, 2005).  A vast numbers of 
companies in Africa are not listed and therefore not affected by corporate governance 
requirements. Thus, mandatory requirements for listed companies would leave the 
majority of the companies outside the remit of corporate governance reform. The above 
arguments suggest that Africa’s lack of advanced markets is a major factor that makes 
the stockholder model of corporate governance inappropriate. 
The regulatory framework in The Gambia is aimed at enhancing the required 
foundation for a legitimate and transparent system of regulation and corporate 
governance. However, weak institutional capacity and corruption still pose problems on 
a more practical level (EIU ViewsWire 2003). The Gambia’s banking sector is relatively 
healthy: non-performing loans as a percentage of banks’ total loan portfolio dropped 
from 11% in 2001 to 5.5% in 2003 (ibid). Finally, Agu (2004) also added that 
commercial banks in The Gambia have not performed as efficiently as they could, due 
to the heavy regulatory framework.  
The UK adopted a voluntary system of governance based on the notion of ‘comply or 
explain’. However, these codes seem to come into effect as a reaction to a particular 
situation. These codes seem to reflect what already happened as opposed to a 
preventative measure. One can argue that it is extremely difficult to predict what the 
future will be.  
There are other external influences on UK corporate governance amongst which 
include: EU company law, the OECD principles of corporate governance, the World 
Bank, the IMF, The Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF), the ICGN, CACG, 
Basle Committee and the Lamfalussy Report. These codes are aimed at reforming and 
strengthening financial services regulation aimed at protecting stakeholders. 
Interestingly, the recent financial crisis couldn’t be averted despite all the codes that 
existed in the UK. Recently, the trend of privatisation seems to be reversed in favour of 
public ownership of companies. This seems to suggest that perhaps privatisation may 
not be the best way forward after all in governance of corporations.  
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The UK Combined Code (2003) adopted a policy of ‘comply or explain’. The US for 
example adopted a legislative approach by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) as 
a result of the corporate failures in 2002-2003. It is believed that the doctrine of ‘legal 
personality’ is fundamental in the development of corporate governance literature.  
The main thrust of next chapter is centred on the research methodology adopted for 
this research namely grounded theory. An evaluation of the two main paradigms of 
inquiry adopted for this research namely the interpretivists and constructivist paradigms 
will also be carried out. Finally, the difference between the Glaser and Strauss schools 
of thought will be explored in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: THE GROUNDED THEORY 
APPROACH  
4.0  Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at establishing the appropriate research methodology that the 
researcher can deploy in order to meet the research aims and objectives. The chapter 
opens with the paradigms of inquiry for this research, followed by the interpretivist 
paradigm before embarking on the constructivist paradigm. Brief commentaries on 
other paradigms are also covered as well as the theoretical framework underpinning 
the research. Grounded theory approach is the preferred research methodology the 
researcher intends to use and it’s covered extensively in this chapter. The researcher 
also explored other areas of interest such as the Glazer and Strauss schools of 
thought, research using grounded theory. Finally, this chapter also aims to elaborate on 
the issue of developing substantive theory (data analysis) and research methods 
before concluding the chapter.  
Grounded theory methodology will be used to develop a substantive theory for 
corporate governance in developing countries, with particular emphasis on The 
Gambian financial sector governance. The methodology will mainly focus on 
paradigms, research methods, and grounded theory as a research methodology for 
corporate governance research, Kant’s CI and reviewing the literature on grounded 
theory as a research instrument. 
Since the introduction of the Cadbury Committee Report on the Financial Aspect of 
Corporate Governance (1992), issues of corporate governance are mainly focused on 
the major shareholders and institutional shareholders of organisations. There is little or 
no attention paid to financial sector and non-profit organisations (Nwanji, 2006). Few 
academic researchers in developing countries focus on financial sector corporate 
governance. Corporate governance systems in the financial sector organisations are 
important, particularly in developing countries such as The Gambia where the biggest 
employers include government departments and the financial sector. 
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Using grounded theory methodology this research will examine the effectiveness of 
corporate governance systems in the financial sector organisations in The Gambia. 
This is aimed at scrutinising how effective the provisions of their services are to 
different stakeholder groups within the context of developing countries. It will also 
examine the effect of corporate governance regulations in relation to stakeholder 
interests in the financial sector organisations in developing countries, with particular 
reference to The Gambian corporate governance system. Focusing on The Gambian 
corporate governance systems the study will determine what contributions, if any; 
effective governance systems lead to effective management of the financial sectors to 
meet the needs of different stakeholders groups within the society. In developing 
countries such as The Gambia, accountability and responsibility are significant 
problems due to corruption and mismanagement of public finances. Will a good 
governance system provide accountability by management of financial sector 
organisations to stakeholders?  
4.1  The Paradigms of Inquiry for this Research   
Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p.183) defined a paradigm as “a set of beliefs that guide 
action. It consist of ethics (how to be a moral person), epistemology (how to acquire 
knowledge), ontology (what is nature of reality), and methodology (means to acquire 
knowledge)”.  
A research paradigm can therefore, be defined as rules that provide the basis of how to 
conduct research based on one’s guiding or underlying principles, their assumptions 
about the world and the nature of knowledge.  In this context, it is about how research 
should be conducted.  
Thus a paradigm can be described as a theoretical framework or structure of thought 
that acts as a template or example to be followed. Guba and Lincoln (1994, p.105) 
argued that “questions of research methods are of secondary importance to questions 
of which paradigm is applicable to your research”. Saunders et al (2007, p.100) defined 
the research “paradigm as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the 
investigation, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically 
fundamental ways”. The research paradigm is therefore not only limited to a basic 
belief system or worldview that guides the investigation but the nature of reality 
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(ontology) and its study of existence as well as the nature of knowledge 
(epistemology), in particular its foundations, scope and validity. Furthermore, Collis and 
Hussey (2009) argued that our personal research paradigm helps us to determine 
which methodology to adopt and in turn, identify the methods of collecting data. Any 
paradigm adopted will eventually have implications for the methodology chosen and 
the outcome of the overall result of the research. Paradigms offer a framework 
comprising an accepted set of theories, methods and ways of defining data (Bell, 
2003). 
To approach the proposed objectives, this thesis will opt for a combination of 
interpretivist and constructivist paradigms. The rationale for adopting this research 
strategy is that it allows the researcher to investigate existing phenomena such as 
corporate governance issues, which are based on the behaviour and actions of 
corporate executives charged with the implementation of the corporate governance 
requirements, their mind set and reality. It will also enable this thesis to build a 
substantive theory of corporate governance using the research questions and research 
design while using grounded theory method in constructing the substantive theory 
(Hussey and Hussey 1997; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Lincoln and Guba 2000; Howell 
2003, 2004). 
4.2  The Interpretivist Paradigm 
The initial application of phenomenological ideas to the social sciences is attributed to 
the work of Alfred Schutz (1899 -1959). His work was influenced by Weber’s concept of 
Verstehen (which means understanding in German) as well as by phenomenological 
philosophers like Husserl (Bryman, 2008). According to Guba and Lincoln (1994, 
p.116) “paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, ought to go about the 
business of inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides his 
or her approach”. Based on the argument above this researcher is compelled to set out 
his intended paradigm underpinning his approach. The proposed paradigm adopted for 
this research will be interpretivism (Phenomenological paradigm) which is a qualitative 
research method employing an inductive process.  
The social world of business and management is far too complex to lend itself to 
theorising by definite ‘laws’ in the same ways as the physical sciences (Saunders et al, 
                             
94 
2007). It is therefore suggested that the rich insights into this complex world will be lost 
if such complexities are reduced entirely to a series of law like generalisations. 
Generally, “positivists now accept that there are important aspects of the social and 
psychological world that simply escape measurement and quantification, and that 
interpretative research can be both insightful and rigorous” (Mingers, 2004, p.165). 
Furthermore, Kamal (2006) added that interpretive research methodology is related to 
data gathering and generating solid descriptions and interpretations and further allows 
theory building. 
Phenomenology can be defined as the way in which humans make sense of the world 
around us (Saunders et al, 2007).  Interpretivism rests on the assumption that social 
reality is in our minds, and is subjective and multiple (Kim, 2003). Hence, social reality 
is affected by the act of investigating it. Interpretivists believe that reality and the 
individual who observes it cannot be separated (Walker and Evers, 1999). Therefore, 
our perceptions of the world are inextricably bound to a stream of experiences we have 
had throughout our lives (Webber, 2004). The life-world has both subjective and 
objective characteristics (Webber, 2004). Subjective characteristics reflect our 
perceptions about the meaning of the world (Webber, 2004). The objective 
characteristics reflect that we constantly negotiate this meaning with others with whom 
we interact (ibid). The arguments above appear to suggest that our perception of 
reality, the interpretation of that reality and subsequent actions in light of our perception 
is prone to be subjective.   
The researcher intends to use an inductive process. This is aimed at providing an 
interpretative understanding of social phenomena within a particular context. The 
inductive approach focuses on the study of mutual simultaneous shaping of factors with 
a newly independent design (categories are identified during the process). Thus, 
findings are accurate and reliable through verification (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
The interpretivism (phenomenological) paradigm is concerned with understanding 
human behaviour from the participant’s own frame of reference. It is a reaction to the 
positivist paradigm, which is a quantitative research method. Positivism focuses on 
“measuring social phenomena; whilst interpretivism focuses on exploring the 
complexity of social phenomena with the view to gaining interpretative understanding” 
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(Collis and Hussey, 2009, p.57). Thus, positivists believe that matters that are the 
subject of research are capable to being investigated objectively, and their veracity can 
be established with a reasonable degree of certainty. Interpretivists on the contrary, 
believe that the qualities they ascribe to the objects they research are socially 
constructed – they are products of their life-worlds.  
Interpretive researchers therefore argued that organisational and social realities are 
constructed as a product of theorising, adding that this individual theorising itself 
shapes and affect reality (Kim, 2003). Hence, Walker and Evers, (1999) suggested that 
there is no mind-independent reality to correspond with hypothesis as an external 
reference point on their acceptability. Therefore, knowledge is seen to be comprised of 
multiple sets of interpretations that are part of the social and cultural context in which it 
occurs (Kim, 2003).  
The contextual and subjective nature of interpretative research is at times a major 
obstacle particularly for researchers who seek to generalise the results to different 
organisational settings. The conditions prevailing in one situation or context may not 
necessarily apply to others. Therefore, attaining findings that are transferable to various 
contexts are rare (if not impossible) due to situational and contextual discrepancies. As 
a result, in many cases, the unique variance of these influential factors makes results 
impossible to replicate.  Interpretivists also accept that there are important aspects of 
“the world, including the social world that goes before and beyond the individual’s 
meanings and beliefs, and that quantitative analysis can sometimes be useful” 
(Mingers, 2004, p.165).  It is also argued that conducting interpretative research can 
also be costly due to the extended research time needed to observe, describe and 
understand a particular phenomenon. Babbie (1993) suggested that researchers views 
are often reflected in the interpretative research process, their personal subjectivity 
may inherently bias the research conclusions.  Thus, their sense making activities 
occur within the framework of their life-worlds and the particular goals they have for 
their work (Webber, 2004). This is mainly because interpretivists recognise that the 
knowledge they build reflects their particular goals, culture, experience, history 
amongst others. However, Kim (2003, p.13) suggested that: 
                             
96 
experience interpretive researchers are able to bracket their pre-existing ideas of 
the phenomena and further assume a moral responsibility to accurately represent 
subjects and contexts as a means of reducing biases in their findings, it is almost 
impossible to completely remove this crucial source of error. Many interpretive 
researchers acknowledge such bias as acceptable, but purists from the positivistic 
traditional believe such contamination is unacceptable.  
This would appear to suggest that interpretivists are able to set aside any pre-existing 
ideas of a phenomenon and assume moral responsibility aimed at reducing biases and 
subjectivity in the research findings. Webber (2004) argued that interpretivists are of 
the view that research is reliable if researchers can demonstrate interpretative 
awareness. Therefore, Interpretivists acknowledge the subjectively they bring into a 
particular research process and measures taken to address the implications of their 
subjectivity. Interpretivists therefore seek to adopt different methods that “seek to 
describe, translate and otherwise come to terms with meaning, not the frequency of 
certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” (Van 
Maaneen,1983, p.9). Therefore, one can broadly conclude that interpretive research is 
any type of research where the findings are not derived from the statistical analysis of 
quantitative data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Furthermore, Holstein and Gubrium 
(2005, p.484) argued that: 
Interpretive practice engages both the hows and the whats of social reality; it is 
centred in both how people methodically construct their experiences and their 
worlds, and in the configurations of meaning and institutional life that inform and 
shape their reality –constituting activity. A growing attention to both the hows and 
the whats of the social construction process echoes Karl Marx’s (1956) adage that 
people actively construct their worlds but not completely on, or in, their own terms. 
The process of engaging both the hows and whats makes it possible to understand and 
appreciate the construction process but also foregrounds the realities themselves that 
enter into and are produced by the process.  This notion of hows and whats now leads 
the researcher into the next major topic which is on constructivism.   
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4.3  The Constructivist Paradigm   
Guba and Lincoln (1989, p.12) posited that “for the constructivist paradigm, the core 
assumption is that realities are not objectively ‘out there’ but are constructed by people, 
often under the influence of a variety of social and cultural factors that lead to shared 
construction”.  Hence, for constructivism, “humanity alone is responsible for knowledge 
development and understanding is a matter of interpretive construction on the part of 
the active subject” (Howell, 2013, p.90).  
However, Greene, (2000, p.986) suggested that “constructivist inquirers seek to 
understand contextualised meaning… the meaningfulness of human actions and 
interactions –as experienced and construed in a given context”. Furthermore, Charmaz 
(2006) argued that a constructivist approach places priority on the phenomena of study 
and sees both data and analysis as created from shared experiences and relationships 
with participants (see Charmaz, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001; Charmaz and Mitchell, 1996). 
Constructivist grounded theory therefore assumes that both data and analysis are 
social constructions that reflect what their production entailed (see Bryant, 2002, 2003, 
Charmaz, 2000, Hall and Callery, 2001; Thorne et al, 2004). Thus, any analysis is 
therefore contextually situated in time, place, culture and situation.  
Furthermore, she argued that constructivist grounded theory lies squarely in the 
interpretative tradition contrary to objectivist grounded theory which is derived from 
positivism. Thus, we do not exist in a social vacuum but instead interact with data and 
create theories about it. This may also appear to suggest that in the process of 
conducting research using the constructivist’s approach, research participants may live 
in the researcher’s mind and influence how the researcher conducts research long after 
immediate contact with them.  Hence, constructivism understands reality as being 
locally constructed and based on shared experiences.  
Epistemologically, constructivist’s research results are created through consensus and 
individual constructions, including the constructions of the investigator (Howell, 2013). 
Navon (2001, p.624) argued that “for a rationalist, the mind unveils reality; for post-
modernist, the mind invents reality whereas for constructivists the mind creates reality 
and claims that facts are produced by human consciousness”. Similarly, Howell (2013) 
commenting on social constructivism and social constructionalism (emphasis on the 
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individual in the former and community in the latter) in relation to how reality is 
developed and understood argued that each amounts to a similar position in that reality 
is not external to human existence but determined and defined through social 
interaction. Guba and Lincoln (1989, p.13) concurred that such “socially constructed 
realities are not independent of the ‘observer’ (constructor) but are absolutely 
dependent on him or her for whatever existence they have”. 
Constructivists therefore focus on how and occasionally why participants construct 
meanings and actions in specific situations. Charmaz (2006, p.130) suggested that a 
constructivist approach means more than looking at “how individuals view their 
situations. It not only theorise the interpretive work that research participants do, but 
also acknowledges that the resulting theory is an interpretation (Bryant, 2002, 
Charmaz, 2000, 2002)”. Social constructivists assume that individuals seek 
understanding of the world in which they live and work. It is argued that individuals 
develop subjective meanings (varied and multiple) of their experiences – meanings 
directed at certain objects or things (Creswell, 2009). As a result of multiple and varied 
meaning, the researcher is able to look at the complexity of views rather than 
narrowing meaning into a few categories or ideas.   
The subjective meanings are therefore negotiated socially and historically not imprinted 
on individuals but are formed through interaction with others (hence social 
constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ 
lives (Creswell, 2009). Therefore, the constructivist approach to research is to make 
sense of (or interpret) the meanings others have about the world instead of starting 
with a theory (as in post positivism), inquirers therefore generate or inductively develop 
a theory or pattern of meaning. Thus, constructivism fosters researchers’ reflexivity 
about their own interpretations as well as those of their research participants. However, 
critics of constructivism point out that “researchers recognise that their own 
backgrounds shape their interpretation, and they position themselves in the research to 
acknowledge how their interpretation flows from their personal, cultural and historical 
experiences” (Creswell, 2009, p.8). Other researches such as Charmaz (2006) 
suggested that grounded theorists can import preconceived ideas into their work if they 
remain unaware of their starting assumptions. 
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According to Howell (2013) the main criticism of constructivism involves the relativist 
reduction and self-refutation; reality is constructed so all constructions are true realities. 
This would appear to suggest that truth in one construction can be true for all or even 
another separate construction. This would be difficult to uphold if not impossible 
because social structures are totally different each has an incommensurable worldview 
and comparative judgement between them is impossible. Therefore, prediction and 
causality and unlikely outcomes of constructivist research although levels of 
understanding (verstehen) can be achieved (Guba and Lincoln, 1985). 
Social constructivism (often combined with Interpretivism; see Mertens, 1998) is 
typically seen as an approach to qualitative research. The ideas came from Mannheim 
and from works such as Berger and Luekmann’s (1967) The Social Construction of 
Reality and Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. Recently more writers have 
summarised social constructivism including Crotty (1998), Lincoln and Guba (2000), 
Neuman (2000) and Schwandt (2007). The qualitative research, which generally uses 
the case study technique, is the most suitable one for conducting research inside an 
interpretivist paradigm (Corbetta, 1999; Thietart, 2001). Qualitative research therefore, 
may not necessarily lead to general rules, but the qualitative approach helps to read 
reality in a wider range of circumstances, if the authors make an effort to conceptualise 
(Ciao, 2011). According to Holstein and Gubrium (2005, p.483):  
Qualitative researchers have been interested in documenting the processes by 
which social reality is constructed, managed, and sustained for some time. 
Subsequently, Alfred Schutz (1962, 1964, 1967, and 1970) commented on social 
phenomenology, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) research focused 
on social constructivism, and the process–oriented strains of symbolic 
interactionism (e.g., Blumer, 1969; Hewitt, 1997 and Weigert, 1981) have all 
contributed to the constructionist project. 
The validity of qualitative method may be found by debating its epistemological 
paradigm rather than its procedures. The qualitative method is justified by the social life 
concept of the interpretivist approach (Ciao, 2011).  
As discussed in the other paradigms of inquiry below, (Refer to table 4.1) there are 
many paradigms that could be used to study corporate governance systems and  
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regulations with particular emphasis on the financial sector organisations. Ultimately 
however, whichever paradigm the researcher decides to adopt will have a profound 
effect on the outcome of the research. For a researcher the ultimate aim is to use a 
paradigm or combination of paradigms that is relevant to the research questions, and 
the research design, that will most likely meet the research objectives set. 
4.4  Commentary on other paradigms of inquiry 
As discussed earlier, this thesis will mainly focus on the phenomenological paradigms 
named under the qualitative research and compare them to identify which paradigm is 
relevant to this research based on the research questions and research design. The 
researcher’s epistemological, ontological and methodological premises may also be 
considered as a paradigm, or an interpretive framework, “a set of beliefs that guides 
action” Guba (1990, p.17). Epistemology is fundamentally concentrated on the nature 
of knowledge and its justification. In other words how do we know what we know? 
Furthermore, epistemology examines the question of how we know that we know 
something.  Whilst ontology examines the nature of social reality and explores 
questions such as what kinds of things can be said to exist, and in what ways. Finally, 
methodology may also be defined as the process of research study that the researcher 
is trying to build or explore.  
In qualitative research the major paradigms that exist are phenomenological, post 
positivism, constructivism, participatory action frameworks and critical theory. Other 
paradigms also exist and some of them are called by names such as positivistic 
paradigm or quantitative paradigm which intends to use quantitative data and often 
using large sample sizes. Positivist paradigms are mainly concerned with hypothesis 
testing and data is highly specific and precise, location of the research is artificial with a 
high reliability but validity may be low. It tends to generalise from sample to population. 
Lincoln and Guba (2005, p.198) outline the major issues confronting all paradigms 
including the positivist, post positivist, critical theory, constructivist and participatory 
action research. They argued that the above paradigms must deal with seven basic, 
critical issues:  
Axiology (ethics and values). Accommodation and commensurability and (asks if 
the paradigms can be fitted into one another)? Action, (what the researcher does 
1
0
2
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in the world). Control, (who initiates the inquiry, who asks the questions). 
Foundations of truth (foundationalism versus anti- and non-
foundationalism).Validity (traditional positivist models versus poststructuralist- 
constructionist criteria), and Voice, reflexivity, and postmodern representation 
(single-voice versus multivoiced representation).  
Each paradigm handles the seven major issues confronting all paradigms differently. 
The positivist and post positivist paradigms are concerned with the following: reliance 
on naïve realism, their dualistic epistemologies, their verificational method to inquiry, 
and their persistence on reliability, validity, prediction, control and a building-block 
approach to knowledge. Lincoln and Guba (2000) discuss the inability of these 
paradigms to appropriately address issues surrounding voice, empowerment, and 
praxis. They also pointed out the failure of these paradigms to adequately address the 
theory – and value-laden nature of facts, the interactive nature of inquiry, and the 
reality that the same sets of “facts” may actually support more than one theory. Users 
of constructivism, transactional epistemology, and hermeneutic and dialectical 
methodology paradigms are oriented to the production of reconstructed understandings 
of the social world (Guba and Lincoln 1994).  
The positivist criteria of internal and external validity are substituted by words such as 
trustworthiness and authenticity. Constructivists appreciate the value transactional 
knowledge and the overlap with different participatory action approaches. 
Constructivism links action to praxis and builds on anti-foundational arguments while 
encouraging experimental and multivoiced texts. Schwandt (1989) identified the 
differences and thought within interpretivist, hermeneutic and constructionist paradigms 
by conducting a well-planned and complex analysis of these perspectives. The author 
also pointed to the fact that these paradigms are unified in their opposition to positivism 
and their endeavour to study the world from the perspective of the interacting 
individual, (see also Schwandt 1996, 1997).  
The history of critical theory (and Marxist theory) can be traced as far back as the 
Frankfurt School to more recent transformations in poststructural, postmodern, 
feminist, critical pedagogy and cultural studies theory (Kincheloe and McLaren (2000). 
Furthermore, Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) outlined the critical theory starting with the 
assumption that Western societies are not un-problematically democratic and free. 
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Their view on critical theory rejects the notion of economic determinism and instead 
focuses on role of the media, culture, language, power, desire, critical enlightenment 
and critical emancipation. Critical theorists aim to produce practical, pragmatic 
knowledge that is cultural and structural, judged by its degree of historical position and 
its ability to produce established practice (praxis), or action. Kincheloe and McLaren 
(2000) introduced the critical, pragmatic approach to texts and their relationships to 
lived experience. This eventually leads to the “resistance” version of critical theory, a 
version connected to critical ethnography, and partisan, critical inquiry committed to 
social criticism and empowerment of individuals. In Lincoln and Guba’s (2000) 
framework, the critical theory paradigm, in its many formulations, articulates ontology 
based on historical realism, an epistemology that is transactional and a methodology 
that is both dialogic and dialectical (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997; Kincheloe et al 
1999). 
4.5  Theoretical Framework of Research   
Most developing countries such as The Gambia have no effective governance system 
based on law and regulations. The issue of corporate governance system and 
regulation based on law is non-existent in The Gambia because it is not part of the 
regulatory framework required by the Central Bank of The Gambia (regulator). 
Therefore corporate governance systems and regulation in The Gambia can only be 
described as patchy at best despite the spectacular corporate failures in recent times 
mainly due to failures in corporate governance. The minimal financial sector 
organisation mechanisms available are riddled with corruption, mismanagement, and 
ineffective provisions of services delivery to the public (Guha, 2006). The issue of 
corruption and mismanagement of the financial sector could be viewed from ethical 
theory as well as regulation theory. Ethics will address the issues relating to moral 
value from a Kantian ethical perceptive (see chapter 2 section 2.6). The focus of 
financial sector organisations is the provision of services to the society as their 
stakeholders therefore; stakeholder theory has ethical issues, which require ethical 
theory.  
The management of financial sector provide the theoretical framework underpinning 
the paradigm and methodological factors for this research. The research aim and 
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objectives lead to the research method of data collection through semi survey 
questionnaire and focus group discussions. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994) both 
quantitative and qualitative methods can be appropriate within any research paradigm. 
The data collection will be a combination of primary and secondary data from those 
who are responsible for decisions making and management of financial sector 
organisations and other stakeholders. Using grounded theory methodology the 
research will analyse this data systemically collected from those responsible for 
decision making and the management of financial sector organisations and other 
stakeholders.  
The analysis of the responses from the interviews will investigate how corporate 
governance regulations affect financial sector organisations and the effect on services 
they provide to their stakeholders. Finally, the results of the interviews and focus group 
discussions will be analysed using open, axial and selective coding procedures of 
grounded theory methods recommended by Straus and Corbin (1990, 1998). These 
will provide information aimed at developing a substantive theory on ethics, corporate 
governance and regulation.   
4.6  Grounded Theory Research Methodology  
According to Hammersley, (1989) grounded theory has its roots in symbolic 
interactionism, which itself stems from pragmatist ideas of James, Dewey, Cooley and 
Mead, most importantly the concept of looking glass self (Cooley, 1922). Individuals 
are self-aware, able to see themselves from the perspective of others and therefore 
adapt their behaviour according to the situation (Mead, 1934). Heath and Cowley 
(2004) suggested that social interactions create meaning and shaping of society via 
shared meaning predominate over the effect of society on individuals.  
Blumer (1937) invented the term ‘symbolic interactionism’ and his development of the 
interactionist approach together with naturalistic inquiry is a key influence on grounded 
theory (Heath and Cowley, 2004). Thus, symbolic interactionism and grounded theory 
see researchers as social beings whose experiences, ideas and assumptions can 
contribute to their understanding of social processes observed (Baker et al, 1992).  
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Grounded theory was initially developed by sociologists Barney G. Glaser and Anselm 
L. Strauss published seminal work entitled The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). This published seminal work was a result of a successful 
collaboration during their studies of the dying in hospitals (see Glaser and Strauss, 
1965, 1968; Strauss and Glaser, 1970). Despite this successful collaboration grounded 
theory appears to marry two rather contrasting – and – competing traditions in 
sociology as represented by Glaser and Strauss: Columbia University positivism and 
Chicago school pragmatism and field research. Glaser’s rigorous quantitative training 
at Columbia University with Paul Lazarsfeld is demonstrated in his epistemological 
assumptions, Logic and systematic approach to grounded theory. In contrast, Strauss 
brought notions of human agency, emergent processes, social and subjective 
meanings, problem solving practices, and open ended study of action to grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2006). Stern (1994) claimed that the differences between the two 
researchers had always been apparent, but it was not until Strauss published detailed 
guidance to the grounded theory process (Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) 
that the divergence was more widely recognised. A summary of the discussion above 
is aptly summed up by Selden (2005, p.115) in Figure 4.1:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Two Central themes in Grounded Theory 
John Dewey 
George Herbert Mead 
Herbert Blumer  
Symbolic interactionism 
Chicago University 
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Grounded Theory 
University of California at San Francisco 
Barney Glaser 
Talcott Parsons 
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Robert Merton 
Statistical Positivism 
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Glaser and Strauss (1976, p.1) defined grounded theory as “the discovery of theory 
from data – systematically obtained and analysed in social research”. As a result, 
Martin and Turner, (1986); Jones and Noble, (2007) concluded that grounded theory is 
an inductive, theory discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop a 
theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding 
the account in empirical observations or data (see Chenitz and Swanson, 1986. Locke, 
2001; Goulding, 2002). 
Alternatively, Charmaz (2006) defined grounded theory methods as systematic, yet 
flexible guidelines for collecting and analysing qualitative data to construct theories 
‘grounded’ in the data themselves. Grounded theory methodology is therefore aimed at 
systematically deriving theories of human behaviour from empirical data. At this point, it 
is important to note that there is a difference between grounded theory method and 
grounded theory itself. A grounded theory is the possible outcome of using the 
grounded theory method. Therefore, it is possible that one might use the method 
without producing a grounded theory.  
There are some who claim to use the method as part of an approach that does not 
seek to develop grounded theories (Bryant, 2002). Myers (2006) argued that to ensure 
that the concepts do indeed emerge from the data, as a general rule the researcher 
should make sure that he or she has no preconceived theoretical ideas before starting 
the research. Therefore grounded theory researchers should ensure that reading of the 
prior literature does not stifle creativity (Urquhart et al, 2006).  
One notable key distinction between grounded theory and other qualitative research is 
its specific approach to theory development – grounded theory suggests that there 
should be a continuous interplay between data collection and analysis (Myers, 1997). 
Thus, “the purpose of grounded theory research in business and management is to 
develop new concepts and theories of business related phenomena, where these 
concepts are firmly grounded in qualitative data” (Myers, 2006, p.107). Since its 
introduction in 1967 grounded theory has be used in qualitative studies within 
organisations and management (Nwanji, 2006) as well as social sciences, nursing and 
many other fields (Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Dey, 1993; Annells, 1996).  
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As a methodology for qualitative research grounded theory has spread across a 
number of domains; in economics, education, nursing, and psychology just to name a 
few (Nwanji, 2006). Grounded theory approach methodology has also been used in the 
study of European integration and political science and recently on European financial 
services (Howell, 2000; 2002). There are few methodological references on grounded 
theory approaches (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Locke, 1997; Howell, 
2000). Grounded theory has been used in many qualitative researches in the past but 
few methodological references used grounded theory for the study of corporate 
governance issues.  
This new research approach therefore, is aimed at providing new insights and 
understanding between business ethics and corporate objectives. Hence, the 
methodological paradigm of inquiry for this research will be phenomenological using 
Kant’s CI. It is also possible to use grounded theory in a mostly positivist, critical theory 
and/or constructivist context. Grounded theory can also provide the basis for a mix of 
inductive and deductive approaches (Howell et. al 2007). 
Grounded theory is a research methodology that offers a comprehensive and 
systematic framework for inductively building of theory. A grounded theory is one that is 
discovered, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of 
data pertaining to a particular phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The careful 
and precise application of this method will ensure that theory that emerges from this 
study meets the criteria of good science: generalisability, reproducibility, precise, rigour 
and verification, (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).  
Grounded theory suggests that there is an over-emphasis on verification theory and 
wishes to demote the idea that discovery of relevant concepts and hypotheses are a 
priority to research (Howell, 2000, p.4). The purpose of grounded theory is to build 
theory that is faithful to and illuminates the area under study. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) considered that grounded was concerned with two types of theory: substantive 
and formal (conceptual); theory allows hypotheses and substantive concepts to emerge 
from the data, so analysis may identify concepts relevant to understanding the data.  
This view is also supported by Howell, (2000, p. 7) suggesting that: 
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in discovering theory, one generates conceptual categories or their properties 
from evidence; then the evidence from which the categories emerged is used to 
illustrate the concept. The evidence may not … be accurate beyond doubt … but 
the concept is undoubtedly a relevant theoretical abstraction about what is going 
on in the area studied.  
According to Howell (2000, p.7), generating theory was accomplished through the 
collection, coding and analysis of the data. Therefore, these three operations should be 
undertaken together as far as possible. These areas should interact continually, from 
the beginning of the investigation to its end. The separation of these areas hinders 
theory generation whereas set ideas stifle it. In this research the aim is to construct a 
substantive theory in relation to Immanuel Kant’s theoretical framework on CI for 
dealing with the effect of corporate governance regulation on financial sector 
organisations in developing countries like The Gambia. 
 
A number of the basic features of grounded theory make it an appropriate method for 
this research:- 
1. Grounded theory methodology includes analysis of process. Within grounded 
theory methodology the term process is used to describe ‘the linking of 
sequences of action/interaction as they pertain to the management of, control 
over or response to, a phenomenon’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.143). 
Process is the analyst’s way of accounting for or explaining change.  
2. Grounded theory methodology directly links macroscopic issues to the 
phenomenon under investigation. This mode of research requires that 
broader, contextual issues, that are shown to influence the phenomenon 
under study, be given appropriate recognition in the development of theory.  
3. Grounded theory makes its greatest contribution, in areas in which minimal 
research has been undertaken.  There is little or no research on corporate 
governance using grounded theory that focuses on corporate governance 
regulations on financial sector organisations in developing countries such as 
The Gambia. Most of the research that used grounded theory has been in the 
area of politics, government and economics (Howell, 2000). 
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4. Grounded theory is very useful in developing context-based, process-oriented 
descriptions and explanations of organisational phenomena (Myers, 1997).  
5. Grounded theory offers relatively well-signposted procedures for data analysis 
(Urquhart, 1997; 2001) and potentially allows for the emergence of original 
and rich findings that are closely tied to the data (Orlikowski, 1993). This 
according to Urquhart et al (2006) provides researchers with a great deal of 
confidence because for each concept produced, the researcher can point to 
many instances in the data that relate to it. 
6. By adopting grounded theory method the researcher can direct, manage, and 
streamline their data collection and, moreover, construct an original analysis 
of their data (Charmaz, 2006).  It also gets the researcher analysing the data 
early. Furthermore, it encourages a constant interplay between data collection 
and analysis.  
7. Grounded theory encourages systematic, detailed analysis of the data and 
provides a method for doing so. For the novice researcher in particular, the 
detailed guidance provides a certain level of comfort that the data is being 
analysed in a systematic and rigorous manner. Grounded theory is a ‘bottom-
up’ approach to coding data (Dey, 1993). It also permits investigation into new 
areas of significance as they emerge from the data (Simpson et al, 2004).  
8. A key strength, and one still central to grounded theory method, is that it 
offers a foundation for rendering the process and procedures of qualitative 
investigation visible, comprehensible, and replicable (Bryman and Charmaz, 
2007). Thereby fulfilling the need to justify qualitative approaches (justification 
process). 
9. Grounded theory method offers a rationale for researchers as they begin their 
research – the method eliminates and precludes need for hypotheses and 
conjectures at the start (justification of methodological flexibility and 
indeterminacy) (Bryman and Charmaz, 2007). 
10.  Grounded theory is also useful for developing new theory or fresh insights 
into old theory; it generates theory of direct interest and relevance for 
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practitioners; and it can uncover micro-management processes in complex 
and unfolding scenarios (Locke, 2001).  
11.  Proponents of grounded theory argue that it is desirable that researchers are 
sensitive to existing conceptualisations, so that their investigations are 
focused and can build upon the work of others (Bryman, 2008). 
Finally, grounded theory is the most appropriate methodology for this research 
because an empirical investigation of governance systems within the financial sector 
organisations, and its impact on society as the stakeholders is a research phenomenon 
that can be studied using grounded theory methods (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Furthermore, the impact of corporate governance regulation on the performance of 
banks in developing countries has been relatively ignored in the literature, or has been 
given superficial attention. Consequently, this researcher’s mission is to build his own 
theory from the ground. The nature of grounded theory is such that the theory to 
emerge ‘will be abstract enough and include sufficient variation to make it applicable to 
a variety of contexts related to that phenomenon’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.23).  
Thus, the theory developed from this research will be of use by other researchers 
interested in studying the issue of corporate governance in the financial sector in 
developing countries.   
4.7  Constraints on Grounded Theory Approach:  
Jones and Noble (2007) conducted a research on grounded theory and management 
entitled lack of integrity. They concluded that grounded theory in management research 
is in danger of losing its integrity. Furthermore, they argued that the methodology has 
become so pliant that management researchers appear to have accepted it as a 
situation of “anything goes” “grounded theory” is now loosely used as a generic term to 
refer to any qualitative approach in which inductive analysis is grounded in data. Bryant 
(2002) added that many researchers often use grounded theory unsystematically to 
mask their own – or their discipline’s methodological confusions. Other grounded 
theorists also found the Strauss and Corbin (1990) book rather formulaic and 
overburdened with many rules (Melia, 1996; and Kendall, 1999). Wasserman et al 
(2009, p.355) argued that while grounded theory:  
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provides no such systematic or transparent way for gaining insight into the 
conceptual relationship between the codes. And  that various works on grounded 
theory have failed to provide any systematic way of using data specific levels of 
scale (the codes) to gain insight into more macro levels of the scale (concepts and 
themes).  
This makes it difficult and at times daunting for first-time users of grounded theory to 
understand the concept and process and often find themselves overwhelmed at the 
coding level. This makes it difficult to ‘scale up’ to larger concepts or themes. The net 
result is often lower level theories. In fact, the use of grounded theory never leads to 
grand social theory, nor should it be expected to do so, but this can be frustrating for 
some people (Myers, 2009). The use of grounded theory does not guarantee that you 
will come up with original and interesting results. As Strauss and Corbin (1998) point 
out, creativity is essential and grounded theory procedures should not be followed 
dogmatically and in an inflexible manner. Therefore, grounded theory procedures 
should be followed carefully, while at the same time trying to foster your own critical 
and creative inspiration (Myers, 2009). There are some who claim to use grounded 
theory method as part of an approach that does not seek to develop grounded theories 
highlighting the confusion between grounded theory itself and grounded theory 
methodology (Bryant, 2002).  
Bryman, (2008) suggested that it is somewhat doubtful whether grounded theory in 
many instances really results in theory. Most grounded theories are substantive in 
character. Thus, suggesting that they pertain to the specific social phenomenon being 
researched and the not the broader range of phenomena (though, of course, may have 
such broader applicability) (ibid). Grounded theory is associated with an approach to 
data analysis that invites researchers to fragment their data by coding the data into 
discrete chunks. To others, this kind of activity results in a loss of a sense of context 
and of narrative flow (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).  
Another constraint on the use of grounded theory is the presence of competing 
accounts of the ingredients. This does not make it easy to characterise or to establish 
how to use it. This point is further compounded by Charmaz’s (2000) suggestion that 
most grounded theory is objectivist and that an alternative, constructivist approach is 
preferable. Furthermore, she argued that grounded theory associated with:  
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Glaser, Strauss, and Corbin is objectivist in that it aims to uncover a reality that is 
external to the social actors. She subsequently, offered an alternative 
(constructionist) version that assumes that people create and maintain meaningful 
worlds through dialectical processes of conferring meaning on their realities and 
acting within them (Bryman, 2008, p.549).   
Thus, implying social reality does not exist independently of human action (Charmaz, 
2000). This view contradicts earlier grounded theory texts that categories and concepts 
can be found within the data, whilst constructivist suggest that categories and concepts 
at theoretical level emerge as a result of the researcher’s interaction within the field and 
questions about the data (Charmaz, 2000). 
Grounded theory method has also been criticised as being empiricist; that is, it relies 
too heavily on the empirical data, considers the fieldwork data as the source of its 
theories and sets itself against the use of preceding theories (Parker and Roffey, 
1997). Other critics such as Bryant (2002b) argued that conceptualisation of data at 
methodological level can degenerate into methodological indifference resulting in 
superficial and ambiguous conclusions.   
Furthermore, Grounded theory’s central practice of overlapping data collection and 
analysis poses other problems. In a grounded theory analysis generaliseability and 
reliability, may be a problem as well. Critics of grounded theory also point out the fact 
that grounded theory methodology is still so intimately linked to its founders might be 
taken as evidence for its failure to move far beyond its origin (Bryant, 2002). Bulmer 
(1979) has questioned whether, as prescribed by the advocates of grounded theory, 
researchers can suspend their awareness of relevant theories or concepts until a quite 
late stage in the process of analysis.  
It is generally agreed that “what we ‘see’ when we conduct research is conditioned by 
many factors, one of which is what we already know about the social world being 
studied (in terms of both social scientific conceptualisations and as members of 
society)” (Byrman, 2008, p.549). Furthermore, there are practical difficulties with 
grounded theory. The time taken to transcribe recordings of interviews can make it 
difficult for researchers, especially when they have tight deadlines, to carry out a 
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genuine grounded theory analysis with its constant interplay of data collection and 
conceptualisation (Byrman, 2008).   
4.7.1  The difference between Glaser and Strauss  
Generally speaking, grounded theory appears to be divided into two distinct variants 
namely the Glaserian and Straussian Schools of thought. The two co-founders 
disagreed about the nature of grounded theory when Strauss and Corbin published 
their book in 1990 called Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures 
and Techniques. This book was aimed at providing clear guidelines and procedures 
and was intended to be a ‘how to’ manual of grounded theory. However, Glaser argued 
that this formalisation is simply far too restrictive pointing out that the prescriptions may 
strangle any emergent conceptualisation and force the concepts into a preconceived 
mould (Myers, 2009). Glaser felt so strongly about Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) book 
that he wrote a rejoinder entitled Emergence vs. Forcing: Basics of Grounded Theory 
Analysis (Glaser, 1992). In this rejoinder Glaser suggested that Strauss and Corbin are 
no longer using grounded theory as it was originally intended arguing that:  
If you torture the data long enough, it will give up! [In Strauss and Corbin’s 
method] the data is not allowed to speak for itself as in grounded theory, and be 
heard from, infrequently it has to scream. Forcing by preconception constantly 
derails it from relevance (p.123). 
For Glaser, the researcher forcing acts to “contaminate, corrupt, pre-empt, and 
obstruct” understanding of the data, will violate his/her “restrained approach in which 
researchers maintain distance and independence from the phenomena they study 
(Locke, 1996, p.241). This would appear to suggest that Glaser was advocating a view 
that the researchers must be aware of the vast array of theoretical codes to increase 
his/her sensitivity to their emergence in the data. Howell (2000) contends that the 
dispute between Glaser and Strauss revolves around the issue of emergence and 
forcing of data with Glaser (1992, p.28) suggesting that Strauss’ and Corbin’s “…pet 
theoretical codes violates relevance and forces data”. Furthermore, Howell (2000, p.45) 
also argued that verification also seems to be a sticking point between the scholars. 
Howell suggested that “on closer examination neither is pursuing pure verification; 
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each wishes for it to add to theory generation not negate or disprove but add variation 
and depth of understanding”.  
Glaser, (1992, p.30) argued that the “two types of methodologies should be seen in 
sequential relation. First we discover the relevance and write hypothesis about them, 
the most relevant may be tested for whatever use may require it”. This researcher does 
not intend to use hypothesis or propose to test hypothesis for this research in order to 
address the research aims and objectives. Therefore the Straussian school of thought 
is more relevant to this research mainly because the researcher shares the same views 
as Corbin and Strauss (1990) when they contradicted Glaser’s (1992) view above 
arguing that “statements should be verified against data, not to necessarily negate our 
questions or statements, or disprove them, rather add variation and depth of 
understanding” (p.108).  
Evaluating the different views above between Glaser (1992) and Corbin and Strauss 
(1990) it appears that each believed that it is possible to utilise verification as part of 
theory generation, with Corbin and Strauss, (1990) suggesting it as part of grounded 
theory. Glaser, (1992) on the contrary saw verification as a methodology in its own 
right. (see Howell, 2000, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss, 1987 and Glaser, 1992). 
Strauss allows a much more provocative, interventionist, and interrogationist 
researcher influence over data. Strauss (1987, p.84) also suggested that:  
techniques encourage researchers to use their own personal and professional 
experience and acquired knowledge as a positive advantage in the grounded 
theory process to enhance theoretical sensitivity rather than obscuring vision “if 
you know an area, have some experience... you don’t tear it out of your head, you 
can use it” (see Strauss et al. 1985).  
No one can claim to enter the field completely free from the influence of past 
experience and reading (Morse, 1994). Even if this were possible, ignorance is not 
synonymous with generating insider understanding (Morse, 1994). Attending to the 
data cannot ignore prior understandings and it could be claimed that the 
phenomenologist’s concept of bracketing or holding preconceptions, values and beliefs 
in abeyance is fundamentally flawed (Heath and Cowley, 2004). As a corporate 
governance lecturer and researcher I share the views of Strauss’ (1987), Morse, (1994) 
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and Heath and Cowley (2004) that my teaching and professional experience will be a 
positive advantage in the grounded theory process to enhance theoretical sensitivity 
rather than obscuring vision.  There are yet other reasons why this researcher 
subscribes to the Strauss’s view as opposed to Glaser. According to Howell (2000, 
p.46) Glaser and Strauss’ disagreement are based around their emphasis on: 
deductive and inductive processes; Strauss considers that induction, deduction 
and verification are essential elements of grounded theory. Glaser charges that 
Strauss confuses induction with testing deductive hypothesis which are forced on 
the data and that it is not inductive to say the data disapproves a hypothesis, it is 
simply verification. Strauss and Corbin contended that it is necessary to 
continually verify concepts and relationships arrived at through deductive thinking 
must be verified over and over against actual data.  
Glaser (1992) therefore suggested that Strauss and Corbin (1990) had created a 
verification method and not a method that generates theory. Other researchers such as 
Urquhart et al. (2006) suggested that the disagreement between Glaser and Strauss 
and Corbin was based on two fundamental issues. The first disagreement is down to 
the coding process. Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggested breaking the codes down to 
four prescriptive steps namely open, axial, selective and ‘coding for process. Glaser 
(1992) on the contrary suggested using just three namely open, selective and 
theoretical coding. The second major contention between Glaser and Strauss and 
Corbin is based on the fact that Glaser objected to the use of a coding paradigm and 
the ‘conditional matrix’ which are designed to provide ready-made tools for the 
conceptualisation process.  
Glaser added that to ‘force’ coding through one paradigm and/or down one conditional 
path was not grounded theory, but conceptual description, which ignored the emergent 
nature of grounded theory (Glaser, 1992). For more detailed discussion of using both 
versions (see Kendall, 1999). Interestingly, it is important to note that the Strauss and 
Corbin version of grounded theory is arguably the most widely known and used 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This is probably because many people find the ‘ready-made’ 
tools provided by Strauss and Corbin to be quite helpful (Myers. 2009). 
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Finally, various efforts have been made to compare the differences between grounded 
theory approaches, but primarily focusing on the divergences between Glaser and 
Strauss (see Stern, 1994; Parker and Roffey, 1997; and Lye et al., (1997). Heath and 
Cowley (2004) as discussed in the table below analyse the differences in relation to the 
greater deductivism in Strauss and Corbin, with their different use of literature and a 
different approach to coding.  Furthermore, also discussed below is the contrasts 
between and within the Glaserian and Straussian Schools by Jones and Noble (2007).  
Based on these discussions, one can conclude that Strauss and others appear to 
advocate a more relativistic approach to ontology and epistemology (Annells, 1996), by 
adopting a “reality that cannot be known, but is always interpreted” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990, p.22) and the subjectivity of the researcher who is never “neutral, 
detached and objective” (Bowers, 1988, p.43). Annells, (1996); Parker and Roffey, 
(1997) suggest that Strauss and Corbin have moved grounded theory to a more 
interpretivist or constructivist stance. In contrast with this seemingly more relativistic 
stance, Strauss and Corbin have provided a more rigid procedure (Gurd, 2008). Glaser 
(1992) by contrast, argues that this forces data into a model, and thereby cuts off the 
development of interpretations by the constraining of theory. Furthermore, Gurd (2008) 
suggested that Glaser remained wedded to the belief in “emergence” and that creativity 
comes from memoing and constantly developing concepts that fit all of the data and 
are changed to meet each new data. Jones and Noble (2007) summarised the 
contrasts between and within the Glaserian and Straussian Schools (table 4.3) and 
Heath and Cowley (2004) data analysis: Glaser and Strauss compared (table 4.3(a)) 
will be discussed further. 
4.7.2  Developing Substantive - Data Analysis 
Grounded theory has become a key qualitative research methodology in all area of 
business, management, political, social economic and corporate governance issues 
(Locke, 1997, 2001; Howell, 2000, 2002, 2004; Nwanji and Howell, 2005). The data to 
be collected for this research is analysed using grounded theory which is a complicated 
process of reducing raw data into concepts that are designated to stand for categories. 
The categories are then developed and integrated into a theory, (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990; Howell, 2000, 2002). This process is achieved by coding data, writing memos,  
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Table 4.3: Contrasts between and within the Glaserian and Straussian Schools 
GLASERIAN SCHOOL STRAUSSIAN SCHOOL 
Emergence and researcher distance 
Everything emerges in a grounded 
theory -Nothing is forced or 
preconceived.    Researchers are 
distant and unknowing as they 
approach data, with only the world 
under study shaping the theorising 
1987, 1990, 1998: researcher adopts a more active 
and provocative influence over data, using 
cumulative knowledge and experience to enhance 
sensitivity. Logical elaboration, and preconceived 
tools and techniques can be employed to shape the 
theorising 
Development of theory 
The goal is to generate a conceptual 
theory that accounts for a pattern of 
behaviour which is relevant and 
problematic for those involve 
1987: conceptually dense, integrated theory 
development is the only legitimate outcome. 
1990, 1998: grounded theory can also be used for 
developing non-theory (conceptual ordering 
or elaborate description). 
Specific, non-optional procedures 
The method involves clear, extensive, 
rigorous procedures and a set of 
fundamental processes that must be 
followed 
1987: grounded theory encompasses a number of 
distinct procedures that must be carried out 
1990, 1998: researchers can cherry pick from a 
smorgasbord table, from which they can 
choose, reject or ignore 
Core category 
The theoretical formulation that 
represents the continual resolving of 
the main concern of the participants 
1987, 1990, 1998: the main theme of a pre-
determined phenomenon which integrates all other 
categories and explains the various actions and 
interactions that are aimed at managing or handling 
the relevant event, happening or incident. 
Coding 
Open, selective and theoretical Open, axial and selective, but with the following 
variations: 
1987: selective coding is an “emergent”    process 
based on continuous use of memo sorting 
and integrative diagrams. 
1990: selective coding employs the “forcing” 
mechanism of the coding paradigm 
1998: paradigm model dropped, and an emergent 
process based on memo sorting is again 
stressed 
 
Source: Adopted from Jones and Noble (2007, p.93).   
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Table 4.4: Data analysis: Glaser and Strauss compared  
 GLASER STRAUSS AND CORBIN 
Initial coding Substantive coding Open coding 
 Data dependent Use of analytic technique 
Intermediate phase Continuous with previous 
phase 
Axial  coding 
 Comparisons, with focus on 
data, become more abstract, 
categories refitted, emerging 
frameworks 
Reduction and clustering of 
categories (paradigm model) 
Final development  Theoretical Selective coding 
 Refitting and refinement of 
categories which integrate 
around emerging core 
Detailed development of 
categories, selection of core, 
integration of categories 
Theory Parsimony, scope and 
modifiability 
Detailed and dense process 
fully described 
Source:  Adapted from Heath and Cowley (2004, p.146) 
and diagramming. In this project, data will be coded and analysed using three coding 
methods of the grounded theory model; - open coding, axial coding and selective 
coding.  
4.7.3  Open Coding  
Open coding is the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, and 
conceptualising, and categorising data.  The aim of open coding is the development of 
categories. Open coding is the analytic process through which concepts are identified 
and their properties and dimensions are discovered in data. It is closely linked to open 
sampling and provides the foundation of the research process (Howell 2002). Glaser 
(1978, p.56) points out that “the analyst’s goal is to generate an emergent set of 
categories and their properties which fit, work and are relevant for integrating theory, to 
achieve this goal the analyst begins with open coding”. Attention should be fixed on a  
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category and the properties that emerge continually coded and analysed, which are the 
initial steps. Ultimately, one constantly compares and continually categorises. 
4.7.4  Axial Coding 
Axial coding involves re-building the data (fractured through open coding) in new ways 
by establishing relationships between categories, and between categories and their 
sub-categories. Axial coding is the process of relating categories to their subcategories, 
termed “axial” because coding occurs around the axis of a category; linking categories 
at the level of properties and dimensions (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Axial coding 
enables this research to bring the analysis together, to form a whole.  The data 
analysed as categories in open coding above are joined together in axial coding, which 
is… “the act of relating categories to subcategories along the lines of their properties 
and dimensions. It looks at how categories crosscut and link”, (Strauss and Corbin 
1998, p. 124). 
Axial Coding involves several basic tasks (these include the following): 
1. Laying out the properties of a category and their dimensions. 
2. Identifying the variety of conditions, actions/interactions, and consequences 
associated with a phenomenon. 
3. Relating a category to its subcategories through statements denoting how 
they are related to each other. 
4. Looking for clues in the data that denote how major categories might relate to 
each other (Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Glaser considers that axial coding “undermines and confuses the very method that he 
(Strauss) is trying to build” (Glaser 1992, p.61). This process forces the data and 
negates theoretical coding. The Grounded Theorist should code categories and 
properties and allow theoretical codes to emerge where they will. Strauss and Corbin 
(1990, p.115) consider that axial coding allows a more focused means of discovering 
and relating categories. They claim that:  
we develop each category (phenomenon) in terms of causal conditions that give 
rise to it, the specific dimensional location of this phenomenon in terms of its 
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properties, the context, the action/interaction strategies used to handle, manage, 
respond to this phenomenon in light of that context, and the consequences of any 
action/interaction that is taken. Furthermore, in axial coding we continue to look 
for additional properties of each category, and to note the dimensional location of 
each incident, happening or event.  
The axial coding can help uncover relationships among categories from open coding 
above through to axial coding and selective coding that follows. 
4.8  Selective Coding: 
Selective coding involves selecting a core category, systematically relating it to other 
categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further 
development or refinement. As Corbin and Strauss (1990, p.15) stated that “selective 
coding is the process by which all categories are unified around a core category”. The 
data selection and the creation of categories will be processed with the core category 
in mind: the core category represents the central phenomenon of the research study. It 
is identified by asking questions such as: what is the main analytical idea presented in 
this research? What does all the action/interaction seem to be about? (ibid). A network 
of conceptual relationships may exist which can be refined during selective coding. 
Howell (1998, p.47) suggested that: 
it is very important to identify these patterns and to group the data accordingly, 
because this is what gives the theory specificity” (ibid). To clarify connections in 
the network grounded theory uses “… a combination of inductive and deductive 
thinking, in which we move between asking questions, generating hypotheses, 
and making comparisons.  
Selective coding integrates the research; it puts the story straight, provides analysis, 
and identifies the core category and illustrates how major categories relate, both to it 
and to each other. It is through this process that all the interpretative work done over 
the course of this research is integrated to form a grounded theory. As stated above 
financial sector organisations are some of the key players in Gambian development 
and a vital contributor towards the social and economic development of The Gambia. 
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4.9  Conclusion  
This chapter provided the methodological overview for the research, which employs a 
grounded theory methodology for the study of corporate governance regulation. The 
methodology is underpinned by interpretivist (phenomenological) paradigm aimed at 
developing a substantive theory to further our understanding of theory as well as the 
empirical nature of The Gambia’s corporate governance regulation and ethical 
practices. The data collected for this research is analysed using grounded theory 
methods, which is a process of reducing raw data into concepts that are designated to 
stand for categories.  
The categories are then developed and integrated into a substantive theory Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) and Howell (2000). This process is achieved by coding data, writing 
memos, and formulating diagrams. As stated in this chapter, data will be coded and 
analysed using the three coding methods of the grounded theory model of open 
coding, axial coding and selective coding. Open coding is the process of breaking 
down, examining, comparing, conceptualising, and categorising data. The aim of open 
coding is the development of categories. Axial coding involves re-building the data 
(fractured through open coding) in new ways by establishing relationships between 
categories, and between categories and their sub-categories. Selective coding involves 
selecting a core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those 
relationships, and filling in categories that need further development or refinement.  
It is through this process that all the interpretative and objective work done over the 
course of this research is integrated to form a substantive theory on corporate 
regulation and ethics. Data obtained through semi-structured interviews, focus groups 
and survey questionnaires are analysed using grounded theory methodology to enable 
the development of a substantive theory. It should be noted however that recent 
developments in grounded theory have taken it in a more interpretivist and 
constructivist direction (Clarke, 2005; Charmaz, 2009).  
Following an evaluation and justification of the methodology adopted for this research 
including a discussion on the paradigms of inquiry focusing on interpretivist and 
constructivist paradigms. The next chapter will mainly focus on the research methods 
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adopted by the researcher including data accessibility and challenges as well as data 
collection methods.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
RESEARCH METHODS 
5.0  Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish appropriate research methods that can be 
deployed in order to collect data aimed at addressing the research aims and objectives. 
This chapter opens with data sampling, followed by data accessibility and challenges. 
Data collection methods including interviews and focus groups are also considered in 
this chapter. Charmaz (2011) suggested that methods extend and magnify our view of 
studied life and, thus, broaden and deepen what we learn of it and know about it. 
Howell (2013, p.194) added that:  
no matter what philosophical position or paradigm of inquiry is used in a research 
project, it is always possible to use a combination of research methods when 
collecting data. The rationale for the balance between these methods will depend 
on the objectives of the research and the extent to which qualitative or quantitative 
techniques are to be utilised.  
Furthermore, Creswell (2009) opine that the choice of methods turns on whether the 
intent is to specify the type of information to be collected in advance of the study or 
allow it to emerge from participants in the project. However, in grounded theory method 
terms, data collection tends to focus on interviews (Urquhart, 2013). The author also 
added that grounded theory method coding can be applied to documents and focus 
groups. Thus, methods are merely tools. With grounded theory methods, you shape 
and reshape your data collection and, therefore, refine your collected data (Charmaz, 
2011). Data for this research will be collected in two main stages namely semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussion.  
5.1  Data sampling 
A sample is defined as the segment of the population that is selected for research 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). Thus, it is a subset of the population. Bryant and Charmaz 
(2011) argued that sampling techniques must be targeted and efficient.  
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Morse (2006) quoted in Bryant and Charmaz (2011, p. 234) added that an excellent 
“qualitative inquiry is inherently biased. By biased, I mean it has been deliberately 
sought and selected. This bias is essential if we are going to do good work and this 
bias is not something that impairs the rigor of the research”.  
The method of sampling used in this research is called judgemental sampling which is 
similar to snowball sampling as the participants are selected by the researcher on the 
strength of their experience of the phenomena under study. In judgemental sampling 
the “researcher makes the decision prior to the commencement of the research and 
does not pursue other contacts that may arise during the course of the study” (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009, p.213). For interpretivists the goal is to gain rich and detailed 
insights of the complexity of social phenomena. Therefore, they can conduct their 
research with a sample of one (ibid). Saunders et al (2009, p.204) commenting on 
sampling suggested that “effective sampling enables the researcher to consider the 
most appropriate subgroup from the population for the data collection instead of 
focusing on the whole”. Furthermore, Creswell (2008) also attributed quantitative 
sampling to be random and qualitative to be purposeful a view exploited by this 
researcher through the selection of senior bank managers (for the semi-structured 
interview) and bank managers, bank employees, customers and regulators (for the 
focus group discussion). 
There are currently thirteen 13 banks in The Gambia comprising of 12 commercial 
banks and one Islamic bank. The data sampling also considered the Central Bank of 
The Gambia (CBG) which supervises all other banks. The process of data collection for 
this research is constrained by a number of unique factors that affect The Gambia as a 
nation. One significant factor is the adult literacy rate of 46% (UNICEF, 2010) and a 
total population of 1.8 million (World Bank, 2014). The percentage of the population 
that bank in The Gambia is 1.1% (CBG, 2012). As a result, finding the right and able 
participant who can make a meaningful contribution to the research was particularly 
challenging. In addition, navigating the process of identifying the right participants and 
composition of the focus group was challenging (Crabtree, Yanoshik, Miller and 
O’Connor, 1993).  Hence, the collection of any meaningful data in relation to The 
Gambia banking sector is always going to be difficult due to these unique 
circumstances.  
                             
128 
The data to be collected for this research is qualitative using primary and secondary 
data. The research will make use of primary and secondary data which includes, in 
house gazettes, data published by the Central Bank of The Gambia (the regulator), 
national newspapers, books, articles, interviews, focus group discussion and journals 
(Nwanji and Howell, 2004; Nwanji, 2006; Sorour, 2011; Boadu, 2013; Ibrahim, 2013).  
Corporate governance in developing countries is normally based on the OECD 
principles of corporate governance and related literature on developing countries. 
Corporate governance will be examined through literature and analysis of data to be 
collected for this research. It is important to note that the data collection methods 
chosen for this research are not without criticism. Qualitative research often attracts 
criticisms in relation to reliability and validity of the collected data given the personal 
influences and involvement of the researcher in the research process (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). Bryman and Bell (2007) also argued that interviewing people for a day 
or so will not necessarily let the researcher know their behaviour.   
5.2  Data accessibility and challenges  
Morgan (1997) suggested that survey researchers made more use of their potential 
respondents during the initial development of the questionnaires (see Thurstone and 
Chave, 1929). Gaining access to interview those responsible for decision making and 
the management of financial institutions in a developing country like The Gambia is 
notoriously challenging. This problem was further compounded given that the 
researcher purposely travelled to The Gambia from the UK for a month to collect all the 
relevant data. Thus, time was of the essence, on the contrary however, bank managers 
and regulators particularly tend to have busy schedules. The process of data collection 
for this research is also constrained by several unique factors that affect The Gambia 
as a nation as discussed above. Banks in The Gambia like other developing countries 
are not always accessible due to poor and inadequate record keeping. It becomes 
even harder to assemble enough of the right people for a group which requires access 
to bank managers, employees, customers and regulators for the purpose of research 
(Morgan, 1997).  
To overcome these challenges the researcher prepared 12 Likert scale questions. 
These survey questionnaires were hand delivered to bank customers and employees 
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across the entire banking sector accompanied by a covering letter (see appendix V). 
The purpose of the questionnaire survey was to: 
 Gain access and sensitise bank customers and employees 
 Help devise clear, concise and appropriate questions for the semi-structured 
interview of bank managers. 
Responses to questions 4 and 5 of the survey indicated confusion with many 
respondents who stated that the current corporate governance system in The Gambia 
was effective in question 4 and ineffective in question 5.  This suggested that this topic 
was best suited to bank managers given their superior knowledge and experience in 
this area.  The analysis of question 10 also suggests that there is conflict of interest 
between shareholders and stakeholders in relation to CSR policies with some degree 
of uncertainty. Drawing upon the responses to the survey questionnaire the researcher 
was able to devise 12 questions for the semi-structured questionnaire of bank 
managers. See appendix V – Likert Scale Questionnaire, appendix VI – Tabular 
Analysis of Results of Likert Scale Questionnaire and appendix VII – Bar Chart 
Analysis of Results of the Likert Scale Questionnaire. 
Access to the management of financial sector organisations in a developing country 
such as The Gambia for research purposes is a valuable and scare resource. As a 
result of this most corporate governance research tend to use quantitative analysis, 
with data from companies’ accounts and annual reports, share prices and profits 
figures. The researcher arranged access to a number of financial institutions across the 
banking sector prior to departing the UK aimed at collecting primary data. The aim was 
to conduct semi-structured interviews with bank managers and focus group discussion 
with regulators, bank managers, employees and customers. This was made possible 
with the help of two senior Gambian bankers and a senior central bank official. The 
issue of corporate governance continues to be a challenge for The Gambia because 
corporate governance regulation is not part of the regulatory or legal framework 
required by the Central Bank (regulator). 
Doing PhD research is highly regarded in a small country like The Gambia. Hence, the 
researcher had no initial concerns or reservations in accessing the participants upon 
arrival. However, the reality on the ground was somewhat different from what the 
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researcher initially envisaged. The climate of fear, paranoia and intimidation in The 
Gambia was so intense that any approach to conduct interviews or administer 
questionnaires was met with suspicion. Other contributory factors include the fact that 
some participants felt that they were too busy to help with the research project. Others 
felt that they had little or no knowledge of corporate governance and therefore had no 
meaningful contribution to make.  
Bryant and Charmaz (2011, p. 231) argued that an excellent participant for grounded 
theory is:  
one who has been through, or observed, the experience under investigation. 
Participants must therefore be experts in the experience or the phenomena under 
investigation; they must be willing to participate, and have the time to share the 
necessary information; and they must be reflective, willing, and able to speak 
articulately about their experience”.  
Furthermore, it later became apparent that some were keen to avoid making comments 
in relation to a government (central bank) institution which could be deem ‘derogatory’ 
or likely to be perceived as criticising the policies of a government body despite the 
assurances that confidentiality would be maintained and that findings would be 
anonymous. This indicates the extent of paranoia and fear in The Gambia exacerbated 
by the arbitrary arrest, detention and disappearance of individuals. This climate of fear 
and intimidation is aptly summarised by the US Ambassador Joseph Stafford (2007) to 
The Gambia via US diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks when he said:  
the GOTG (Government of The Gambia) itself has shown little willingness in 
recent months to engage with us in substantive fashion on human rights issues, 
declining our proposal to consult on steps it could take to address human rights-
related and other concerns. The GOTG has maintained silence over our recently-
published Country Report on Human Rights Practices, which amply documents 
the deterioration in the GOTG's human rights record in 2006. We will continue to 
look for ways to press for reversal of the negative human rights trend here, but 
President Jammeh's increasingly autocratic behaviour serves as a major 
constraint on our efforts and those of other Western representatives, e.g., the UK 
and European Union. 
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On arrival, the researcher proceeded to distribute and collect the survey questionnaires 
initially before embarking on semi-structured interviews questionnaires and focus group 
discussion as originally intended. All participants gave their informed consent to 
participate in the research. Crucially, all the participants were assured that their 
participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the research at any time 
should they wish to do so.  
Finally, participants were assured that confidentiality would be maintained and that 
findings would be anonymous. This practice is in line with recommendations by Jansick 
(2001) who suggested that researchers should consult participants to be studied 
throughout the entire research process. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) argued that this will 
ensure that the concepts and methods that were adopted are culturally valid and 
sensitive to the population concerned. Bank customers, employees, managers and 
regulators were invited to participate in this research given their role as stakeholders in 
this industry. Strauss and Corbin’s (1994) purposive sampling approach was used to 
seek out groups and individuals where understanding and repositories of knowledge of 
“bank corporate governance regulation” were likely to be evident. Following the initial 
exploratory survey questionnaire, the researcher prepared semi-structured interview 
questionnaires that were meaningful theoretically (Morgan, 1997). This is aimed at 
building certain criteria where social explanations can be constructed on depth, 
complexity and roundness in data, rather than a broad survey questionnaire (Mason, 
2001). This is because the social world of business and management is far too 
complex to lend itself to theorising by definite ‘laws’ (Saunders et al, 2007). 
Furthermore, the social world of business and management simply escape 
measurements and quantification in the same ways as the physical sciences (Mingers, 
2004; Saunders et al, 2007). 
Initially, the plan was to conduct a focus group discussion consisting of bank 
customers, employees, managers and regulators. The aim was to triangulate the views 
and opinions of these key stakeholders who took part in the data collection. However, 
on arrival in Banjul from the UK to conduct focus group discussion the regulators had a 
change of mind. They made it clear that they were not prepared to participate in a 
focus group discussion with selected bank customers, employees and managers. In 
the end, the researcher had to conduct two separate focus group discussion instead of 
                             
132 
one as originally intended.  As a result, the banks customers, employees and 
managers were deployed in one focus group and the regulators in another. Ironically, 
this change of mind by the regulators allowed the bank customers and senior 
managers to discuss issues surrounding bank corporate governance regulation much 
more honestly than they might have done if the regulators had been present. In fact, 
Krueger and Casey (2009) suggested that researchers should avoid situations where 
supervisors and subordinates are the same focus group. It can therefore be argued 
that the regulator’s refusal to be part of the enlarge focus group actually benefited this 
research in the end. 
The bank managers and employees alleged that part of the reason the regulators 
decided not to be in the same focus group discussion was to avoid being criticised for 
promises they failed to deliver. They argued that the regulators at the Central Bank had 
for some time promised to offer corporate governance guidelines but had never 
delivered on their promise. However, the regulators suggested that they are in the 
process of developing corporate governance guidelines as part of the regulatory 
framework and will seek the author’s input once a general framework is agreed in due 
course.  
The regulators added that they are keen and determined to develop a corporate 
governance framework as part of the regulatory process but are not entirely sure which 
form that will be in the future. It is worth remembering that The Gambia is yet to have a 
formal corporate governance requirement for the financial institutions as part of the 
regulatory framework despite the financial crisis the world over.  Subsequently, the two 
focus group discussions were audio taped with participants’ permission. Both focus 
group discussions started with the rationale of the research and allowed the 
respondents to seek clarification where necessary. 
5.3  Data collection methods  
Having decided on a focus for the research, the research questions to which you seek 
answers, and the overall research strategy that is appropriate to get those answers, 
you now need to give thought to methods (Robson, 2005). However, the dilemma 
facing researchers is that there are no rigid guidelines to preferred data collection in 
literature for each 
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Table 5.1  Key data collection methods employed, and specification and justification 
of how the research methods were operationalized 
Data 
collection 
method 
Survey questionnaires Semi-structured 
interviews 
Focus groups 
Purpose Gain access and 
sensitise bank customers 
and employees. 
 
Help devise clear, 
concise and appropriate 
questions for the semi-
structured interview. 
To seek further 
clarification on questions 
4, 5 and 10 identified in 
the survey questionnaires  
 
To guided and help 
devise clear, concise and 
appropriate questions for 
the focus group. 
To clarify questions 1, 3, 
4, 5 and 10 identified in 
the semi-structured 
interviews and 
 
To elaborate and shed 
light on corporate 
governance issues raised 
during the semi-
structured interview that 
need further clarification 
How data 
was analysed 
Bar charts – this 
quantitative part of the 
research informed the 
qualitative element from 
which the grounded 
theory is derived. 
Open coding  Axial coding and 
Selective coding 
Duration Varies from one person 
to another. 
An hour for each 
interview 
Two hours for each focus 
group discussion 
Questions 
needing 
clarification 
Questions 4, 5 and 10 Question 1, 3,4, 5 & 10 None 
Previous 
academic 
precedents 
Nwanji and Howell (2004); Nwanji (2006); Sorour (2011); Boadu (2013); Ibrahim 
(2013). 
Key literature Crabtree, Yanoshik, 
Miller and O’Connor 
(1993); Strauss and 
Corbin (1994); Morgan 
(1997); Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005); Bryman 
and Bell, (2007); Creswell 
(2009); Collis and 
Hussey, (2009); Krueger 
and Casey (2009); 
Charmaz (2011); Bryant 
and Charmaz (2011); 
Howell (2013); Urquhart, 
(2013); Patton (2014). 
Glaser and Strauss 
(1967); Patton (1990; 
2014); Morgan (1992; 
1997); Krueger (1998); 
Robson (2002); Sekaran 
(2003); Wengraf (2004); 
Rubin and Rubin (2005); 
Berg (2009); Myers 
(2009); Krueger and 
Casey (2009); Howell 
(2013).  
Glaser and Strauss 
(1967); Krueger (1988); 
Stewart and Shamdasani 
(1990); Patton (1990); 
Templeton (1994); 
Kitzinger (1994; 1995); 
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research one is also faced with conflicting demands regarding data collection in terms 
of levels of validity, reliability and trustworthiness (Howell, 2013). Table 5.1 sets the key 
Data collection method employed, and specification and justification of how the 
research methods were operationalised. The ensuing discussion examines this in more 
detail. 
Newby (2010) also added that there are different sources of data and many ways of 
collecting them. Thus, the researcher’s skill lies in combining these in order to ensure a 
sufficient quantity and quality of data to answer the research question. According to 
Robson (2005) and Myers (2009), the choice of a particular data collection technique 
will depend on the chosen research method, topic, availability of data, what kind of 
information is sought, from whom and under what circumstances.  
Howell (2013) explained that data can be collected through a number of different 
methods which includes: survey or questionnaires, interviews (structured, semi-
structured and unstructured), observations (participatory and non-participatory) and 
focus groups. Similarly, Creswell (2009) argued that the data collection procedures in 
qualitative research involve four basic types namely; observations, interviews, 
documents and audio-visual materials. Qualitative observations are defined as those in 
which the researcher takes field notes on the behaviour and activities of individuals at 
the research site. These notes can be unstructured or semi-structured (prior questions 
that the inquirer wants to know) activities at the research site. Observers may engage 
in roles from non-participant to full participation. Howell (2013, p.206) suggested that 
most studies and methods of data collection are based on “some form of observation 
and can be used in both positivist and phenomenological studies”.  Phenomenological, 
especially constructivist and participatory, paradigms encourage interaction with 
respondents in natural settings.  Interviews and focus groups take into consideration 
body language and gestures that lend meaning to the interviewees discourse (Howell, 
2013).  
Qualitative interviews can be defined as those in which the researcher conducts face to 
face interviews, telephone interviews with participants or engages in focus group 
interviews (with six to eight interviewees in each group) according to Creswell (2009). 
These interviews may involve unstructured and generally open ended questions (few in 
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number) and intended to elicit views and opinions from the participants. Moreover, in 
the process of conducting research, the investigator may collect qualitative data from 
additional source (Creswell, 2009). These may include public documents (newspapers, 
minutes of meetings, official reports) or private documents including diaries, letters and 
emails (Creswell, 2009). In addition the use of audio and visual materials may take the 
form of photographs, art objects, videotapes, or any form of sound may be used 
(Creswell, 2009). For this research interviews and focus group discussions are the 
primary data collection methods used in addressing the research aims and objectives. 
5.4  Interviews 
Interviews are used in almost all kinds of qualitative research (positivists, interpretive, 
or critical) and are the technique of choice in most qualitative research methods 
(Myers, 2009). Rubin and Rubin (2005) argued that interviews are like night goggles 
‘permitting us to see that which is not ordinarily on view and examine that which is 
looked at but seldom seen’. Patton (2014) suggested that the purpose of an interview is 
to allow us to enter into the other person’s perspectives. Wengraf (2004, p.4) added 
that the purpose of interviews is:  
(1) to develop/construct a ‘model’ of some aspect of reality in accordance with ‘the 
facts’ about that reality, or (2) test a constructed model to see whether it is 
confirmed or falsified by ‘the facts’, and, more usually, (3) doing both the above”.  
Thus, qualitative interviewing begins with the assumption that the perspective of others 
is meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit (Patton, 2014). Sekaran (2003) 
suggested that interviews are a basic source of obtaining qualitative data aimed at a 
purposeful discussion involving two or more participants. An interview can be defined 
as a method for collecting primary data in which a sample of interviewees are asked 
questions to find out what they think, do or feel (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Berg (2009) 
added that interviews are simply a conversation with a purpose. Thus, all types of 
interviews can be conducted with individuals or groups, using face-to-face, telephone 
or video conferencing methods. Interviews can be structured, unstructured or semi-
structured (Walsh, 2001). The major difference between these different interview 
structures is their degree of rigidity with regard to presentational structure (Berg, 2009). 
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Structured interviews normally make use of questions that are predetermined. Semi-
structured interviews are normally in depth and informal (Robson, 2002). Hence, 
allowing the researcher to explore other areas of interest. Wengraf (2004) also sets out 
models of research design and their application to semi-structured interviews. The 
author also added that semi-structured interviews are designed to have a number of 
interview questions planned and prepared in advance. Saunders et al (2009) argued 
that this strategy allows the researcher to ask participants to provide an answer to the 
same set of questions in a pre-determined manner.  
The results of the interviews will be analysed using grounded theory coding 
procedures, first open coding to identify categories that emerged from the data (Nwanji, 
2006; Sorour, 2011; Boadu, 2013; Ibrahim, 2013). Further analysis of these categories 
through axial coding established relationships between and sub-categories (Nwanji, 
2006; Sorour, 2011; Boadu, 2013; Ibrahim, 2013). Through selective coding, core 
categories will be identified (Nwanji, 2006; Sorour, 2011; Boadu, 2013; Ibrahim, 2013). 
The following are some of the reasons why the researcher chose interviews as a 
method of data collection. Interviews have the ability to give an in-depth 
comprehension of the data under analysis or give basis for a numerical study through a 
scale or matrix (Wengraf, 2004; Patton, 2014). Interviews are also perceived as a 
means of developing an accurate interpretation and understanding of a given situation 
(Wengraf, 2004). Interviews according to Howell (2013) also provide data collection 
mechanisms that enable description, interrogation, evaluation and consideration of 
personal accounts or biographical and historical data; interview can be confrontational 
and allow an environment for storytelling.  
Finally, there is also very little training required to conduct interviews because 
interviews has become institutionalised and the norms embodied within it second 
nature for individuals and society (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Interviews, however, are 
not without weaknesses. Interview limitations include possibly distorted responses due 
to personal bias, anger, anxiety, politics, and simple lack of awareness since interview 
can be greatly affected by the emotional state of the interviewee at the time of the 
interview (Wengraf, 2004; Patton, 2014). Investigation through questions and answers 
involve ambiguity; interpretations of answers will always involve a level of subjectivity 
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(Howell, 2013). In any interview the interviewer will have some impact on the interview 
and interviewee; bias in terms of sexuality, gender, race or class may exist (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). Howell also argued that expectations from the research may 
overshadow what is discovered or emerges. Bias and subjectivity is difficult to negate 
in all interviews because what is said pre-interview could influence responses (Howell, 
2013).  
The use of semi-structured interviews for this research also brings in some added 
advantages which includes the following. Semi-structured interviews provide a set of 
preconceived questions and therefore allow for deviation and more open discussion 
(Wengraf, 2004). In addition, semi-structured interviews are also useful when the 
process or research methodology is inductively driven (Howell, 2013; Patton, 2014). 
The use of semi-structured interviews also provides an opportunity for in an in-depth 
understanding of the situation and the individual position within this context is 
imperative for the analysis.  It is also helpful because a comprehension of worldviews, 
cultures and norms are required in this study (Ibrahim, 2013). This will further enhance 
the research because an understanding of the underlying rationale for beliefs and 
attitudes are also an important factor. As the name suggests semi-structured interviews 
are a hybrid of structured and unstructured interviews (Wengraf, 2004; Howell, 2013; 
Patton, 2014). The use of this method is also beneficial for an inexperienced 
interviewer because it ensures that the interview remains on the right track while at the 
same time enables opportunity for wider discussion (Wengraf, 2004; Howell, 2013; 
Patton, 2014). Furthermore, the researcher is also likely to leave with some information 
relevant to the study by conducting a semi-structured interviews (Wengraf, 2004). 
In a structured interview all respondents are asked exactly the same pre-defined 
questions. As a result, the expectation is limited variation, clear means of coding in a 
pre-determined format (Howell, 2013). A structured interview takes the form of a 
questionnaire (ibid). Hence, it could be argued there is little difference between this 
method of data collection and closed questionnaires (Patton, 2014). Whilst, 
unstructured interviews provide in depth data because the researcher enters the 
research with no pre-conceived questions and with the interview taking the form of 
discussion or conversation (Wengraf, 2004; Howell, 2013). Therefore the respondents 
are not necessarily restricted to a certain scope and direction (Wengraf, 2004; Hatton, 
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2005; Howell, 2013). Thus, the primary objective of an unstructured interview is to 
understand social and behavioural complexities in an inductive manner (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). In contrast, the aim of a structured interview is to generate specific data 
explaining human behaviour that can be easily coded in pre-determined categories. 
One major disadvantage of this method is the use of priority categorisation which has 
the tendency to stifle discovery and hence, impose constraints on the investigation 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009; Howell, 2013).   
The semi-structured interview for this research had 12 questions in total aimed at the 
senior bankers (directors with 5 or more line reports) who are involved with the day to 
day operation and governance of the bank. The interviewees came from five different 
banks namely: 
 Prime Bank – is the first African subsidiary of a Lebanese Canadian Bank.  
 Arab Gambia Islamic Bank – is the only Islamic bank in The Gambia and has no 
other subsidiary or parent company. 
 Guaranty Trust Bank – is a joint initiative and partnership between a Nigerian 
leading bank (GT Bank) and a number of Gambian businessmen and 
institutions.  
 Ecobank Gambia Limited – a bank initiated and spearheaded by the Federation 
of West African Chambers of Commerce and Industry with the support of 
Ecowas (regional body). It was set up to challenge the dominance of foreign or 
state owned banks in West Africa. 
 Standard Chartered Bank – is the oldest and biggest bank in The Gambia. It 
used to carry many of the functions of the Central Bank of The Gambia and until 
2002 it was the only international bank in The Gambia. 
Morgan (1997) argued that both individual interviews and focus groups are frequently 
conducted with purposively selected samples in which the participants are recruited 
from a limited number of sources. This group of bank staff are best placed to answer 
the required questions in terms of knowledge and experience of the subject matter 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Patton, 1990; Krueger, 1998; Nwanji, 2006; Boadu, 2013; 
Ibrahim, 2013). The survey and interview questionnaires are designed to cover the 
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issues that are required for effective governance system/practices including regulation, 
ethics, CSR, good governance, management decision-making and its consequences, 
accountability and stakeholder approach (Nwanji, 2006; Sorour, 2011; Ibrahim, 2013).  
The researcher targeted a total of 20 senior bankers (directors with 5 or more line 
reports) who are involved with the day to day operation and governance of the bank to 
complete the semi-structured questionnaires. However, the researcher was only able to 
obtain 14 completed semi-structured questionnaires from these senior bankers 
representing 5 out of 13 banks in total that exist in The Gambia. This is a completion 
rate of 70% per cent of the population. Subsequently the responses to questions 1, 3, 
4, 5 and 10 of the semi-structured questionnaire help devise the six questions used in 
the focus group discussion. These six questions were based on the key issues 
identified during the interview that required further clarification. Thus, the semi-
structured questionnaire guided, help devise clear, concise and appropriate questions 
for the focus group discussions that followed. Below are the 12 questions used for the 
semi-structured interviews:  
1. To what extent does corporate governance regulation affect the financial 
performance of financial sector organisations? 
2. What was the rationale for the introduction of corporate governance regulation 
in the financial service sector in The Gambia? 
3. How does the governance of financial sector organisations affect the services 
you provide to your stakeholders? 
4. How effective is the current corporate governance system within the financial 
sector organisations? 
5. How can effective corporate governance in the financial sector organisation 
provide management accountability to stakeholders? 
6. How vital is effective corporate governance systems in financial sector 
organisations necessary to meet the needs of its stakeholders?  
7. Would you prefer a voluntary code of governance or the current legislative 
approach (please give your reasons)?  
8. What are the key contributors/factors of good governance?  
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9. Does good corporate governance in the financial sector organisations 
enhance CSR and ethics (please give your reason)? 
10. Do you see yourself as accountable to shareholders only or stakeholders 
generally (please give reasons)? 
11. Do you consider the ethical consequences of your decisions on your 
stakeholders (if so why)?  
12. How will increased emphasis on business ethics (legislative or voluntary) 
affect financial performance of the financial sector organisations? 
See appendix VIII - Sample of the Semi-structured Interview Questions.  
Morgan (1997) suggested that combining individual interviews and focus groups within 
research projects is the best way to explore the most effective uses for each method. 
Furthermore, preliminary individual interviews can help generate focus group 
discussion guides by giving a feel for how people think and talk about topics that the 
groups will discuss (Morgan, 1992). When deciding whether to mix certain population 
segments in focus groups, a small number of preliminary individual interviews could 
show whether the various participants’ way of speaking about the topic would allow for 
a comfortable conversation (Morgan, 1997). A final way to combine focus group with 
individual interviews is to conduct one as a follow-up to the other (Morgan, 1997; 
Krueger and Casey, 2009). Thus, as these suggestions show, focus groups and 
individual interviews can be complementary techniques across a variety of different 
research designs. This illustrates the larger point that “the goal of combining research 
methods is to strengthen the total research project, regardless of which method is the 
primary means of data collection” (Morgan, 1997, p.23). In other situations focus 
groups have been used after other research methods (in this case after interviews) to 
help interpret or to develop recommendations for later action or study (Krueger and 
Casey, 2009). 
5.5  Focus Group Discussions  
Patton (2014) defined focus groups as interviews with a small group of people on a 
specific topic. Morgan (1996) added that focus groups are a research technique that 
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collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher. In 
essence, it is the researcher’s interest that provides the focus, whereas the data 
themselves come from the group interaction (Morgan, 1996). Krueger and Casey 
(2009) suggested that the function of the group may be to suggest ideas, to clarify 
potential options, to react to ideas, to recommend a course of action, to make a 
decision, to plan or to evaluate. Thus, the purpose of a focus group discussion is to get 
collective views on a certain defined topic of interest from a group of people who are 
known to have had certain experiences (Myers, 2009). Kitzinger (1995) added that the 
idea behind focus groups discussions is to explore and clarify views in ways that would 
be less easily accessible in a one to one interview. In essence, focus groups reach 
parts that other methods cannot reach, revealing dimensions of understanding that 
often remain untapped by the more conventional data collection technique (Kitzinger, 
1995). Thus, tapping into such interpersonal communication is also important because 
this can highlight (sub) cultural values or group norms (Kitzinger, 1995). Focus group 
research is participatory and is a cycle of interaction between researchers and 
participants that begins and ends in shared activities and understanding (Howell, 
2013).  
Berg (2009) argued that focus group interviews explicitly use group interactions as part 
of the data gathering method. The use of group interactions are part of data gathering 
is essential in stimulating new ideas and creative concepts as well as interpreting 
previously obtained qualitative results (Berg, 2009). Kitzinger (1995) added that the 
explicit use of group interaction is particularly useful for exploring peoples knowledge 
and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but how they 
think and why they think that way. Kitzinger (1994, p.107) suggested that: 
when group dynamics work well the co-participants acted as researchers taking 
the research into new and often unexpected directions and engaging in interaction 
which were both complementary (such as sharing common experiences) and 
argumentative (questioning, challenging, and disagreeing with each other).  
Furthermore, focus group discussions combine interviewing and observation, but allow 
fresh data to be generated through the interaction of the group (Collis and Hussey, 
2009). Thus, one can argue that focus groups provide an environment where the 
construction of points of view may be explored and are adept for studying attitudes and 
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experiences based around specific topics (Howell, 2013). Basically, focus group 
discussions are a form of collective activity such as discussing sets of questions. The 
size of focus groups is flexible with  others suggesting as few as three will be 
acceptable (Howell, 2013 and Kleiber, 2004). Coincidentally, there are a number of 
texts devoted to identifying how to construct and facilitate focus groups such as: 
Krueger (1988); Stewart and Shamdasani (1990); Templeton (1994); Fern (2001); 
Collis and Hussey (2009) and Howell (2013). These academics have made an 
immense contribution to the development of focus groups as a method of data 
collection. Focus groups are different from group interviews in that they explicitly use 
group interaction to generate data.   
Kleiber (2004) also says that in a focus group discussion usually five to six general 
questions are posed to the group. The interview questions and the subsequent 
responses during the interview inform the questions presented during the focus group. 
The focus group discussions for this research consist of six key questions (Kleiber, 
2004). The questions are aimed at addressing issues surrounding corporate 
governance regulation, ethics, corporate accountability, effects of corporate 
governance in relation to the services provided to stakeholders and the effectiveness of 
the governance system in the financial sector organisation.  
There are several reasons for selecting focus group participants through purposive or 
“theoretical” sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Patton, 1990). Participants are 
selected because they have certain characteristics in common that relate to the topic of 
the focus group (Krueger and Casey, 2009). Furthermore, Krueger and Casey (2009, 
p.6) opine that focus group interviews typically have five characteristics namely “(1) 
people, who (2) possess certain characteristics, (3) provide qualitative data (4) in a 
focused discussion (5) to help understand the topic of interest”. Furthermore, it is also 
important to note that group work is also invaluable for grounded theory development 
which is the focus of this research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Kitzinger, 1994). It 
focuses on the generation rather than the testing of theory and exploring the categories 
which the participants use to order their experience (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Kitzinger, 1994).  
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In this case, the participants are purposely selected because they are best placed to 
answer the required questions in terms of knowledge and experience of the subject 
matter (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Patton, 1990; Krueger, 1998; Nwanji, 2006; Boadu, 
2013; Ibrahim, 2013). Patton (2014) describes these information-rich cases as those 
from which one can learn a great deal about the issues of central importance to the 
purpose of the research. Therefore, the question the researcher asks is who has the 
greatest amount of insight on this topic? (Krueger and Casey, 2009). Therefore, the 
purpose of the research should guide the invitation decision. However, it is important to 
note that no selection is perfect because selection is limited by our human capacity 
(Krueger and Casey, 2009).  
The composition of the focus group for this research was initially designed to include 
key stakeholders in the banking industry in The Gambia namely: regulators, bank 
managers, customers and employees from selected banks. However, this particular 
composition did not materialise in the end as previously discussed. Thus, the 
researcher had to modify the structure of the focus group initially planned. In the end, 
the researcher conducted the focus group discussion in two groups. The first focus 
group discussion was conducted with two regulators and the researcher.  The two 
regulators came from the Central Bank of The Gambia. The second focus group 
discussion was structured as follows: 
 One senior manager from Prime Bank 
 One senior manager from Arab Gambia Islamic Bank 
 One customer from Guaranty Trust Bank 
 One customer from Ecobank Gambia Limited 
 One employee from Ecobank 
 One employee from Standard Chartered Bank and the researcher. 
The proceedings of the focus groups were recorded using an audio recorder with the 
consent of the participants.  The focus group discussions will be analysed and 
compared with the core categories from the interviews to establish the major categories 
upon which substantive theory will be developed. See appendix IX – Sample of the 
Focus Group Questionnaire. 
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Focus groups can be useful for a number of reasons such as to develop knowledge of 
a new phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1997; 
Krueger, 1998; Berg, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 2009; Howell, 2013; Patton, 2014). 
The strength of relying on the researcher’s focus is the ability to produce concentrated 
amounts of data on precisely the topic of interest (Morgan, 1997). It can also be used 
to generate propositions from the issues that emerge and obtain feedback on the 
findings of research in which the focus group members participated (Kleiber, 2004; 
Collis and Hussey, 2009). In addition, other reasons for conducting the focus 
discussion are as follows: Focus group discussion enables the researcher to explore a 
specific set of issues and explore individual experiences, opinions and concerns 
(Morgan, 1997). Group interaction can generate data and encourage participants to 
speak with one another through exchanging anecdotes, questioning one another and 
commenting on different points of view (Morgan, 1997; Howell, 2013; Patton, 2014). 
Focus groups can also encourage multiple lines of communications and a safe 
environment for the participants to share ideas, beliefs and attitudes between 
individuals from similar professional backgrounds (Howell, 2013). Focus groups were: 
perceived as a mechanism for overcoming the interviewer’s bias and subjectivity 
in terms of beliefs and values directing the interview. Through attempted negation 
of interview bias and power the focus group can provide a more accurate 
perspective of social constructions of those participating (Howell, 2013, p.201).  
Moreover, the control of the researcher is minimal in focus groups. Johnson (1996) 
added that the dynamics of focus groups have been identified as a means of 
developing a new knowledge through accessing raw un-codified data through 
stimulating the imagination of both researchers and participants. Focus groups also 
allow horizontal as well as vertical interactions (Johnson, 1996). Thereby providing an 
environment that encourages plurality in the construction of knowledge with 
precedence given to what participants consider important (Johnson, 1996). Focus 
group can provide fertile soil for the collection of anecdotal material (Johnson, 1996; 
Howell, 2013). Overall, focus groups intensify the opportunity for the participants to 
decide the direction of the research and in this way it offers much to constructivist and 
participatory paradigms of inquiry.  
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Focus groups are not without disadvantages (Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1997; Krueger, 
1998; Berg, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 2009; Howell, 2013; Patton, 2014). Some of the 
demerits of focus groups are as follows: They may be open to careless or inappropriate 
usage as results can be manipulated to justify decisions that have already been taken 
and subjects of research exploited (Berg, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 2009). Another 
difficulty with focus groups revolves around whether they should be homogenous or 
heterogeneous in terms of group design (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Howell, 2013). The 
authors also added that homogeneity can be more productive, heterogeneity can 
provide deeper insight. It is also possible that some individuals may be intimidated by 
the prospect of group discussion while the group environment may offer reassurance to 
others. Focus groups discussions sometimes do not work because one member is 
highly vociferous and dominates the discussion. There is also the question of 
confidentiality in relation to the participants in that focus groups cannot assure 
confidentiality. Finally, the fact that focus groups are driven by the researcher’s interest 
can also be a source of weakness (Morgan, 1997).   
It is suggested that participants should be presented with key statements to be 
collectively assessed and that during the collective tasks participants should 
concentrate on one another rather than the facilitator (Morgan, 1997; Howell, 2013). All 
participants should be given equal opportunity to participate and should not feel 
uncomfortable with the situation (ibid). It is also important to note that facilitators should 
refrain from being judgemental and making assumptions that close down further 
exploration.  Therefore, any intervention requires balance, and, taken only to clarify 
ambiguity and encourage participation. Howell (2013, p.204) argued that 
“understanding of separate cultural meanings and knowledge of group’s language is 
important as is the ability to lose control and allow the group to lead the discussion”. 
Focus group is a special type of group in terms of purpose, size, composition, 
procedures and analysis (Kitzinger, 1995; Krueger and Casey, 2009; Howell, 2013). 
Thus, the purpose of conducting a focus group is to listen and gather opinions by 
capitalising on communication between research participants in order to generate data 
(Kitzinger, 1995).  
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5.6  Secondary data 
Secondary data refers to any data gathered that has been previously published (Myers, 
2009). Through the literature review secondary data will be identified and used to 
support the primary data. There are a number of research works from the UK and 
beyond which will help focus the data collection in relation to the research questions, 
the research methodology and the research objectives.  The combination of primary 
data in the form of interviews and focus groups combined with secondary data from 
other studies in this area will enable the researcher to carry out empirical investigations 
on financial sector corporate governance system in The Gambia in relation to pre-
existing theoretical perspectives using grounded theory methodology. Even though 
interviews and focus groups are the major data collection methods used in this 
research other secondary sources were also used to complement the primary data 
sources.  
The following secondary data sources were used in the process of this research which 
enables the researcher to develop a greater understanding, awareness, depth and  
appreciation of literature that exist in this area of research. These data sources mainly 
from The Gambia includes: the Banking Act 2009, the Money Laundering Act 2003, the 
Central Bank Act 2005, Anti-Terrorism Act 2002, the Insurance Act 2003, the Financial 
Institutions Act 2003, Companies Act 1955, the Central Bank Gazettes, Minutes of the 
monetary committee meetings, the Bank’s newsletters. All the documents named 
above are readily available on The Central Bank of The Gambia’s website (Central 
Bank of Gambia, 2014). These documents complement the existing primary data thus 
forming an integral part of the theoretical framework which underpins the research.  
The knowledge and understanding acquired as a result of combining the primary and 
secondary data used for this research enables the researcher to develop a greater 
understanding and awareness of corporate governance issues. Thus, enabling 
development of a more rounded understanding of corporate governance issues in The 
Gambia and beyond. 
5.7  Conclusion  
Finally, this chapter discusses a number of different methods of data collection but 
mainly focuses on the methods the researcher used for this research. The method of 
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sampling used in this research is called judgemental sampling which is similar to 
snowball sampling as the participants are selected by the researcher on the strength of 
their experience of the phenomena under study. In judgemental sampling “the 
researcher makes the decision prior to the commencement of the research and does 
not pursue other contacts that may arise during the course of the study” (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009, p.213). When one undertakes a piece of research one is also faced with 
conflicting demands regarding data collection in terms of levels of validity, reliability and 
trustworthiness (Howell, 2013).  Newby (2010) also added that there are different 
sources of data and many ways of collecting them. Thus, the researcher’s skill lies in 
combining these in order to ensure a sufficient quantity and quality of data to answer 
the research question. According to Robson (2005) and Myers (2009), the choice of a 
particular data collection technique will depend on the chosen research method, topic, 
availability of data, what kind of information is sought, from whom and under what 
circumstances.  
Howell (2013) explained that data can be collected through a number of different 
methods which includes: survey or questionnaires, interviews (structured, semi-
structured and unstructured), observations (participatory and non-participatory) and 
focus groups. Chapter four is mainly focused on research methodology while this 
chapter is mainly based on the research method. An evaluation of chapter four and this 
chapter suggest that there is a distinction between methodologies and methods.  
However, there exists a clear link between these areas. The way data is collected and 
the mode of analysis will be determined by the methodological approach and the 
philosophical position that guides the methodological approach. The philosophical 
position and paradigm of inquiry will identify the best methodology and consequent 
stance when methods of data collection are employed. In general, the 
phenomenological positions will use qualitative data and positivist quantitative; 
subsequently the methods of data collection deployed will reflect this (Howell, 2013). 
Table 5.7.1 sets the key literature for each data collection method employed, and 
specification and justification of how the research methods were operationalised. 
 
                             
148 
The next chapter is focused on analysing the semi-structured interviews and focus 
group using open coding. Open coding is the first stage of grounded theory method of 
data collection aimed at developing a substantive theory on corporate governance in 
The Gambia. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
ANALYSIS OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS AND 
FOCUS GROUP: OPEN CODING 
6.0  Introduction 
This chapter deals with the analysis of the semi-structured interviews and focus group 
results collected from bank managers, employees and customers as well as regulators 
in The Gambia. The previous chapter discusses the research methods adopted for this 
research and other qualitative research methods. This chapter is based on grounded 
theory method of data collection as the first stage towards developing a substantive 
theory on corporate governance. Data for this thesis was collected in two main stages 
namely; semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. 
This chapter aims to cover the following areas including the semi-structured interview 
process, detailing the participants, duration of the interview, questions used for the 
semi-structured interview, analysis of the interview questions – open coding. The same 
structure will be adopted for the focus group also covered in this chapter.  One of the 
simplest ways to analyse qualitative data is “to do some kind of coding on the data. A 
code can be a word that is used to describe or summarise a sentence, a paragraph, or 
even a whole piece of text such as interview” (Myers, 2009, p.167).  Miles and 
Huberman (1994) described codes as tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to 
words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or otherwise to a specific 
sentence during the study 
As soon as you start coding a piece of text, you have already started to analyse it. 
Coding is analysis. Coding helps you to reduce the size of your data (Myers, 2009). 
Coding is useful for retrieving and organising data, and it speeds up the analysis (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Coding involves interpreting the data and moving from concrete 
to more abstract conceptualisation. Thus, broadly speaking during open coding, data 
are broken down and closely examined for similarities and differences (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). As a result, similar events, happenings, objects and action/interactions 
that are found to be conceptually similar are grouped under more abstract concepts 
called categories (ibid).  
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Furthermore, Howell (2013) also added that Coding involves microanalysis and 
involves a dynamic fluids process; categories and properties are created and 
relationships assessed through open and axial coding. 
The semi-structured interview and focus group data collected for this research is 
analysed below using open coding process of grounded theory. The analysis involved 
the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising, and 
categorising data. The aim of open coding is the development of categories from the 
semi-structured interview and focus group data collected from the stakeholders of The 
Gambia banking sector.  
Grounded theory generates substantive theory through comparative analysis and 
coding of data that is systemically collected with a view to developing theory (Glaser, 
1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Howell 2000; Nwanji, 2006; Urquhart, 2013). 
Researchers state that the grounded theory coding method does not attempt to 
undermine theory but to improve it, through discovering data, coding it, and 
comparative methods step by step; and through their analytic questions, hypotheses, 
and methodological applications (Glaser, 1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Howell 
2000; Nwanji, 2006; Urquhart, 2013).  
The purpose here was to identify and suggest resolution for two core problems of 
grounded theory. First, while grounded theory provides transparency to one part of the 
conceptualization process, where codes emerge directly from the data, it provides no 
such systematic or transparent way for gaining insight into the conceptual relationships 
between discovered codes. Producing a grounded theory depends not only on the 
definition of conceptual pieces, but also on the delineation of a relationship between at 
least two of those pieces. Secondly, the conceptualization process of grounded theory 
is done in hierarchical fashion, where individual codes emerge from the data but then 
are used to generate insight into more general concepts and thematic statements 
(Glaser, 1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Howell 2000; Urquhart, 2013). However, 
various works on grounded theory have failed to provide any systematic way of using 
data specific levels of scale (the codes) to gain insight into more macro levels of scale 
(concepts and themes) (Glaser, 1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Urquhart, 2013).  
Fractional concept analysis can be offered as a means of resolving both of these 
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issues (Glaser, 1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). By using a logic structure generator, 
fractal concept analysis delineates self-similar conceptual frameworks at various levels 
of abstraction, yielding a method for linking concepts together within and between 
levels of scale encountered in the grounded theory coding and categorisation process 
(Glaser, 1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Howell 2000; Urquhart, 2013). 
6.1  Semi-structured interview process and questions 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with several bank managers across the 
banking sector in The Gambia. The duration of each interview lasted for about an hour 
because these managers are already similar with the corporate governance issues that 
are been discussed with the researcher (Morgan, 1997). There were 14 interviews 
conducted for this research. The participants for these semi-structured interviews came 
from five out of 13 banks in The Gambia as previously discussed.  
The results of the interviews were analysed using grounded theory coding procedures, 
first open coding to identify categories that emerged from the data. Further analysis of 
these categories through axial coding established relationships between categories 
and sub-categories. Through selective coding, core categories were identified. The 
focus group discussions were analysed and compared with the core categories from 
the interviews to establish the major categories upon which the substantive theory was 
constructed. As clear categories from the analysis were in forms of terms that support 
or did not support the literature review of previous research studies in this area, further 
analysis will be required in which the results of the data here are analysed further using 
axial coding and selective coding.  
6.2  Analysis of semi-structured interview questions – open coding 
The semi-structured interview for this research had 12 questions in total aimed at the 
senior bankers with line reports. The interviewees came from five different banks (see 
5.2) namely: Prime Bank, Arab Gambia Islamic Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, Ecobank 
Gambia Limited and Standard Chartered Bank. 
These interviewees were experienced senior bank managers involved in policy making 
and implementation of corporate governance matters ranging from branch managers, 
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risk managers, compliance managers, and financial controllers to portfolio managers 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Patton, 1990; Krueger, 1998; Nwanji, 2006; Krueger and 
Casey, 2009; Bryant and Charmaz, 2011; Boadu, 2013; Ibrahim, 2013; Patton, 2014). 
The rationale for purposely selecting these participants is because the analysis drawn 
from these managers based on their views can be held as an account of corporate 
governance issues in The Gambia. Bryant and Charmaz (2011) argued that an 
excellent participant for grounded theory is one who has been through, or observed, 
the experience under investigation. The following key is used to denote the various 
positions of participants for the semi-structured interview: 
 A Branch Manager – participant 1 
 A Risk Manager – participant 2 
 A Compliance Manager – participant 3 
 A Financial Controller – participant 4 
 A Portfolio Manager – participant 5.  
In response to question one participant 4 expressed that:  
corporate governance regulation requires organisations to operate ethically and 
be more accountable to all stakeholders and not shareholders alone. This 
however, may come at a cost which will in turn affect the profitability of the 
organisation.  
Similarly participant 3 added that:  
corporate governance regulation help prevent certain illegal or selfish practices, 
thus attracting investors and increasing confidence of depositors and ethical-
driven investments.  
Furthermore, participant 1 suggested that:  
corporate governance regulation affects the financial performance of financial 
corporations through the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions 
own codes. It can equally affect the sound approaches by which corporations are 
directed and controlled (both internally and externally). 
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Based on the analysis of these quotes one can conclude that ethics, 
accountability, processes, customs, policies, laws, codes, direct and control 
appears to be the main concepts one can draw from these analysis.  
While responding to question two, participant 2 suggested that the rationale for the 
introduction of corporate governance regulation in the financial sector in The Gambia 
is:  
to regulate the way banks are directed and administered. Corporate governance 
regulation was also introduced in The Gambia to increase the accountability of 
directors and reduce or eliminate the principal agent problem. 
Participant 5 suggested that the introduction of corporate governance regulation is 
to:  
ensure the adoption of good ethical practices that prohibits cartels that restrict 
competition and exploit financial sector clients.  
In addition, a senior bank manager (participant 3) also argued that the rationale for the 
introduction of corporate governance regulation is to provide:  
appropriate ethical approaches, effective decision making, proper accountability 
and transparency.  
Therefore, based on these evaluations in relation this specific question it appears that 
direct, accountability, ethics and transparency seem to be the main concepts that could 
be derived.    
While responding to question three during the interview, participant 1 expressed that:  
it sets the standards required to meeting the service needs of stakeholders. 
Furthermore, participant 4 commented that:  
services provided to stakeholders can be affected by mitigating procedures, 
policies, and laws which enhances economic efficiency, accountability of people in 
the business and the welfare of the shareholders.  
Another manager (participant 2) added that it:  
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creates and enhances transparency and accountability of the operations of 
financial institutions.  
On close examination of these three quotes it is evident that standards, procedures, 
policies, laws, accountability and transparency are central concepts that can be derived 
from this analysis.  
Analysing the responses of the semi-structured interview in relation to question four 
regarding how effective the current corporate governance system within the financial 
sector organisations. An interviewee (participant 5) explained that:  
in the contemporary volatile markets, it is quite effective in ensuring that 
corporations conduct activities in relation to the laws and apply sound approaches 
by which corporations are directed and controlled.  
In addition, participant 1 added that:  
the system is highly effective because the sector is constantly monitored and all 
failures to abide by the regulations are punished by fines. 
Furthermore, participant 3 said that:  
I believe the governance is achieving the desired objectives of regulating the 
operations of financial institutions in both coerce and voluntary liquidation of some 
banks that do not meet minimum standards of compliance. However, there are 
tendencies for the effectiveness of governance to be undermined by impromptu 
executive directors to single handedly effect compliance away from regulation. 
This is evident in a ban on shipment and other financial transactions last 
December. 
An evaluation of these quotes suggests that regulation, laws, direct, control, monitor, 
standards and compliance are the main concepts one can be drawn.  
In response to question five aimed at evaluating how effective corporate governance in 
the financial sector organisations provides management accountability to stakeholders. 
An interviewee (participant 4) argued that:  
with effective corporate governance in place all stakeholders are fully informed of 
management actions which they have the right to oppose if unfavorable. 
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Participant 2 suggested that effective corporate governance in the financial sector 
organisations provide management accountability to stakeholders:  
by having the right structures in place. 
Finally, participant 5 added that: 
through an institution’s performance in the delivering of corporate social 
responsibility, it is accountable to its host locality and government at large. It also 
provides penalty measures in cases of defaults to regulatory performances.  
On close scrutiny of these quotes it is evident that the concepts of action, structures, 
CSR and regulation are prominent.  
Referring to how vital effective corporate governance system in the financial sector 
organisations necessary to meet the needs of its stakeholders (question six), 
participant 2 explained that:  
corporate governance identifies the risks and provides systems or measures to 
mitigate those risks.  
Another manager (participant 4) also commented that it is:  
very vital as it remunerate fairly and responsibly. It recognise and manages risk. It 
recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders. 
It was also suggested (participant 3) that:  
it is very vital to put in place effective processes that are fully acceptable by 
stakeholders and guided by policies that conforms to laws of the land. 
An analysis of these quotes from the senior bank managers suggests that the concept 
of risk, mitigate, legitimate, processes, policies, conform and laws are clearly evident.  
An analysis of question seven led to the uncovering the following quotes by participant 
1:  
a legislative code to unify the culture and standards set aside for more effective 
management.  
While another respondent (participant 3) suggested that:  
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ideally voluntary, but preferably legislative as the latter ensures uniformity whilst 
the former may be recipe for lack of best practice – every institution may think its 
way is the best. 
In addition, participant 2 explained that: 
I would prefer the current legislative approach because the voluntary codes are 
just guidelines which directors can either choose to follow or not to follow.  
Based on these analyses one can conclude that the concepts of uniformity, culture, 
standards, best practice and guidelines can be drawn.  
While responding to question eight in relation to the key contribution/factors of good 
governance participant 5 suggested:  
a well-established structure that is understood at all levels. Consistency in 
management decision making and board of directors avoiding insider trading. For 
any corporate governance to be strong the board of directors must help. 
Whilst participant 1 added that:  
structure, solid supervision and regulatory unit.  
Finally, research participant 4 argued that:  
leadership, constant monitoring, discipline and transparency are the key 
contributions of good governance.  
The analysis of these three quotes above seem to suggest that structure, consistency, 
board of directors, supervision, regulation, leadership, monitoring, discipline and 
transparency are the main concepts that could be derived.  
In relation to question nine focusing on whether good corporate governance in the 
financial sector organisations enhances CSR and ethics one manager (participant 5) 
argued that:  
good corporate governance enhances corporate social responsibility and ethics 
because organisations are accountable and responsible to the environment which 
they operate in.  
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Furthermore, another participant 3 added that:  
the two are synonymous in that help immensely in monitoring and ensuring active 
compliance with the spirit of the law, ethical standards and international norms. 
They both help in impacting positively on the environment, consumers, 
employees, communities, stakeholders and all other members of the public 
sphere.  
Finally, another respondent (participant 2) suggested that:  
it does enhance CSR in its bid to enhance all stakeholders. In that case, it serves 
as a source of reference in case of lack of compliance on the part of financial 
institutions and hence, vital in legal decision against a party.  
A careful scrutiny of the above quotes suggests that accountability, responsibility, 
environment, monitoring, compliance and law are the main concepts that can be drawn 
at this stage.  
Question ten asks managers as to whether they see themselves accountable to 
shareholders only or stakeholders generally. In response to this question a manager 
(participant 4) said:  
I believe accountability should be extended to both the shareholders and 
stakeholders because of the different roles they play in the sector. 
Another manager (participant 5) explained that as managers they are accountable to:  
all because they all have interest in the organisation.  
In addition, another respondent (participant 1) added that:  
we are accountable to all stakeholders and not only shareholders because some 
stakeholders are powerful and should be well informed and kept satisfied. Our 
stakeholders are always aware of our actions.  
Analyses of these quotes appear to suggest that role, interest, power and actions are 
the main concepts that can be drawn.  
Question 11 focuses on whether these managers consider the ethical consequences of 
their decisions on stakeholders. Participant 1 added that:  
                             
158 
not always unless ethical consequences has a legal implications for the institution. 
Another manager (participant 3) suggested that:  
absolutely – I’m bind by the code of conduct which guides directors.  
In addition another respondent (participant 4) argued that:  
yes, I consider these consequences because their contribution to corporate 
governance is crucial and means a lot to the financial sector.  
The analysis of these quotes appear to suggest that legal, code, guide and corporate 
governance are the main concepts that could be drawn from this question.  
Finally, question 12 focuses on how increase emphases on business ethics (legislative 
or voluntary) affect financial performance of the financial sector organisations. 
Participant 2 suggested that it:  
will increase trust and confidence.  
Another manager (participant 5) added that:  
it is most likely going to increase profitability, the more trust is assured, the 
more people will engage into business with you.  
Furthermore, participant 1 added that:  
this will provide guidelines and principles to better improve the performance in 
organisations and effective reporting to the stakeholders and shareholders.  
The key concepts that can be derived from these analyses are trust, confidence, 
profitability, guidance and principles.  
In summary through the grounded theory method of simultaneous comparison of 
concepts and there commonalities across the 12 semi-structured questions 42 
concepts eventually emerged.  A similar process will be followed for the focus group 
discussion below. Finally, a simultaneous comparison of the concepts and there 
commonalities across both the semi-structured interview and the focus group 
discussion will then be carried out to establish the open codes. 
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6.3  Focus group interview process and questions 
Bryant and Charmaz suggested that sampling techniques must be targeted and 
efficient. Morse (2006) quoted in Bryant and Charmaz (2011, p. 234) also added that 
“an excellent qualitative inquiry is inherently biased. By biased, I mean it has been 
deliberately sought and selected. This bias is essential if we are going to do good work 
and this bias is not something that impairs the rigor of the research”. For interpretivists 
the goal is to gain rich and detailed insights of the complexity of social phenomena 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). Therefore, interpretivists can conduct their research with a 
sample of one (ibid). The proceedings of the focus groups were recorded using an 
audio recorder with the consent of the participants (Nwanji, 2006; Sorour 2011; 
Ibrahim, 2013).  
The duration of both focus groups lasted for two hours (Morgan, 1997). The two bank 
managers and employees are experienced bankers involved in policy making and 
implementing corporate governance issues. The two bank customers chosen for this 
focus group discussion also happen to run their own business. The focus group 
discussion was intended to elaborate and shed light on corporate governance issues 
raised during the semi-structured interview phase that need further clarification. The 
semi-structured interviews also help the researcher to formulate the research questions 
for the focus group discussion.  
Below are the six questions used for the focus group discussion:-  
1. How do corporate governance regulations affect financial sector 
organisation? 
2. How does the governance of financial sector organisations affect the 
services they provide to their stakeholders? 
3. How effective is the corporate governance system within the financial sector 
organisation in The Gambia? 
4. Can corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provide 
accountability by management to stakeholders? 
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5. How does being public organisation (central bank) affect the governance 
mechanism, the institutional ethics and the code of conduct of such 
organisation?  
6. How does the current governance structure affect the regulation of the 
financial sector organisations?  
6.4  Analysis of focus group interview questions – open coding  
The focus group discussion was conducted using two groups. However, the analysis of 
focus group interview questions below is a combination of both groups. The first focus 
group discussion was conducted with two regulators from the Central Bank of The 
Gambia and the researcher. Please note that the two regulators in the first focus group 
discussion will both denoted as participants 7a and 7b. The second focus group 
discussion was structured as follows as previously discussed: 
 A senior manager from Prime Bank – participant 1 
 A senior manager from Arab Gambia Islamic Bank – participant 2 
 A customer from Guaranty Trust Bank – participant 3 
 A customer from Ecobank Gambia Limited – participant 4 
 An employee from Prime Bank – participant 5 
 An employee from Standard Chartered Bank – participant 6 and the researcher. 
While responding to question one participant 1 responded that:  
in respect of financial sector in The Gambia, the body in charge of corporate 
governance is the central bank which is enacted by the act of parliament called 
the Central Bank Act. The operations of banks in The Gambia are regulated and 
controlled by directors, ethics, and design, monitored and controlled by the central 
bank that affects all the operations of the banks.  
Furthermore, a regulator (participant 7a) suggested that:  
it has critical role to play in the running and management of financial institutions, 
in the sense that corporate governance provide a framework of rules and 
regulations. You can have a fantastic set of rules and regulations on paper but if 
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they are ineffective and dysfunctional they are useless. So I think the good 
corporate governance regulation should be complemented by enforcement and 
observations, they should be observed and enforced. Good corporate governance 
has a positive impact on financial organizations anywhere in the world, across 
regions, across countries, across tribes, across ethnicity wherever you may see 
the lifeline for business organizations lies in sound and good corporate 
governance which is strong and enforceable regulation.  
A second regulator (Participant 7b) added that:  
The regulation of corporate governance is beneficial because it basically protects 
the interest of other stakeholders. Usually the companies which have good 
corporate governance steps in place that helps them direct, administer and control 
the managers to make sure they deliver as per their work corporate objectivity to 
maximize shareholder’s wealth. Now the benefit of regulation is, if you like to 
safeguard the interest of other stakeholders (secondary) if you like and for that 
reason it is very important. Banks have their own internal corporate governance; 
they have their own systems. Now regulation if you like is that protect the 
depositors and others besides shareholders. It is very important in terms of 
market discipline because if the market participants are not happy nobody would 
participate.  
Based on the evaluation of the quotes mentioned above one can conclude that the 
following concepts can be drawn namely: act, control, ethics, monitor, framework, 
rules, good corporate governance, enforcement, observations, protect, stakeholders, 
direct, administer, shareholder, wealth, safeguard, systems and discipline.  
In response to question two participant 2 argued that:  
the primary purpose of the central directives or acts is to safeguard the interest of 
the depositors, shareholders, and the economy of The Gambia. In light of this, its 
effects are clearly manifested in all the operations of the financial sector of The 
Gambia.  
Participant 6 also added that the governance of financial sector organisations affect the 
services they provide to their stakeholders through: 
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the restriction of capital and also where you take deposit you can only invest 86% 
of the deposit you have collected. This is a central bank requirement because 
14% of the deposit we take from customer we can only deposit that at the central 
bank.. 
Furthermore, participant 4 also suggested that: 
I have a multiple experience with this, in the sense that I was banking with one 
particular bank and my driver was stealing my cheques to the tune of $9000. On I 
think six occasions in different times, the first was D10,000, second cheque he 
wrote was 25,000 in words and in figure it was D25 million, they gave him money. 
When I approached the bank I said excuse me, this guy has clearly stolen my 
money he has forged my signature. I also wrote to central bank, I said this is 
situation I need my money the bank said it’s my fault. They said it’s your 
responsibility to keep you cheque book at all times. 
Participant 3 added that:  
credit lines are affected by rules imposed by the central bank guidelines. Now we 
are not allowed to have any unsecure loan facility before you can have overnight 
facilities. Credit referencing has also been introduced as a result of central bank 
regulations.  
Finally, participant 7b explained that: 
corporate governance essentially reconciles conflicting interest and safeguarding 
stakeholders with strong rules and regulations that are observed effectively. So I 
think corporate governance does play a critical role in the quality and manner of 
services banks offer to their stakeholders.  
Therefore, an evaluation of these discussions suggests that directives, acts, safeguard, 
restrict, capital, responsibility, rules, guidelines, regulation, reconcile and conflict, are 
the main concepts that could be derived from this evaluation.  
While answering question three participant 7a expressed that:  
as of now we don’t have any explicit corporate governance regulations but we 
have an implicit regulation of corporate governance mainly stemming from the 
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banking act 2009. Most institutions have their own external governance systems 
that they develop internally. I think there is room for improvement. I can say the 
ground is not at level we have some organizations in The Gambia which have 
sound and fantastic corporate governance processes because of the influence of 
their parent bank. The parent company insists on certain minimum level of 
corporate governance. Banks also have an obligation to comply the local 
regulation. These local regulations take precedence of whatever regulation a 
group may have. We don’t have a formal documented code of corporate 
governance at central bank level yet. This is in the formative stage, lot of work is 
done on it and central bank is coming with minimum corporate governance 
standards for financial institutions. But at regulatory level we can say minimum 
capital requirement is D150 million which all the banks have complied with.  
Participant 7b added that:  
once the central bank issues the guidelines is almost mandatory, that they have to 
do it.  
Furthermore, confidence emerged as a consequence of these properties: trust, control 
and processes. Participant 3 added that: 
I don’t know what structures they have.  
Participant 5 suggested that: 
they (Central Bank) only work from direct rules, they give direct rules then 
monitored and controlled.  
Finally, participant 1 explained that:  
with powers vested on the Central Bank of The Gambia by the Central Bank Act 
of 2009, the Central Bank of The Gambia in its drive to providing a safe, sound 
and resolute financial sector identified and enhanced on corporate governance 
through the development of good corporate governance policies. In these current 
global financial uncertainties corporate governance is never a finished article.   
One can therefore conclude that explicit, implicit, regulation, act, processes, 
compliance, precedent, code, standards, mandatory, structures, rules, monitor, control, 
                             
164 
power, good corporate governance and policies are the main concepts that can be 
drawn at this stage. 
Question four asks can corporate governance in the financial sector organisations 
provide accountability by management to stakeholders. Participant 7a explained that: 
possibly, yes it could do, but I think it could also be other way. It depends on the 
system, design and the appreciation by the end users.  
Participant 7b added that:  
for corporate governance to provide accountability by management to 
shareholders the structures have to be observed and they have to be effective 
and monitored. We have organizations in this country where on paper there are 
rules and regulations but in practice there are no rules and regulations. Issues are 
decided depending on who is involved. 
Furthermore, participant 4 suggested that:  
based on my experience, no – because there is nothing they did for me when I 
lost the money. Therefore, they can’t be held accountable. It’s clear that they do 
not care about their customers. All they care is about their profit.  
Participant 3 added that:  
management are accountable to some extent but the central bank needs to play 
an active role because they have the resources, manpower, expertise and other 
tools to hold management accountable for their actions as regulators.  
Participant 2 argued that:  
in recent years, corporate governance has received increased attention because 
of high profile scandals involving abuse of corporate power and, in some cases, 
alleged criminal activity by corporate officers. An integral part of an effective 
corporate governance regime includes provisions for civil or criminal prosecution 
of individuals who conduct unethical or illegal acts in the name of an enterprise. 
With well-studied and structured and stringent controls and supervision corporate 
governance in the financial sector would impact on the operations of the financial 
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sector and achieve its primary purpose of providing accountability and the 
confidence of all stakeholders’  
Participant 5 also added that:  
shareholders hold management accountable but other stakeholders do not hold 
managers accountable for their actions because they “do not have the right and 
knowledge to do so.  
Thus, an evaluation of the participants response to this question appear to suggest that 
system, structures, observe, monitor, rules, regulation, resources, expertise, scandals, 
power, prosecution, acts,  structure, control, supervision and confidence are the main 
concepts that can be drawn.  
In response to question five a regulator (participant 7b) suggested that: 
when we have a documented corporate governance structure in place, the shape, 
scope, content of that document must receive the blessing of the Central Bank of 
The Gambia and other stakeholders. However, without an imposed formal 
corporate governance requirement, it is difficult to discuss how being a public 
organisation affect the governance mechanism, the institutional ethics and the 
code of conduct of such organisation. 
A second regulator (participant 7a) added that: 
if implemented it will be the mechanism that will set the truth, the philosophy and 
the environment for corporate governance culture in The Gambia. The culture 
also will be informed by what is happening in Africa Monitory Zone.   
A bank manager (participant 1) explained that: 
we have our own separate manual adopted to fit The Gambian regulatory 
framework and banking environment. All the banks have their own ethical 
procedures, traditions and culture.  
A bank customer (participant 3) suggested that: 
there is no consistency between the banks when it comes to general banking 
issues, corporate governance mechanisms, ethics and codes.  
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Furthermore, a regulator (participant 7b) expressed that:  
The first and most important function of the central bank is to accept responsibility 
for advising the government on the making of the country’s financial policy, and 
thus to see that it is carried out. The Central Bank of The Gambia being a public 
organisation, instituted by an act of parliament is affected in terms of governance, 
ethics and code of conduct by the financial policies of the government. 
Based on the summary of these responses to question five one can conclude that 
structure, truth, philosophy, environment, culture, regulatory, framework, procedure, 
traditions, responsibility, policy and act are the main concepts that stood out. 
While responding to question six a regulator (participant 7a) explained that:  
It enhances the performance. It makes us accountable for the decision we are 
taking. It’s a classical rules and regulations and apart from the banking act we 
have our own manual of guidelines and instructions. We have a framework we 
called action framework which enables us to take prompt correcting action (PCA) 
when required. It is the most dramatic of our regulatory rules. So that is a classic 
example of strong system of regulation and enforcement, and then our banking 
act is also there like I told you. 
A second regulator (participant 7b) added that: 
it does have some effect on private sector participants. However, the degree of 
effect it has on the private sector is not entirely straightforward and not easy to 
measure either.  
A bank manager (participant 1) suggested that:  
there is no formal governance structure in place but regulations imposed by the 
banking act do impact on the financial sector organisations such as minimum 
capital requirements and loans to deposit ratios.  
A bank employee (participant 5) added that:  
 the restrictions on deposit to loan ratios ultimately affect the banks financial  
performance.   
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An evaluation of these quotes suggests that accountability, rules, act, guidelines, 
instructions, framework, system, enforcement and requirements are the main concepts 
that can be drawn.  
In summary through the grounded theory method of simultaneous comparison of 
concepts and there commonalities across the six questions 56 concepts eventually 
emerged. As a consequence of continuous comparison of these concepts (namely the 
concepts that arise from the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion) the 
following nine open codes below have been identified. 
6.5  Open categories developed from the interview and focus group 
These nine codes are now explained further in relation to their properties and 
dimensions. Further analysis of these categories through axial coding will establish the 
relationships between categories and sub-categories. Through selective coding, core 
categories will be identified. The semi-structured interviews and the focus group 
discussions will also be analysed and compared with the core categories from both the 
interviews and the focus group to establish the major categories upon which the 
substantive theory will be constructed. 
6.5.1  Institutional factors  
Goswami (2003) defined institutional factors as rules and regulations that govern an 
economy, society and politics. It is difficult to define what is meant by “institutional 
factors” because of the ambiguous meaning of “institution” (Common, 1931). Baumol 
(1990) suggested that institutions can be perceived as “the rules of the game” for a 
society and include two general classifications. These two classifications according to 
Scot (2001) are “formal institutions” and “informal institutions”. The author considers 
formal institutions to be the regulative which includes rules within a society such as 
legal systems and government regulations. Informal institutions consist of normative 
and cognitive constraints that result in a society’s code of conduct according to Scot 
(2001).  
Furthermore, Commons (1931) defined institutions as collective action in control, 
liberation and expansion of individual action. He further commented that “institutions” 
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cover unorganised customs up to the organised management of social life, such as 
family, the corporation, trade association, the trade union, the reserve system and the 
state. A feature common to all them is control: ways to arrange individual actions as 
part of collective action (Commons, 1931). 
However, in the context of this research “institutional factors” relates to rules and 
regulations including legal systems, government policies and control mechanisms that 
govern corporate organisations. Institutional factors emerge as a consequence of these 
properties: culture, environment and policies. It is worth noting that culture, 
environment and policies all emerged both during the interview and the focus group 
discussion. While responding to question five during the focus group discussion a 
participant said “all the banks have their own ethical procedures, traditions and culture”. 
Commenting further on question five during the focus group discussion with particular 
emphasis on the lack of formal corporate governance requirements as part of the 
regulatory framework in The Gambia. A participant 7a commented that: 
If implemented (corporate governance requirements) it will be the mechanism that 
will set the truth, the philosophy and the environment for corporate governance 
culture in The Gambia. Culture will also be informed by what is happening in 
Africa Monitory Zone.  
In response to question one during the interview an interviewee said:  
Corporate governance regulation affects the financial performance of corporations 
through the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions own codes. 
It can equally affect the sound approaches by which corporations are directed and 
controlled (both internally and externally).  
Policies in this context refer to government policies in relation to the regulation of 
corporate entities in The Gambia.  In the context of this research culture and the 
environment are strongly interlinked and form an integral part in the governance of 
corporate organisations and the promotion of corporate governance culture in The 
Gambia. Therefore, culture, environment and government policies all needs to be 
enhanced and adequately addressed if corporate governance regulation is to succeed 
in The Gambia as part of the regulatory framework.  
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6.5.2  Benchmarks 
Benchmarking is a Total Quality Management (TQM) re-engineering/continuous 
improvement technique brought to the forefront in the last few years mainly due to the 
efforts of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award in the US (Sarkis, 2001). 
However, benchmarking is still not well defined, since over 42 definitions have been 
noted (Heib and Daneva, 1995). The original meaning of the word benchmark refers to 
a metric unit on a scale for measurement (Sarkis, 2001). From a managerial 
perspective, benchmarking has been defined as a continuous, systematic process for 
evaluating the products, services and work processes of organisations that are 
recognised as representing best practice, for the purpose of organisational 
improvement according to Camp (1989) and Sarkis (2001). Khad and Scot (1996, p.34) 
defined benchmarking as:  
measuring one’s performance against that of the best-in-class companies, 
determining how the best-in-class achieves its performance levels, and gaining a 
competitive advantage by using the information gained as a basis for one’s own 
company’s strategies and targets.  
However, in the context of this research benchmark relates to a systematic process of 
evaluating the products, services and work processes of organisations based on the 
company’s strategies and targets not a metric unit on a scale for measurement. 
Benchmarks emerged as a consequence of these properties: code, guide and 
standard. It is worth noting that code, guide and standard all emerged both during the 
interview and the focus group discussion.  
While responding to question one during the interview a respondent expressed that  
Corporate governance regulation affects the financial performance of financial 
corporations through the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions 
own code. It can equally affect the sound approaches by which corporations are 
directed and controlled (both internally and externally). 
While responding to question six during the interview a respondent suggested that:  
it is very vital to put in place effective processes that are fully acceptable by 
stakeholders and guided by policies that conforms to laws of the land.  
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In response to question three during the interview one participant expressed that:  
it sets the standards required to meeting the service needs of stakeholders.  
In the context of this research, benchmarks are continuous improvement techniques 
guided and informed by the entity’s code and standard expected. The governance of 
corporate entities can have a profound effect on the performance of financial 
institutions through a set of processes including a company’s guide, standard, customs 
and the institutions own code of governance. Therefore, understanding the company’s 
internal and external codes and standards expected are paramount in guiding and 
protecting the interest of stakeholders.  
6.5.3  Implementation of standards 
Implementation is the carrying out, execution, or practice of a plan, a method, or any 
design for doing something (Sarkis, 2001). As such, implementation is the action that 
must follow any preliminary thinking in order for something to actually happen (Teach 
target, 2013). Alternatively, there are many definitions of a ‘standard’.  Standard can be 
defined is a rule or principle that is used as a basis for judgement. Furthermore, 
according to ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1996, definition 3.2 a standard is:  
a document established by consensus and approved by a recognised body that 
provides for common and reported use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of 
order in a given context. 
In effect, it is something considered by an authority or by general consent as a basis of 
comparison; an approved model.  
On the basis of these two definitions namely implementation and standard. One can 
define implementation of standards as carrying out a plan or any design established by 
consensus and approved by a recognised body aimed at achieving optimum degree of 
order in a given context (Sarkis, 2001).  
However, in the context of this research ‘implementation of standard’ relates to a 
systematic process of carrying out corporate governance policies established by 
consensus and approved by a recognised body aimed at the achievement of the 
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optimum degree of compliance. Implementation of standards emerged as a 
consequence of these properties: compliance, discipline and responsibility. It is worth 
noting that compliance, discipline and responsibility emerged during the interview and 
focus group discussions. Analysing the responses of the semi-structured interview in 
relation to question four during participant 3 expressed that:  
I believe the governance is achieving the desired objectives of regulating the 
operations of financial institutions in both coerce and voluntary liquidation of some 
banks that do not meet minimum standards of compliance. However, there are 
tendencies for the effectiveness of governance to be undermined by impromptu 
executive directors to single handedly effect compliance away from regulation.  
While responding to question eight in relation to the key contribution/factors of good 
governance one research participant participant 4 said: 
leadership, constant monitoring, discipline and transparency are the key 
contributions of good governance.  
In response to question five a regulator (participant 7b) suggested that: 
the first and most important function of the central bank is to accept responsibility 
for advising the government on the making of the country’s financial policy, and 
thus to see that it is carried out. The Central Bank of The Gambia being a public 
organisation, instituted by an act of parliament is affected in terms of governance, 
ethics and code of conduct by the financial policies of the government. 
Finally, in the context of this research implementation of standards relates to the 
degree of compliance and implementation of corporate governance rules and 
regulations in The Gambia aimed at achieving the optimum degree of compliance. 
However, corporate compliance cannot be achieved without corporate discipline and 
collective responsibility. Thus, for corporate governance regulation to succeed in The 
Gambia both the regulators and the financial institutions have to be disciplined, 
responsible and compliant with the Banking Act 2009.  
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6.5.4  Regulatory oversight 
This can be defined as hierarchical supervision of regulatory action by executives and 
legislative actors (Resources for the future, 2013). Thus regulatory oversight is a formal 
process for improving regulation typically using economic analysis (ibid). However, in 
the context of this research regulatory oversight relates to the supervision and control 
of executive power in a corporate environment. Regulatory oversight emerged as a 
consequence of these properties: supervision, control and power. While responding to 
question four during the focus group discussion participant 2  said: 
in recent years, corporate governance has received increased attention because 
of high profile scandals involving abuse of corporate power and, in some cases, 
alleged criminal activity by corporate officers. An integral part of an effective 
corporate governance regime includes provisions for civil or criminal prosecution 
of individuals who conduct unethical or illegal acts in the name of an enterprise. 
With well-studied and structured and stringent controls and supervision corporate 
governance in the financial sector would impact on the operations of the financial 
sector and achieve its primary purpose of providing accountability and the 
confidence of all stakeholders. 
In response to question one during the focus group discussion participant 1 responded 
that: 
in respect of financial sector in The Gambia, the body in charge of corporate 
governance is the central bank which is enacted by the act of parliament called 
the Central Bank Act. The operations of banks in The Gambia are regulated and 
controlled by directors, ethics, and design, monitored and controlled by the central 
bank that affects all the operations of the banks.  
While answering question three during the focus group discussion participant 1 
explained that: 
with powers vested on the Central Bank of The Gambia by the Central Bank Act 
of 2009, the Central Bank of The Gambia in its drive to providing a safe, sound 
and resolute financial sector identified and enhanced corporate governance 
through the development of good corporate governance policies. In these current 
global financial uncertainties corporate governance is never a finished article. 
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In the context of this research regulatory oversight relates to the supervision, control 
and regulation of corporate entities aimed at minimising the abuse of corporate power. 
An effective corporate governance regulation can only succeed in The Gambia if the 
regulators are able to effectively supervise, control and minimise the abuse of 
corporate executive power.  
6.5.5  Ethics 
Ethics can be defined as a system of moral principles governing the appropriate 
conduct for a person or a group (Oquist, 1999). Ethical values in the management of 
corporations will eventually form the basis of good governance and ultimately enhance 
CSR (Oquist, 1999). The author also added that ethics and integrity must be 
widespread among the citizenry and especially strong in public and private leadership 
positions for good governance to prevail. Furthermore, Spiller (2002) argued that 
numerous investors are especially interested in business ethics as a consequence of 
its positive effects on financial performance. However, in the context of this research 
ethics relates to maintaining moral standards and therefore minimise the need for 
stringent corporate governance regulation.  
Ethics emerged as a consequence of these properties: procedures, direct and monitor. 
In response to question five during the focus group discussion participant 1 explained 
that: 
we have our own separate manual adopted to fit The Gambian regulatory 
framework and banking environment. All the banks have their own ethical 
procedures, traditions and culture. There is no consistency between the banks 
when it comes to general banking issues, corporate governance mechanisms, 
ethics and codes.  
While responding to question one participant 7b added that: 
the regulation of corporate governance is beneficial because it basically protects 
the interest of other stakeholders. Usually the companies which have good 
corporate governance have steps in place that helps them direct, administer and 
control the managers to make sure they deliver as per their work corporate 
objectivity to maximize shareholder’s wealth. Now the benefit of regulation is, if 
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you like to safeguard the interest of other stakeholders (secondary) if you like and 
for that reason it is very important. Banks have their own internal corporate 
governance; they have their own systems. Now regulation if you like is that protect 
the depositors and others besides shareholders. It is very important in terms of 
market discipline because if the market participants are not happy nobody would 
participate.  
Finally, in response to question four during the interview an interviewee participant 1 
explained that: 
the system is highly effective because the sector is constantly monitored and all 
failures to abide by the regulations are punished by fines.  
In the context of this research ethics relates to maintaining moral standards and 
therefore minimise the need for stringent corporate governance regulation in The 
Gambia. Without ethics and morality it will be extremely difficult to implement an 
effective corporate governance regulation particularly the voluntary approach. For any 
meaningful corporate governance regulation in The Gambia to be successful it will 
require the underpinning of ethics, procedures and monitoring.  
6.5.6  Accountability 
This can be defined as a means for organising control and to prevent power holders 
from wrongdoing (Riekmann, 2007). Accountability can also be defined as the 
responsibility of either an individual or department to perform a specific function 
(Investopedia, 2013). Thus, accountability is considered as a tool to shed light on the 
‘interstices of power’ (Riekmann, 2007). Central to good governance is accountability 
and a strong legal framework as well as understanding the relationships between the 
various players (Fyfe, 2003). In the context of this research, accountability relates to 
organising control and to prevent power holders from wrongdoing.  
Accountability emerged as a consequence of these properties: action, control and 
monitor. In response to question five during the interview aimed at evaluating how 
effective corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides 
management accountability to stakeholders. Participant 4 explained that:  
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with effective corporate governance in place all stakeholders are fully informed of 
management actions which they have the right to oppose if unfavorable.   
While responding to question four during the interview a bank manager participant 2 
said: 
in recent years, corporate governance has received increased attention because 
of high profile scandals involving abuse of corporate power and, in some cases, 
alleged criminal activity by corporate officers. An integral part of an effective 
corporate governance regime includes provisions for civil or criminal prosecution 
of individuals who conduct unethical or illegal acts in the name of an enterprise. 
With well-studied and structured and stringent controls and supervision corporate 
governance in the financial sector would impact on the operations of the financial 
sector and achieve its primary purpose of providing accountability and the 
confidence of all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, a regulator (participant 7b) said: 
for corporate governance to provide accountability by management to 
shareholders the structures have to be observed and they have to be effective 
and monitored. We have organizations in this country where on paper there are 
rules and regulations but in practice there are no rules and regulations. Issues are 
decided depending on who is involved.  
Therefore, in the context of this research the issue here is the lack of accountability. 
Thus, a successful implementation of corporate governance rules and regulations in 
The Gambia will to a greater extent depend on the ability of boards and shareholders to 
hold management accountable for their actions. 
6.5.7  Confidence 
Confidence is defined as a feeling of trust and a firm belief in yourself or others (Scot, 
2001). Confidence is the feeling or belief that one can have faith in or rely on someone 
or something (Goswami, 2003). 
Thus, confidence tends to focus on two related ideas. Firstly, confidence is about being 
certain of your abilities. Secondly, confidence is about having trust in people, plans or 
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the future (Careers.stir, 2013). However, in the context of this research confidence 
relates to trust in the governance of corporate entities including the implementation of 
corporate governance rules and regulations in The Gambia. Confidence emerged as a 
consequence of these properties: trust, control and processes. In response to question 
12 during the interview a bank manager (participant 5) said:  
it is most likely going to increase profitability, the more trust is assured, the more 
people will engage into business with you.  
While responding to question four during the focus group discussion participant 2 
added that:  
in recent years, corporate governance has received increased attention because 
of high profile scandals involving abuse of corporate power and, in some cases, 
alleged criminal activity by corporate officers. An integral part of an effective 
corporate governance regime includes provisions for civil or criminal prosecution 
of individuals who conduct unethical or illegal acts in the name of an enterprise. 
With well-studied and structured and stringent controls and supervision corporate 
governance in the financial sector would impact on the operations of the financial 
sector and achieve its primary purpose of providing accountability and the 
confidence of all stakeholders. 
While responding to question one during the interview participant 4 said:  
corporate governance regulation affects the financial performance of financial 
corporations through the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and 
institutions own codes.  
However, in the context of this research confidence relates to trust in the governance of 
corporate entities including the implementation of corporate governance rules and 
regulations in The Gambia. Investors must have confidence in the governance of 
financial institutions in The Gambia. The operation of financial institutions very much 
rely on trust to succeed. Without trust financial institutions will not be a going concern.  
Banks and other institutions must gain and maintain the trust of the general public if 
they are to succeed as a business. 
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6.5.8  Structure 
Structure be defined as a framework of identifiable elements which gives form and 
stability, and resists stresses and strains (Sarkis, 2001). Thus it is simple to plan or 
organise something. However, in the context of this research structure relates to a 
framework of rules and regulation which gives form and stability in the management of 
corporate entities in The Gambia aimed at protecting the stakeholders.  Structure 
emerged as a consequence of these properties: monitor, system and act. In response 
to question four during the focus group discussion participant 7b said:  
for corporate governance to provide accountability by management to 
shareholders the structures have to be observed and they have to be effective 
and monitored’.  
While answering question four during the focus group discussion participant 7a  
explained that:  
possibly, yes it could do, but I think it could also be other way. It depends on the 
system, design and the appreciation by the end users.  
Finally, while responding to question six during the focus group participant 7a said: 
it enhances the performance. It makes us accountable for the decision we are 
taking. It’s a classical rules and regulations and apart from the banking act we 
have our own manual of guidelines and instructions. We have a framework we 
called action framework which enables us to take prompt correcting action (PCA) 
when required. 
However, in the context of this research structure relates to a framework of rules and 
regulations designed to protect the interest of stakeholders. An effective monitoring 
system backed by law will go a long way in addressing the concern of stakeholders in 
the banking industry. Therefore, effective systems of governance, monitoring and laws 
are an integral part of an effective corporate governance regulation.  
6.5.9  Regulation 
This can be defined as a rule of order having the force of law, prescribed by superior or 
competent authority, relating to the actions of those under the authority’s control 
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(Riekmann, 2007). Therefore, it is a general principle or rule employed in controlling, 
directing or managing an activity, organisation or system (ibid). In the context of this 
research regulation relates to corporate governance rules having the force of law 
relating to the actions of those under the authority’s control. Regulation emerged as a 
consequence of these properties: direct, enforcement and rule. In response to question 
one during the interview participant 4  said:  
corporate governance regulation affects the financial performance of financial 
corporations through the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions 
own codes. It can equally affect the sound approaches by which corporations are 
directed and controlled.  
While responding to question one during the focus group discussion participant 7a said 
that: 
it has critical role to play in the running and management of financial institutions, 
in the sense that corporate governance provide a framework of rules and 
regulations. You can have a fantastic set of rules and regulations on paper but if 
they are ineffective and dysfunctional they are useless. So I think the good 
corporate governance regulation should be complemented by enforcement and 
observations, they should be observed they should be enforced. Good corporate 
governance has a positive impact on financial organizations anywhere in the 
world, across regions, across countries, across tribes, across ethnicity wherever 
you may see the lifeline for business organizations lies in sound and good 
corporate governance which is strong and enforceable regulation’. 
However, in the context of this research, regulation relates to the enforcement of 
corporate governance rules and regulations in The Gambia. Corporate entities have to 
be directed, controlled and must follow the required rules and regulations. However, 
rules and regulations can only be effective if there is a robust system of enforcement.  
Without an effective enforcement corporate governance rules and regulations will be 
rendered useless. Thus, an effective enforcement strategy is necessary if corporate 
governance regulation is to succeed in The Gambia. 
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6.6  Conclusion 
Finally, these open categories arise from and across various questions and responses 
during the interview and focus group discussion. Open coding is: 
designed to help analysts carry out the steps of theory building – conceptualising, 
defining categories, and developing categories in terms of their properties and 
dimensions – and then later relating categories through statements of 
relationships. (Strauss and Corbin, 2009, p.121).  
The first step in theory building is conceptualising which is the process of grouping 
similar items according to some defined properties and given the items a name that 
stands for that common link (Strauss and Corbin, 2009). A concept is a labelled 
phenomenon. It is an abstract representation of an event, object, or action/interaction 
that a researcher identifies as being significant in the data (Strauss and Corbin, 2009). 
“One of the simplest ways to analyse qualitative data is to do some kind of coding on 
the data. A code can be a word that is used to describe or summarise a sentence, a 
paragraph, or even a whole piece of text such as interview” (Myers, 2009, p.167). Miles 
and Huberman (1994, p.56) added that: 
codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during a study. Codes are attached to “chunks” of 
varying size – words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or 
unconnected to a specific sentence.  
The semi-structured interview and focus group data collected for this research were 
analysed using open coding process of grounded theory. The analysis involved the 
process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising, and categorising 
data. The aim of open coding is the development of categories from the semi-
structured interview and focus group data collected from the stakeholders of The 
Gambia banking sector.  
In the end a summary of the Likert scale questionnaire inform the interview 
questionnaire and focus group discussion. These subsequently covered the issues that 
are required for effective governance system/practices including regulation, ethics, 
CSR, good governance, management decision-making and its consequences, 
                             
180 
accountability and stakeholder approach with particular emphasis on The Gambia. The 
next chapter focuses on the next two stages of the process (analysis of the responses 
from the semi-structured interviews and focus groups) which are axial and selection 
coding using the paradigm model. Analysing the categories using axial coding will 
establish the relationships between categories and sub-categories. Finally, selective 
coding well be used to identify core categories. 
                             
181 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
ANALYSIS OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS AND 
FOCUS GROUP: AXIAL AND SELECTIVE CODING 
7.0  Introduction 
In grounded theory research there are three basic types of coding; open, axial and 
selective (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Therefore, following the analysis of the 
responses from the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion using open 
coding the research now focuses on the next two stages of the process which are axial 
and selective coding using the paradigm process. Thus, this chapter combines the 
second and third analytical stage of grounded theory coding process. The results of the 
interviews and focus group discussion were analysed using grounded theory coding 
procedures, first open coding to identify categories that emerged from the data. Further 
analysis of these categories through axial coding will establish the relationships 
between categories and sub-categories. Through selective coding, core categories will 
be identified.  
The semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were analysed and 
compared with the core categories from both the interviews and the focus group to 
establish the major categories upon which the substantive theory will be constructed. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested that the purpose of axial coding is to reassemble 
data that were fractured during open coding. Thus, axial coding involves the re-
structuring of the whole process by finding connections between the data (Howell, 
2013). Howell added that axial coding pulls the analysis together and provides a means 
of unifying the data into a coherent whole. Thus, it indicates how the categories created 
by open coding fit together and how they congregate around a core category (Howell, 
2013). In axial coding, categories are related to their subcategories to form more 
precise and complete explanations about phenomena.  Strauss and Corbin (1998, 
p.124) also added that “procedurally, axial coding is the act of relating categories to 
sub-categories along the lines of their properties and dimensions”  
A phenomenon has the ability to explain what is going on. Sub-categories answer 
questions about the phenomenon such as when, where, why, who, how and with what 
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consequences, thus giving the concept greater explanatory power (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Howell (2013, p.136) added that:  
ultimately, the relationship between categories and sub-categories which are 
discovered during the research should be as a result of information contained 
within the data or from deductive reasoning which has been verified within the 
data, but not from previous assumptions which have not been supported”.   
Thus, open coding and axial coding examine phenomena through comparing and 
categorising data. The goal according to Howell (2013) is to generate an emergent set 
of categories and their properties which fit, work and are relevant for integrating theory.  
Axial coding uses a set of terms to denote the process which include: causal conditions 
and phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, action/interaction and consequences 
(Howell, 2013). These terms will be discussed in more details as part of the paradigm 
model. Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.61) suggested that:  
axial coding allows a more focused means of (phenomenon) in relation to the 
underlying conditions that enables its development, through identification of 
properties the location of this phenomenon on a dimension (dimensionalisation), 
the context and the action/interaction strategies used to ‘handle, manage, and 
respond to this phenomenon 
Contrastingly, selective coding illustrates how the phenomenon fits around a core 
category and involves the process by which emerging categories are organised and 
unified around a core category (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).  Howell (2013, p.143) 
added that:  
core categories incorporate central phenomenon of research projects as they are 
identified through questions such as: ‘what is the main analytical idea presented in 
this research? What does all the action/interaction seem to be about?  The 
selection of data and the creation of other categories are processed with the core 
category in mind which are identified and unified through axial coding. 
This chapter will now focus on the application of the paradigm model and the 
identification of the six categories based on the categories that emerged through the 
open coding in chapter six. Thus, the main categories derived here are a combination 
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of open categories that are presented in the earlier chapter. This chapter therefore 
forms the basis that allows the researcher to carry out further analysis, the identification 
of the core category and the formulation of the substantive theory.  
7.1  An application of the Paradigm Model  
The researcher intends to adopt the paradigm model for this research. As discussed 
above Strauss and Corbin (1998) argued that axial coding is the process of 
reassembling data that were fractured during open coding, as such nine open 
categories were developed through open coding procedures (see chapter 6). These 
nine open categories are subsumed into six categories in axial coding, each 
representing a component in the paradigm model (see table 7.1). The main categories 
of axial coding and their corresponding open categories are shown in table 7.2.  
Table 7.1:  Renaming the open categories that emerged in chapter six 
Main Categories (Axial coding) Renamed or unchanged 
1 Institutional factors Obstacles 
2 Regulation + regulatory oversight Supervision 
3 Benchmark + implementation of standards Compliance 
4 Ethics Ethics 
5 Lack of accountability Lack of accountability 
6 Structure + confidence Lack of trust 
 
Thus, “axial coding involves the re-structuring of the whole process by finding 
connections between the data.  Axial coding pulls the analysis together and provides a 
means of unifying the data into a coherent whole” (Howell, 2013, p.142).  The purposes 
of axial coding are to sort, synthesize, and organise large amounts of data and 
reassemble them in new ways after open coding (Creswell, 1998). The use of axial 
coding is aimed at further developing the open categories into main categories through 
the paradigm process. It is important to note that axial coding differs in purpose from 
open coding, these are not necessarily sequential analytical steps, and no more than  
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Table 7.2: Axial Coding- Main categories 
Main Categories 
(Axial Coding) 
Open Categories (Open Coding) 
   Chapter 6 
1 Obstacles   Culture 
 Environment  
 Government policies  
2 Supervision  Direct  
 Enforcement  
 Rule   
 Control  
 Power  
3 Compliance  Code  
 Guide  
 Standard  
 Discipline  
 Responsibility 
4 Ethics   Procedures  
 Direct 
 Monitor  
5 Lack of accountability   Action  
 Control  
 Monitor  
6 Lack of trust   Monitor  
 System  
 Act  
 Control  
 Processes  
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labelling is distinct from open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). For the purpose of 
this research both open and axial coding occurred concurrently and sequentially. As 
both open and axial coding can “proceed quite naturally together” (Strauss and Corbin, 
1992).  
In axial coding, the analyst is relating categories at a dimensional level. Thus, when 
data is analysed at axial level, there are two levels of analysis. These are (a) the actual 
words used by the respondents and (b) the analyst’s conceptualisation of these 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The use of the paradigm model is aimed at linking and 
developing categories by asking questions and the making of comparison. Therefore, 
“when analysts code axially, they look for answers to questions such as why or how 
come, where, when, how, and with what results, and in so doing they uncover 
relationships among categories” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.127). Thus, “in axial 
coding the nature of questions we are asking are really denoting a type of relationship” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.107). Answering these questions helps us to 
contextualize a phenomenon. Thus, with these questions in mind “we then return to our 
data and look for evidence, incidents, and events that support or refute our questions” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.107). This is because the relationships between events 
and happenings are not always so evident when working with actual data (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998).  
In actuality, the paradigm is nothing more than a perspective taken toward data, 
another analytical stance that helps to systematically gather and order data in such a 
way that structure and process are integrated (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.128). The 
following sections will further demonstrate the application of the axial procedures 
including how open categories are linked and subsumed into main categories, the 
questions asked to link the various categories together, thereby demonstrating the 
application of the paradigm model. 
7.2  The phenomenon 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.130) suggested that a phenomenon is a term that answers 
to the question “what is going on here?” They went on to argue that “in looking for 
phenomena, we are looking for repeated patterns of happenings, events, or 
actions/interactions that represent what people do or say, alone or together, in 
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response to the problems and situations in which they find themselves”. The answer to 
this question is lack of accountability. This is clearly evident through data collection and 
analysis during open and axial coding. Thus, the phenomenon of lack of accountability 
incorporates all the open categories identified through coding of data collected in the 
interview and focus group discussions namely: action, control and monitor as shown in 
table 7.2.  
Lack of accountability as a category in this case refers to the inability of certain 
stakeholders particularly bank customers to hold management and regulators 
accountable for their actions or lack of it.   The inability to hold management and 
regulators accountable for their actions or inaction could be explained by the obstacles 
(culture, environment and government policies).  These obstacles combined with lack 
of corporate governance regulation as part of the regulatory framework leads to a 
variety of corporate governance identifies in The Gambian banking system and lack of 
accountability. These impediments namely: culture, environment government policies 
and lack of corporate governance as part of the regulatory framework cannot be 
changed overnight. Thus, any change will have to be a gradual process rather than 
instant or radical change. The following subsequent sections will highlight how the 
other components of the paradigm model contribute to the lack of accountability 
phenomenon.    
7.3  Causal conditions 
There are different definitions of causal conditions in that in corporate governance 
literature (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). However, Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.130) 
suggested that conditions are:  
sets of events or happenings that create the situations, issues, and problems 
pertaining to a phenomenon and, to a certain extent, explain why and how 
persons or groups respond in certain ways. Conditions might arise out of time, 
place, culture, rules, regulations, beliefs, economics, power, or gender factors as 
well as the social worlds, organisations, and institutions in which we find ourselves 
along with our personal motivations and biographies.  
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Causal conditions refer to events, incidents or happenings that lead the occurrence of 
the phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Therefore, identifying the causal 
conditions requires asking the following question: 
What are the incidents, events or happenings that lead to the occurrence of 
the phenomenon? 
The main category obstacles answers this question. Here obstacles indicate the 
happenings that caused or derived the phenomenon of lack of accountability. This 
category is based on three open categories that emerged in the open coding stage 
namely: culture, environment and government policies.  
Government policies or lack of it in this case is a significant contributory factor that 
caused or derived the phenomenon lack of accountability in The Gambian banking 
system. The lack of corporate governance requirements as part of the regulatory 
framework in The Gambian banking system leads to inconsistent corporate governance 
policies across the banking sector. Thus, making it difficult to hold corporate executives 
accountable for their actions or inactions. The Central Bank of The Gambia intends to 
develop a corporate governance code for banks operating in The Gambia as indicated 
by its officials during the focus group discussion but this is yet to emerge.  
Culture and environment are factors driving the lack of accountability phenomenon.  
Respondent’s belief that a legislative code would unify the culture and standards set for 
more effective management thereby enhancing corporate accountability.  If corporate 
governance codes are implemented as part of the regulatory framework it will be the 
mechanism that will set the truth, the philosophy and the environment for corporate 
governance culture in The Gambia. The culture also will be informed by what is 
happening in the African Monitory Zone (CBG, 2014).  
Banks in The Gambia have their own separate manual adapted to fit The Gambian 
regulatory framework and banking environment due to the government’s inability to 
develop a corporate governance code. Furthermore, all the banks have their own 
ethical procedures, traditions and culture. As a result, the attainment of corporate 
accountability becomes more of a challenge due to the diverse nature of banks 
operating in The Gambia. The high illiteracy rate among bank customers inhibits their 
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ability to challenge and hold bank executives accountable for their actions or inactions. 
Furthermore, the culture of not challenging authority due to the current political 
environment and economic conditions makes the attainment of corporate and 
executive accountability a daunting task.  In this research government policies, culture 
and the environment are strongly interlinked and form an integral part in the 
governance of corporate entities and the lack of accountability in The Gambian banking 
system. 
7.4  Context 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.132) “contextual conditions are the specific 
sets of conditions (patterns of conditions) that intersect dimensionally at this time and 
place to create the set of circumstances or problems to which persons respond through 
actions/interactions”. Thus a context represents “the particular set of conditions within 
which the action/interaction strategies are taken to respond to a specific phenomenon” 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990, p.101). The following question would identify the context 
within which the phenomenon is taking place:  
What are the set of conditions that affect the banks strategies and 
responses in relation to their lack of accountability? 
The answer to this question is the lack of trust in the banking system. The failure of 
Continental Bank Gambia Limited in 1992 led to the loss of trust in The Gambian 
banking system. The government of The Gambia at the time failed to rescue the bank, 
causing significant financial loss and distress to the customers and loss of confidence 
in the banking sector. The contextual factors category includes five open categories 
namely: monitor, system, act, control and processes. One contributory factor that led to 
the demise of Continental Bank was regulatory failure due to inadequate monitoring 
systems. For corporate governance to provide accountability by management to 
shareholders the structures have to be observed and they have to be effective and 
monitored. Furthermore, leadership, constant monitoring, discipline and transparency 
are the key contributions of good governance. The operations of banks in The Gambia 
are controlled internally by directors and regulated externally by the Central Bank of 
The Gambia. Corporate governance identifies risks and provides systems or measures 
to mitigate those risks. 
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The primary purpose of the central directives or acts is to safeguard the interest of 
depositors, shareholders, and the economy of The Gambia (CBG, 2014). However, 
participants have indicated that at present the Central Bank of The Gambia does not 
have any explicit corporate governance regulations but have an implicit regulation of 
corporate governance mainly stemming from the Banking Act 2009. However, an 
integral part of an effective corporate governance regime includes provisions for civil or 
criminal prosecution of individuals who conduct unethical or illegal acts in the name of 
an enterprise. Thus, corporate governance regulation affects the financial performance 
of financial corporations through the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and 
institutions own codes. It can equally affect the sound approaches by which 
corporations are directed and controlled (both internally and externally). It is therefore 
vital to put in place effective processes that are fully acceptable to stakeholders and 
guided by policies that conform to laws of the land. The lack of trust among bank 
customers constitutes a part of the context where lack of accountability phenomenon is 
embedded.   
7.5  Intervening Conditions 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.131) “Intervening conditions are those that 
mitigate or otherwise alter the impact of causal conditions on phenomenon”. Therefore, 
one can identify intervening conditions by asking the following question: 
What are the conditions that mitigate or alter the impact of causal 
conditions on the lack of accountability within The Gambian banking 
system?  
The main categories supervision and ethics refer to the crucial factors that diminish or 
modify the impact of causal conditions (culture, environment and government policies) 
on the phenomenon lack of accountability within the banking system in The Gambia. 
As such causal conditions and the intervening conditions can be seen as opposing 
each other. From one perspective, causal conditions are fundamental in the lack of 
accountability; while from another the intervening conditions will enhance 
accountability. The main categories supervision and ethics includes eight open 
categories developed through open coding namely: direct, enforcement, rule, control, 
power, procedures and monitor.  
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Participants have indicated that the Central Bank of The Gambia only work from direct 
rules. That is, they give direct rules then monitor and control the banks. This it is 
argued will significantly mitigate the risk of bank failure in The Gambia. You can have a 
good set of rules and regulations on paper but without enforcement they are useless 
and irrelevant (CBG, 2014). Therefore, good corporate governance regulation should 
be complemented by effective and robust enforcement and observations. Thus, an 
effective enforcement strategy is necessary if corporate governance regulation is to 
succeed in The Gambia.  
A respondent observed that in recent years, corporate governance has received 
increased attention because of high profile scandals involving abuse of corporate 
power and, in some cases, alleged criminal activity by corporate officers. Thus, to curb 
this abuse of power bank executives must ensure that governance procedures are 
effectively implemented, monitored and controlled. Furthermore, participants have 
indicated that services provided to stakeholders can be affected by mitigating 
procedures, policies, and laws which enhance economic efficiency, accountability of 
people in the business and the welfare of the shareholders. Finally, the main categories 
supervision and ethics refer to the crucial factors that diminish or modify the impact of 
causal conditions namely; culture, environment and government policies on the 
phenomenon lack of accountability within the banking system in The Gambia. Thus, an 
effective supervision combined with business ethics (serving as a moral compass 
where there is lack of rules) will go a long way in addressing the lack of accountability 
in The Gambian banking system.    
7.6  Action/interactional strategies 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.104) suggested that “action/interactional strategies 
component of the paradigm model is evolving in nature and can be studied in terms of 
change overtime done for some reason in response to or to manage a phenomenon”. 
Therefore, identifying the action/interactional strategies requires asking the following 
question: 
What are the action/interactional strategies adopted by various actors of 
The Gambian banking system in relation to lack of accountability within the 
causal, intervening and contextual conditions? 
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The main category of compliance answers this question by demonstrating the 
action/interactional strategies of banks in The Gambia as well as the Central Bank of 
The Gambia in response to phenomenon of lack of accountability under conditions 
mentioned in the previous sections. Therefore, the main categories of compliance 
consist of five open categories of code, guide, standard, discipline and responsibility as 
shown in table 7.2. The banks responses and the Central Bank of The Gambia 
response will now be discussed below. 
The banks’ action/interactional strategies are outlined and framed within the interplay 
between the causal conditions (culture, environment and government policies), the 
intervening conditions (procedures, monitor, responsibility, standard and discipline) and 
the contextual conditions (system, act, control and processes). Bank executives in The 
Gambia have indicated that the response (action) of banks in relation to the 
phenomenon was to be accountable to stakeholders in order to regain the trust of the 
general public. This is indicated by the main category compliance shown in table 7.2.  
Supervision and the promotion of business ethics are strategies the CBG are adopting 
in response to or to manage the phenomenon of lack of accountability. As a result of 
supervision, the CBG is able to interact with strategies adopted by banks to manage 
the phenomenon. As such, it includes the adoption of internally generated corporate 
governance codes voluntarily or the adoption of corporate governance codes imposed 
on them by their parent company as part of their internal control requirements. 
Therefore, highly committed banks will try to maintain their compliance status and 
maintain the trust of the general public.  
7.7  Consequences 
The final paradigmatic term is consequences. Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.134) 
defined consequences as where “there is action/interaction or a lack of it taken in 
response to an issue or a problem or to manage or maintain a certain situation”. 
Consequences are therefore simply outcomes of actions/interactions; they could also 
be the result of failures of persons or groups to respond to a situation created by 
action/interactions Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.134). Thus, consequences can be 
identified through the following question: 
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What are the consequences of the strategies adopted by various actors 
within The Gambian banking system in response to the phenomenon of lack 
of accountability?  
Most banks in The Gambia have developed voluntary corporate governance codes and 
frameworks for internal use. In some cases, these practices have been imposed on 
them by their parent body as part of their internal control mechanisms. The 
consequence of these strategies is that banks are likely to be accountable and ethical 
thereby enhancing supervision, compliance and trust among the general public. These 
will ultimately enhance the banks legitimacy amongst stakeholders and protect the 
interest of shareholders.  
7.8  Selective coding 
Selective coding is the third and final stage using the grounded theory approach 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The results of the interviews and focus group discussion 
were analysed using grounded theory coding procedures, first open coding to identify 
categories that emerged from the data (see chapter six). Further analysis of these 
categories through axial coding established relationships between categories and sub-
categories. “However, it is not until the major categories are finally integrated to form a 
larger theoretical scheme that the research findings take the form of theory” (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998, p.143). Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.116) defined selective coding 
as “the process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to the other 
categories, validating those relationships…the core category is the central 
phenomenon around which all the other categories are integrated”. 
Thus selective coding is the process of integrating and refining categories (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). Furthermore, selective coding illustrates how the phenomenon fits 
around a core category and involves the process by which emerging categories are 
organised and unified around a core category according to Strauss and Corbin (1990 
cited in Howell, 2013, p.143). Figure 7.1 summarises the application of the paradigm 
model of corporate governance in The Gambia.  
7.8.1  Revalidation and verification  
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.211) argued that:
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Figure 7.1: The Paradigm model of corporate governance regulation in The 
Gambian banking system. 
 
 
the aim of selective coding is to integrate the categories along the dimensional 
level to form a theory, validate the statements of relationship among concepts, 
and fill in any categories in need of further refinement. Sampling becomes very 
deliberate at this point.  
As a result, this researcher intends to adopt the process of discriminate sampling:  
when engage in discriminate sampling, a researcher chooses the sites, persons, 
and documents that will maximise opportunities for comparative analysis. This 
might mean returning to old sites, documents, and persons or going to new ones 
to gather the data necessary to saturate categories and complete a study. 
Throughout a study, validation of the products of analysis is a crucial part of 
theory building. Validation is built into each step of analysis and sampling”…only 
the concepts and statements that stand up to this rigorous constant comparison 
process become part of the theory. Recall that negative cases also are very 
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important. For us, they denote a possible extreme example of variation in a 
concept.   (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.211).  
Given the rationale above, the researcher deliberately chose individuals that 
maximised the opportunity for comparative analysis. In this case, it means returning to 
individuals who took part in the initial research (data collection) aimed at gathering the 
data necessary to saturate categories and complete the study. In the end six people 
were specifically selected to participate in the revalidation and verification process. 
These individuals were carefully selected because they are involved in the formulation, 
implementation and supervision of corporate governance policies in The Gambian 
banking sector. Furthermore, these participants were also selected because of their 
critical experience, knowledge and experience in corporate governance within the 
banking industry. Below are the positions of individuals specifically selected in the 
revalidation and verification process.  
1. A Senior Official Central Bank of The Gambia – will be called B1  
2. A Senior Bank Examiner Central Bank of The Gambia – B2 
3. A Senior Bank Manager of a Foreign Owned Bank – B3 
4. A Senior Commercial Bank Executive  - B4 
5.  A commercial Bank’s Branch Manager – B5  
6. A Commercial Bank’s Legal and Compliance Officer – B6.   
Subsequently, six statements were developed to explain the main category of lack of 
accountability and validate its relationships with other subcategories. Thus, these 
statements were developed to define the main properties of core category and illustrate 
the logical relationship between core category of lack of accountability and other sub-
categories developed in axial coding. Participants were then asked to comment on this 
semi-structured statements (B). This enables the participants and the researcher to 
discuss and raise issues on ad-hoc basis. Furthermore, this process enabled the 
researcher to develop and select the core category and linking it with other sub-
categories. The six statements used are shown in table 7.3 below. 
A general but fundamental question that always arises is how long a researcher must 
continue to sample. The general rule when building theory is to gather data until each 
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category is saturated (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978). This according to 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.212): 
means until (a) no new or relevant data seem to emerge regarding a category, (b) 
the category is well developed in terms of its properties and dimensions 
demonstration variations, and (c) the relationship among categories are well 
established and validated. Theoretical saturation is of great importance. Unless a 
researcher gathers data until all categories are saturated, the theory will be 
unevenly developed and lacking density.  
Table  7.3: The statements used in the second semi-structured interview 
1. Culture, environment etc. has been a major obstacle affecting the 
realisation of corporate governance regulation for banks in The Gambia. 
2. A trusting relationship would influence corporate governance control, 
monitoring etc. in The Gambian banking sector. 
3. Considering ethical factors/path is essential in addressing current 
corporate governance issues within the banking within the banking sector 
in The Gambia. 
4. The enforcement of rules, power and the ability of the regulator (Central 
Bank of The Gambia) to direct and control banks in The Gambia will 
enhance supervision and the development of corporate governance 
framework with the banking sector; thereby minimising the potential 
control of interest between depositors, shareholders and the regulator.  
5. Compliance is a strategy in response to lack of accountability and trust in 
the governance of banks in The Gambia partly driven by the Banking Act 
2009, discipline, taking responsibility and upholding corporate governance 
standards.  
6. The lack of accountability is still a major problem in achieving the desired 
corporate governance framework in The Gambian banking system due to 
ineffective monitoring, control and action. 
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Thus, “the continual correction of data by comparative analysis gives the sociologist 
confidence in the data upon which he is basing his theory, at the same time forcing him 
to generate the properties of his categories” according to Glaser and Strauss (1967, 
p.68). Furthermore: 
theory generated from just one kind of data never fits, or works as well, as theory 
generated from diverse slices of data on the same category. The theory based on 
diverse data has taken into consideration more aspects of the substantive or 
formal area, and therefore can cope with more diversity in conditions and 
exceptions to hypothesis. (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.68).   
With the arguments above in mind it is important to verify the fitness of the story to 
selected respondents across The Gambia banking sector. Therefore, the data from this 
Semi-structured interview were visited when necessary. Furthermore, commenting on 
the causes of verification Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.67) also suggested that: 
different people in different positions may offer as “the facts” very different 
information about the same subject, and they vary that information 
considerably when talking to different people. Furthermore, the information 
itself may be continually changing as the group changes, and different 
documents on the same subject can be quite contradictory.  Some 
sociologist see these circumstances as presenting an un-bounding relativism 
of facts – no data is accurate.   
According to Charmaz (2006) qualitative researchers often use negative cases to find 
new variables or to provide alternative explanations from their developing theory. If 
negative cases emerge in the data, however, these cases may indicate the need to 
refine one’s emerging theory (ibid). Examining negative cases comes close to the 
emphasis on variation in a category or process and analytic density in grounded theory 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Identification of the core category  
The first step according to Strauss and Corbin (1998) in integration is deciding on a 
central category. The central category (sometimes called the core category) represents 
the main theme of the research. Although the central category evolves from the 
research, it too is an abstraction (ibid).  Howell (2013, p. 143) also added that: 
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core categories incorporate central phenomenon of research projects as they are 
identified through questions such as: what is the main analytical idea presented in 
this research? What does all the action/interaction seem to be about? The 
selection of data and the creation of other categories are processed with the core 
category in mind which are identified and unified through axial coding. 
In an exaggerated sense, it consists of all the products of the analysis condensed into 
a few words that seem to explain what the research is all about (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Strauss (1987, p.36) provided a list of criteria that can be applied to a category 
to determine whether it qualifies:  
1. It must be central; that is, all other major categories can be related to it. 
2. It must appear frequently in the data. This means that within all or almost all 
cases, there are indicators pointing to that concept. 
3. The explanation that evolves by relating the categories is logical and 
consistent. There is no forcing of data. 
4. The name or phrase used to describe the central category should be 
sufficiently abstract that it can be used to do research in other substantive 
areas, leading to the development of a more general theory. 
5. As the concept is refined analytically through integration with other concepts, 
the theory grows in depth and explanatory power. 
6. The concept is able to explain variation as well as the main point made by 
the data, that is, when conditions vary, the explanation still holds, although 
the way in which a phenomenon is expressed might look somewhat different. 
One also should be able to explain contradictory or alternative cases in terms 
of that central idea. 
Thus, a central category has an analytical power. What gives it that power is its ability 
to pull the other categories together to form an explanatory whole (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). The core category lack of accountability represents the central phenomenon of 
the study that emerged thus far as a result of open and axial coding as previously 
mentioned. Therefore, both the creation of other categories and the selection of data 
for the revalidation and verification have been processed with lack of accountability in 
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mind. Finally, the results of the responses to the statements are summarised in table 
7.8.2. 
Based on the research participants’ responses presented in table 7.8.2 and the 
subsequent discussion thereafter properties of the core category human factor can be 
summarised as follows: 
I. Human Factor  
Commenting on the lack of accountability and trust in the statements used in the 
second semi-structured interview participant B6 said:  
as a result of sophisticated banking software and systems in place, monitoring of 
control procedures has virtually been ineffective resulting to lack of accountability. 
However, major strides have been registered from improved data sharing 
between banks and much more improved monitoring from the regulators. 
This is partly responsible for lack of sound governance in the banking system 
(participant B3). 
Trusting relationship will promote information sharing, improve reporting and 
development of the industry (participant B4). 
Trusting relationship is the bedrock of all banking relationships and will generally 
influence corporate governance and The Gambia is no exception (participant B1). 
The first two quotes were in response to lack of accountability while the last two were 
based on participants responses in relation to the lack of trust. Thus, the main 
categories lack of accountability and lack of trust in axial coding has contributed to the 
identification of human factor as the core category. In this context human factor relates 
to the behaviour of those entrusted with the responsibility of managing public 
institutions and how their actions or inactions are viewed by stakeholders. The human 
factor therefore boils down to lack of accountability and trust taking into account the 
systems, monitoring, controls and processes in place to protect the interest of 
stakeholders. 
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Table 7.4: The results of the responses to the semi-structured interview 
statements 
Main Category 1: OBSTACLES 
Interview statement 1 
Culture, environment etc. has been a major obstacle affecting the realisation of corporate 
governance regulation for banks in The Gambia 
Interpretation and further discussion 
From the analysis the participants have reaffirmed that culture; environment etc. has been a 
major obstacle affecting the realisation of corporate governance regulation for banks in The 
Gambia.  A senior commercial bank executive commented that “majority of the banks in The 
Gambia are foreign owned with their own expatriates in key management positions”.  
The realisation of corporate governance regulations for banks in The Gambia is a major 
obstacle because such professional expatriates in these key positions do not easily adapt to 
The Gambian culture”. Furthermore, a senior bank examiner commenting on this statement 
simply said “agree”.  This confirms that culture, environment etc. are still major obstacles in 
the development of cohesive corporate governance regulations in The Gambian banking 
sector. 
Main Category 2 :  LACK OF TRUST 
Interview statement 2 
A trusting relationship would influence corporate governance control, monitoring etc. in The 
Gambian banking sector 
Interpretation and further discussion 
A consensus amongst the research participants supports the view that a trusting relationship 
would influence corporate governance control, monitoring etc. in The Gambian banking 
sector. A commercial bank’s legal and compliance officer commented that “trusting 
relationship will promote information sharing, improve reporting and development of the 
industry”.  
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These appear to support the proposition that trust is fundamental in any banking relationship. 
Therefore is likely to influence corporate governance control and monitoring in The Gambia. 
Thus, for corporate governance to succeed in The Gambia, banks and the regulators have to 
ensure that they have the trust of bank customers if there is to be a future for banks and 
regulators. 
Main Category 3: ETHICS 
Interview statement 3 
Considering ethical factors/path is essential in addressing current corporate governance 
issues within the banking sector in The Gambia. 
Interpretation and further discussion 
The majority of respondents agreed that considering ethical factors/path is essential in 
addressing the current corporate governance issues within the banking sector in The Gambia. 
Commenting on this statement a senior central bank official stated that “everything boils down 
to ethics. However, the problem remains sincere commitment and believes in those ethical 
factors provide the needed framework for the desire corporate governance practice and 
culture”.  
A senior bank manager of a foreign bank also added that “The Gambia has one of the highest 
default rates in Africa and this has to do with ethical issues, therefore it is really essential in 
addressing corporate governance within the banking sector in The Gambia”. These 
statements underline the importance of ethics in the governance of banks in a poor country 
like The Gambia. Improving ethical standards are likely to change attitudes and enhance 
corporate governance.   
Interview statement 3 
Considering ethical factors/path is essential in addressing current corporate governance 
issues within the banking sector in The Gambia. 
Interpretation and further discussion 
The majority of respondents agreed that considering ethical factors/path is essential in 
addressing the current corporate governance issues within the banking sector in The Gambia. 
Commenting on this statement a senior central bank official stated that “everything boils down 
to ethics. However, the problem remains sincere commitment and believes in those ethical 
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factors provide the needed framework for the desire corporate governance practice and 
culture”.  
A senior bank manager of a foreign bank also added that “The Gambia has one of the highest 
default rates in Africa and this has to do with ethical issues, therefore it is really essential in 
addressing corporate governance within the banking sector in The Gambia”.  
These statements underline the importance of ethics in the governance of banks in a poor 
country like The Gambia. Improving ethical standards are likely to change attitudes and 
enhance corporate governance.   
Main Category 4: SUPERVISION 
Interview statement 4 
The enforcement of rules, power and the ability of the regulator (Central Bank of The Gambia) 
to direct and control banks in The Gambia will enhance supervision and the development of 
corporate governance framework with the banking sector; thereby minimising the potential 
control of interest between depositors, shareholders and the regulator. 
Interpretation and further discussion 
The feedback from the participants clearly support the view that; The enforcement of rules, 
power and the ability of the regulator (Central Bank of The Gambia) to direct and control 
banks in The Gambia will enhance supervision and the development of corporate governance 
framework with the banking sector. Thereby minimising the potential control of interest 
between depositors, shareholders and the regulator. While responding to this statement a 
senior central bank official simply said “that is right”.   
A commercial bank’s legal and compliance officer also added that “empowering the CBG will 
lead to effective supervision and development of the banking industry”. Effective supervision 
is therefore an essential part in the development of corporate governance and the protection 
of depositors and shareholders. 
Main Category 5:   COMPLIANCE 
Interview statement 5 
Compliance is a strategy in response to lack of accountability and trust in the governance of 
banks in The Gambia partly driven by the Banking Act 2009, discipline, taking responsibility 
and upholding corporate governance standards. 
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Interpretation and further discussion 
From the analysis the participants have reaffirmed that; compliance is a strategy in response 
to lack of accountability and trust in the governance of banks in The Gambia partly driven by 
the Banking Act 2009, discipline, taking responsibility and upholding corporate governance 
standards. A senior bank commercial bank executive commented that “Absolutely. However, 
compliance cannot be effective if management of banks interfere with the work of compliance 
officers. Thus, compliance officers should report directly to the board of directors instead of 
the CEO’s as presently in existence in The Gambian banking system”.  
A commercial bank’s legal and compliance officer commented that “promotion of compliance 
will improve accountability and discipline in the banking industry”. Compliance in The 
Gambian banking system is therefore largely driven by the Banking Act 2009 which largely 
protected the banking industry during the recent global financial crisis to some extent. 
Furthermore, discipline, taking responsibility and upholding corporate governance standards 
were also significant contributing factors 
Main Category 6:   LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Interview statement 6 
The lack of accountability is still a major problem in achieving the desired corporate 
governance framework in The Gambian banking system due to ineffective monitoring, control 
and action. 
Interpretation and further discussion 
There is consensus amongst research participants that; lack of accountability is still a major 
problem in achieving the desired corporate governance framework in The Gambian banking 
system due to ineffective monitoring, control and action. A senior commercial bank executive 
commented that “as a result of sophisticated banking software and systems in place, 
monitoring of control procedures has virtually been ineffective resulting to lack of 
accountability. However, major strides have been registered from improved data sharing 
between banks and much more improved monitoring from the regulators”.  
Furthermore, a branch manager added that “this is partly responsible for lack of sound 
governance in the banking system”. These statements support the view that lack of 
accountability is still an issue in the governance of banks in The Gambian banking system 
due to ineffective monitoring and control. Therefore, lack of accountability has to be 
addressed if corporate governance regulation is to flourish in The Gambian banking sector 
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II. Regulatory Compliance 
While commenting on supervision and compliance in the statements used in the 
second semi-structured interview participant B5 simply said:  
that is right.   
Empowering the CBG will lead to effective supervision and development of the 
banking industry (participant B2). 
‘Absolutely’. However, compliance cannot be effective if management of banks 
interfere with the work of compliance officers. Thus, compliance officers should 
report directly to the board of directors instead of the CEO’s as presently in 
existence in The Gambian banking system (participant B6). 
Promotion of compliance will improve accountability and discipline in the banking 
industry (participant B1). 
The initial two quotes were in response to banking supervision in The Gambia while the 
latter two were based on the participant’s responses in relation to compliance. 
Therefore, the main categories supervision and compliance in axial coding has 
contributed to the identification of regulatory compliance as a key requirement for the 
development of any meaningful corporate governance framework in The Gambia and 
the protection of depositors and shareholders. Thus, in this context regulatory 
compliance relates to the enforcement of rules and regulations set out in the banking 
act 2009. This is aimed at holding those in power accountable and to ensure that 
standards, discipline and transparency are maintained. 
III. Obstacles 
Whilst responding to culture in the statements used in the second semi-structured 
interview participant B2 said:  
majority of the banks in The Gambia are foreign owned with their own expatriates 
in key management positions. The realisation of corporate governance regulations 
for banks in The Gambia is a major obstacle because such professional 
expatriates in these key positions do not easily adapt to The Gambian culture and 
environment.   
 I Agree (participant B5). 
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The two quotes above were in response to obstacles as a main category in axial 
coding previously. From these analyses the participants have reaffirmed that culture, 
environment etc. has been a major obstacle affecting the realisation of corporate 
governance regulation for banks in The Gambia. Culture, environments and policies 
are thus considered as key obstacles in the development of an effective corporate 
governance regulation in The Gambian banking system.  
IV. Ethics 
Commenting on statements three used in the second semi-structured interview 
participant B3 said:  
everything boils down to ethics. However, the problem remains sincere 
commitment and believes in those ethical factors provide the needed framework 
for the desire corporate governance practice and culture (participant B4). 
The Gambia has one of the highest default rates in Africa and this has to do with 
ethical issues, therefore it is really essential in addressing corporate governance 
within the banking sector in The Gambia (participant B2). 
The quotes mentioned above were in response to ethics as a main category in axial 
coding previously. The consensus amongst respondents agreed that considering 
ethical factors/path is essential in addressing the current corporate governance issues 
within the banking sector in The Gambia.  
Integrating core categories with sub-categories 
The paradigm model enabled the research to link the core category to sub-categories 
within selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Howell (2000) added that the focus 
of axial coding was the development of sub-categories, selection of data and 
establishing connections with the core category in mind. Subsequently, selective 
coding then took these sub-categories namely: lack of trust, ethics, compliance, 
supervision and obstacles and verified their relationship with the core category. This 
was done by using the semi-structured interview statements used in the discriminate 
sampling accompanied by comments by research participants.  
Each component of the paradigm model has an equivalent statement representing the 
relationship between the core category and the sub-categories. Table 7.3 
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demonstrates the semi-structured statements verifying the relationship between the 
core category and the sub-categories using the paradigm model. The verification of 
these relationships was based on the research participant’s responses to the 
statements above.  
Human factor has been identified as the core category which was derived from lack of 
accountability and trust in axial coding (now sub-categories) in selective coding. In this 
context, human factor relates to the behaviour of those entrusted with the responsibility 
of managing public institutions and how their actions or inactions are viewed by 
stakeholders. The human factor therefore focuses on the lack of accountability and 
trust taking into account the systems, monitoring, controls and processes in place to 
protect the interest of stakeholders.  
Furthermore, the main categories supervision and compliance in axial coding has 
contributed to the identification of regulatory compliance as a key requirement for the 
development of any meaningful corporate governance framework in The Gambia and 
the protection of depositors and shareholders. Thus, in this context regulatory 
compliance relates to the enforcement of rules and regulations set out in the Banking 
Act 2009. This is aimed at holding those in power accountable and to ensure that 
standards, discipline and transparency are maintained. 
In addition, based on the analysis of the semi-structured statements the participants 
have reaffirmed that culture, environment etc. has been a major obstacle affecting the 
realisation of corporate governance regulation for banks in The Gambia. Culture, 
environments and policies are thus considered as key obstacles in the development of 
an effective corporate governance regulation in The Gambian banking system. Finally, 
the consensus amongst respondents agreed that considering ethical factors/path is 
essential in addressing the current corporate governance issues within the banking 
sector in The Gambia.  
Therefore one can conclude that human factors and a strategy of regulatory 
compliance are therefore central to the development and implementation of corporate 
governance rules and regulations in The Gambian banking system. It is clear from the 
analysis above that the human factor has a significant influence on the need for   
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Table 7.5: The application of the paradigm model to verify relationships between 
the core category and sub-categories.  
Interview statement Subcategory 
Paradigm 
component 
Culture, environment etc. has been a major 
obstacle affecting the realisation of corporate 
governance regulation for banks in The Gambia. 
Obstacles Causal condition 
A trusting relationship would influence corporate 
governance control, monitoring etc. in The 
Gambian banking sector. 
Lack of trust Context 
Considering ethical factors/path is essential in 
addressing current corporate governance issues 
within the banking sector in The Gambia. 
Ethics  Intervening 
conditions 
The enforcement of rules, power and the ability of 
the regulator (Central Bank of The Gambia) to 
direct and control banks in The Gambia will 
enhance supervision and the development of 
corporate governance framework within the 
banking sector; thereby minimising the potential 
conflict of interest between depositors, 
shareholders and the regulator. 
Supervision  
Compliance is a strategy in response to lack of 
accountability and trust in the governance of 
banks in The Gambia partly driven by the Banking 
Act 2009, discipline, taking responsibility and 
upholding corporate governance standards. 
Compliance  Action/interactional 
strategies and 
consequences 
Most banks in The Gambia have developed 
voluntary corporate governance codes and 
frameworks for internal use. In some cases, these 
practices have been imposed on them by their 
parent body as part of their internal control 
mechanisms 
Consequences Consequences  
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regulatory compliance (monitoring, control, enforcement etc.) and ethics which serves 
as a moral compass in the absence of corporate governance requirements as part of 
the regulatory framework in The Gambia. However, the development of corporate 
governance frameworks in Gambian banking system are hampered by obstacles such 
as culture, environment and policies which needs to be addressed if good corporate 
governance is to prevail in The Gambia.  The regulators and the banks need to be 
transparent, have a robust ability to control, monitor and develop adequate processes 
to act where required. This will enhance regulatory compliance and thus help to re-
establish accountability and trust within the banking sector.  
Finally, the consequence, benefits and constraints of identifying the human factor 
model will now be examined. The current corporate governance regulatory framework 
in The Gambian banking sector is not unitary with a centralised corporate governance 
requirement. Thus, the existing corporate governance regulatory framework in The 
Gambia can be optimally described as “fractured independent corporate governance 
policies”. The benefits of human factor as the core category is that efforts are now on 
the way at regulatory level to develop corporate governance policies and frameworks 
for The Gambian banking system. As a result, banks have now developed their own 
internal corporate governance policies and frameworks most of which were adopted 
from their parent company. Furthermore, the obstacles identified above can be 
explained in relation to the human factor phenomenon (lack of accountability and trust) 
and ethics (in the absence of a mandatory corporate governance framework) as part of 
bank corporate governance regulation in The Gambia.  
Commenting on the use of diagrams Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.153) suggested that:  
there are times when, either through preference or because the analyst is more of 
a visual person, diagrams are more useful than storytelling for sorting out the 
relationships amongst concepts.  
They went on to set out the advantages of diagramming which includes the following: 
1. Diagramming is helpful because it enables the analyst to gain distance from the 
data, forcing him or her to work with concepts rather than with details of data. 
  
                            
208 
2. It also demands that the analyst think very carefully about the logic of 
relationships because if the relationships are not clear, then the diagrams comes 
across as muddled and confused. 
3. Integrative diagrams are very abstract representations of data. They need not 
contain every concept that emerged during the research process, but they 
should focus on those that reach the status of major category and finally, 
4. Integrative diagrams should flow, with the logic apparent without a lot of 
explanation and not too complicated. The details should be left to the writing as 
discussed detailed below (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.153). 
The relationship of the core phenomenon with sub-categories can be depicted as 
shown in figure 7.2 this can be further summarised as follows. The use of grounded 
theory methodology adopted by Strauss and Corbin has contributed to the 
development of the human factor model (core category) of bank corporate governance 
regulation in The Gambia. The human factor reinforces the existence of the obstacles. 
The obstacles however determine the human factors. Subsequently, the human factors 
leads to the need for regulatory compliance within the banking system. Thus, 
regulatory compliance will eventually reduce the human factors. Regulatory compliance 
will also improve the existing ethical practices in The Gambia banking system. 
Ultimately, these ethical practices will strengthen the regulatory compliance. Thereby 
protecting all the stakeholders. Furthermore, the ethical practices will minimise the 
existence of obstacles. Obstacles in this case will also constrain current ethical 
practices. Obstacles call for regulatory compliance which is aimed at reducing the 
existence of these obstacles. The existence of the human factors also calls for ethical 
practices within the banking system in the absence of corporate governance regulatory 
framework. These will ultimately reduce the human factor phenomenon that exists in 
The Gambian banking system. Obstacles in this case will also constrain current ethical 
practices. Obstacles call for regulatory compliance which is aimed at reducing the 
existence of these obstacles. The existence of the human factors also calls for ethical 
practices within the banking system in the absence of corporate governance regulatory 
framework. These will ultimately reduce the human factor phenomenon that exists in 
The Gambian banking system.  
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A model of bank corporate governance regulation in The Gambia (Figure 7.2) is the 
substantive theory integrating the core categories with subcategories.   
7.9.1  A Substantive Theory of Bank Corporate Governance 
Regulation 
The main aim of this research is to build a substantive theory of bank corporate 
governance regulation within the context of The Gambian banking system using the 
application of grounded theory methodology. The substantive theory developed in this 
research achieves this objective by establishing the causes that led to the existence of 
the phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, causal condition, action/interactional 
strategies and consequences. As a result, the substantive theory enabled the 
researcher to develop a thorough understanding and balanced view of bank corporate 
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governance in The Gambia. The establishment of the substantive theory will enable 
banks in The Gambia to develop strategies aimed at maximising shareholder profit and 
wealth. Furthermore, this will also protect depositors and enhance corporate 
governance regulation in Gambian banking sector and thus minimise corporate 
governance related bank failures. The development of a substantive theory is the final 
stage following coding, categorising and analysis of the data systematically collected 
for this research through: semi-structured interviews and statements as well as focus 
groups discussions. The substantive theory therefore reflects the opinions of 
regulators, commercial bank executives, legal and compliances officers, bank 
managers, employees and customers. Therefore, the substantive theory is grounded in 
the data obtained in The Gambia. Finally, the substantive theory can be summarised 
as follows: 
1. The substantive theory shows there that is no consistency between banks in 
The Gambia when it comes to general banking issues, corporate governance 
mechanisms, ethics and codes.  
2. In the context of this research the lack of accountability and trust are due to 
obstacles such as environment, culture and policies.  
3. Regulatory compliance is aimed at controlling, monitoring and enforcing 
corporate governance rules and regulations in The Gambian banking system. 
4. Ethics serve as moral compass in the absence of a corporate governance 
policies as part of the regulatory requirement in The Gambian banking 
system.  
5. Enhanced accountability and trust will lead to improved regulatory compliance 
and therefore minimise the conflict of interest between the key stakeholders in 
the banking sector (depositors, regulators and shareholders). This will 
eventually protect and enhance shareholder wealth and profit.  
6. Human factors and regulatory compliance are therefore central to the 
development and implementation of any meaningful corporate governance 
rules and regulations in The Gambian banking system.  
7. The regulators and the banks need to be transparent, backed by robust ability 
to control, monitor and develop adequate processes to act where required. 
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8. The benefit of human factor as the core category is that efforts are now on the 
way at regulatory level to develop corporate governance policies for The 
Gambian banking system. 
9. Banks have now developed their own internal corporate governance policies 
most of which were adopted from their parent company. 
10. The interplay between human factor, regulatory compliance and ethics will 
eventually lead to more transparent, accountable and trusting banking system 
in The Gambia.  
11. The bank corporate governance regulatory framework currently existing in 
The Gambia is inconsistent and not standardised. Hence, can be best 
described as “fractured independent corporate governance regulatory 
frameworks”. 
12. Finally, the system of corporate governance regulatory framework (as a result 
of the Banking Act 2009) currently prevailing in The Gambia is pluralistic, 
designed to protect and enhance the interest of key stakeholders.   
7.9  Conclusion 
This chapter was based on axial and selective coding using grounded theory 
procedures.  Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.124) added that “the purpose of axial coding 
is to begin the process of reassembling data that were fractured during open coding”. 
Thus, axial coding involves the re-structuring of the whole process by finding 
connections between the data (Howell, 2013). This chapter further demonstrated how 
the nine open categories that emerged during the open coding were further arranged 
and linked together to form a coherent overall system (Howell, 2000). These nine 
categories were further developed into six main categories taken into account their 
properties and dimensions. The six main categories developed through axial coding 
are: lack of accountability, obstacles, lack of trust, supervision, ethics and compliance. 
The main categories were subsequently linked together by means of the coding 
paradigm (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1998). The application of the paradigm model 
enables the identification of the phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, causal 
conditions and action/interactional strategies that occurred with the consequences as 
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detailed discussed above. Subsequently, the core category and sub-categories were 
identified. Selective coding is the third and final stage using the grounded theory 
approach (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).  
The results of the interviews and focus group discussion were analysed using 
grounded theory coding procedures, first open coding to identify categories that 
emerged from the data (see chapter six). Further analysis of these categories through 
axial coding established relationships between categories and sub-categories. 
“However, it is not until the major categories are finally integrated to form a larger 
theoretical scheme that the research findings take the form of theory” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p.143). Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.116) defined selective coding as the 
process of “selecting the core category, systematically relating it to the other 
categories, validating those relationships…the core category is the central 
phenomenon around which all the other categories are integrated”. 
Thus selective coding is the process of integrating and refining categories (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). Furthermore, selective coding illustrates how the phenomenon fits 
around a core category and involves the process by which emerging categories are 
organised and unified around a core category according to Strauss and Corbin (1990 
cited in Howell, 2013, p.143). 
Finally, CI, is explored in the next chapter to deal with the issues of financial sector 
stakeholders. A normative claim  is the idea that stakeholders have intrinsic moral 
rights in relation to the management of corporations, particularly financial sector 
organisations are primarily derived from non-consequentialist or deontological ethical 
theory (Matten and Moon, 2008). The arguments in support of stakeholder concept are 
rooted in the theories of Kantian duties and rights. The idea that a person, by virtue of 
being a person, possesses intrinsic moral rights can be traced to Kant’s theory. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
RELATING SUBSTANTIVE THEORY TO FORMAL THEORY 
8.0  Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the substantive theory of human factor presented 
in chapter seven in light of the existing literature related to formal theory called CI. The 
substantive theory of human factor was derived as a result of applying the grounded 
theory techniques such as open coding (see chapter 6), axial and selecting coding (see 
chapter 7). Subsequently, selective coding identified the core category as the human 
factor model in terms of its properties and dimensions which eventually led to 
development of the human factor model of bank corporate governance regulation in 
The Gambia. This model and verification of the relationship between the human factor 
model and sub-categories led to the formulation of the substantive theory of bank 
corporate governance regulation in The Gambia.  
8.1  Formal grounded theory building 
In the context of this thesis, the use of substantive theory is aimed at facilitating further 
discussion in light of the existing literature related to formal theory. Commenting on the 
difference between formal and substantive theories Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.174) 
argued that:  
the former emerges from the study of a phenomenon examined under different 
types of situations while the latter evolves from the study of a phenomenon 
situated in one particular situational context.  
The aim of this thesis is to develop a substantive theory about bank corporate 
governance regulation in The Gambia using the grounded theory approach. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) suggested that a formal theory is still a substantive theory but gain 
more formality through comparison with already established formal theories. Therefore, 
the application of a substantive theory already developed to a more formal theory gives 
it “greater meaning” according to Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 94). In addition, 
Charmaz (2006, p.169) added that linking substantive theory and formal theories would 
help to locate the arguments made in substantive theory in the existing body of 
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knowledge, thereby making the substantive theory more explicit. Thus, this possibly 
“refines, extends, challenges, or supersedes extant concepts” (ibid).  
In this context, the application of Immanuel Kant’s theoretical framework, which he 
called CI, is explored to deal with the issues of financial sector stakeholders. A 
normative claim  is the idea that stakeholders have intrinsic moral rights in relation to 
the management of corporations, particularly financial sector organisations are 
primarily derived from non-consequentialist or deontological ethical theory. The 
arguments in support of stakeholder concept are rooted in the theories of Kantian 
duties and rights. The idea that a person, by virtue of being a person, possesses 
intrinsic moral rights can be traced to Kant’s theory.  
The rest of this chapter will now summarise the reason why the application of 
Immanuel Kant’s CI is relevant to underpin this thesis and as such further explore the 
main findings of the substantive theory. This will be followed by a critical review of 
corporate governance studies informed by CI. Finally, the researcher aims to discuss 
the substantive theory in the light of CI and present a more substantive theory.  
8.2  Relevance of formal theory to corporate governance research 
The CI is well suited to study bank corporate governance phenomenon. The merits of 
these arguments are already discussed in the literature review (see 2.6) of this thesis. 
However, these reasons are briefly revisited here as follows: 
1. A normative claim  is the idea that stakeholders have intrinsic moral rights in 
relation to the management of corporations, particularly financial sector 
organisations are primarily derived from non-consequentialist or deontological 
ethical theory (Matten and Moon, 2008).  
2. CI emphasises that ethics, in one form or another, is grafted onto the corporate 
body as a preventative or remedial measure to help combat corruption, promote 
obedience to laws and procedures, and increase trust between citizens and 
institutions (Garofalo, 2003). Trust is essential in any banking operation. 
3. An evaluation of CI literature on governance, regulation, CSR and ethics 
suggests the need for accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust if the 
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financial markets are to regain public trust and investor confidence (Labelle, 
2009). 
4. Using Immanuel Kant’s CI theory Wolfensohn (1999) argued that corporate 
governance is all about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and 
accountability.  
5. The use of CI is gaining more popularity among corporate governance 
researchers. Kaur and Mishra (2010) suggested that corporate governance 
recently gained momentum the world over due to corporate failures, unethical 
business practices, insufficient disclosure and transparency.   
6. Holland (2002) commenting on the recent regulatory changes in the financial 
sector concluded that adherence to corporate accountability, responsibility, 
transparency and trust will significantly reduce the probability of adverse media 
coverage, damaging litigation or unfavourable regulatory changes which could 
undermine shareholder value.  
7. Barker (2009) suggested that the fundamental threat facing by the banking 
industry despite the losses, power struggle and increased regulation is the 
destruction of trust.  
8. Furthermore, Yandle (2010, p.343) suggested that “trust is the most fragile 
human sentiment (rooted in individuals) and practically all markets transactions 
depend on some degree of trust”. Furthermore, the author added that the recent 
financial crisis will lead to permanent expansion of regulations, thereby, 
replacing market driven trust devices (ibid).  
9. Forster and Nilakant (2005) commenting on the role of trust in privatisation 
focusing on the transformation of the electricity utility in The Gambia. They 
concluded that “organisational factors such as trust generation may be as critical 
as economic factors in ensuring the success of deregulation and privatisation in 
less developed countries” (Forster and Nilakant, 2005).    
10. Commenting on the Kant’s CI, Wicks (1998) argued that it forms the basis for 
developing a moral theory which applies to all rational beings. Furthermore, the 
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norms created by this notion are both universal in scope and necessarily 
binding. Making the point more explicit, Kant claims that we need to work for a 
pure notion of ethics and that the fundamental moral duty of all rational beings is 
to act in accordance with norms that are generated by, and consistent with the 
CI (Wicks, 1998)  
8.3  Reviewing corporate governance research utilising the CI 
Various corporate governance researchers have employed CI as their theoretical 
framework, one commonality amongst this research avenue is using CI to explore and 
understand the issues of financial sector stakeholders. For example, Nwanji (2006) 
explored ethical implications of corporate governance, a deontological and teleological 
approach using CI. Many more corporate governance researchers have used CI as 
their theoretical framework as detailed below. 
Brady (1999) suggested that during the past hundred years the dominant philosophical 
opinion is divided into two distinct categories namely teleology and deontology. 
Understanding the two distinct categories above requires one to have a basic 
understanding of the word ethics. There are different types of ethical theories that exist 
primarily because various philosophers adopted different perspectives regarding the 
benchmark upon which ethical judgements should be based (Aronson, 2001).  
The focus of this study however, will be centred around the notion of teleology and 
deontology with emphasis on consequentialism. This is mainly because the 
consequences of a financial crisis affect all stakeholders with devastating 
consequences. Deontology can be defined as the study/theory of moral obligation. In 
order to understand Kant’s deontology one needs to understand his notion of “good 
will”. It means acting out of respect for the moral law, i.e. for the sake of duty (Kant, 
1964, p.74). Macdonald and Beck-Dudley (1994) suggested that deontological 
approaches to ethics attempt to establish the content of duty without considering the 
consequences of particular ways of acting. 
Contrary, teleological approach to morals is centred firstly, around the need to identify 
the sort of goods human actions ought to protect and realised, before evaluating 
actions as right or wrong according to their effects/consequences (Macdonald and 
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Beck-Dudley, 1994). Whilst, Helms and Hutchins (1992) insisted that the moral value of 
a particular behaviour should be separated from the outcome because the certainty of 
the outcome is questionable at the time of the decision to act.  
It is important to appreciate the contribution of Kant’s insistence on absolute demands 
of duty. Indeed one of the deep seated moral convictions is that there are ways of 
treating people that can never be allowed regardless of the circumstances. Criminal 
law it is argued is centred on absolutism to a degree in that murder is always and 
everywhere forbidden (Macdonald and Beck-Dudley, 1994). Garofalo and Geuras, 
(1999) addressed several technical matters in relation to Kant’s CI. Garofalo (2003) 
later sets out three formulations namely: firstly, do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you. Secondly, treat human beings as ends in themselves and never as means 
only. Finally, to paraphrase, each rational and autonomous being must be considered a 
legislator in a kingdom of ends.  
Commenting on the Kant’s CI, Wicks (1998) argued that it forms the basis for 
developing a moral theory which applies to all rational beings. Furthermore, the norms 
created by this notion are both universal in scope and necessarily binding. Making the 
point more explicit, Kant claims that we need to work for a pure notion of ethics and 
that the fundamental moral duty of all rational beings is to act in accordance with norms 
that are generated by, and consistent with the CI (Wicks,1998). Grisez (1983) objected 
to Kant’s moral philosophy arguing that it is entirely too permissive, allowing morally 
horrendous maxims to pass muster. Furthermore, critics argue that it commands us to 
do as we should be done by but failed to answer/address the question of how we 
should be done by.  
Other researchers suggested that there are two main categories of deontological 
theories namely the rule and act deontology (Wicks, 1998). The rule deontology it is 
argued should follow a specific predetermined standards/rules. Hence, one’s behaviour 
is either ethical or unethical not as a consequence one’s action but in comparison to 
the standards initially set out (Rallapalli et al. 1998). Alternatively, act deontology 
argues that human beings act ethically according to their norms, but limited to a 
specific behaviours which suggests that there are exemptions to the rule (Rallapalli et 
al. 1998).  Furthermore, Aronson (2001) argued that people are required to behave 
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towards others in a particular manner because they are human. It is therefore, 
incumbent for one to consider their rights and dignity regardless of the consequences. 
Hence, the concern is for a moral inherent in the action itself (White, 1998). However 
philosophers disagree about precisely what teleology affirms (Gaus, 2001).  
Teleological approaches to ethics tend to morally evaluate actions by evaluating their 
consequences (Garofalo, 2003). Hence, right actions are right because they tend to 
have good consequences and bad actions are wrong because they tend to have bad 
consequences (Macdonald and Beck-Dudley, 1994). Thus, from a teleological 
perspective, evaluations of consequences as good or bad provide the premises for 
inferring the norms of right acting. Gaus (2001) suggested that a theory is teleological if 
it justifies the right, moral duty, or obligation, on grounds that it promotes what is good. 
Thus, an act is defined as moral if it is deemed to produce a greater degree of good or 
evil than any other alternative, and is immoral if it failed to do so (Aronson, 2001). 
Further buttressing this point is the argument by Helms and Hutchins (1992) who 
perceives teleological perspectives to ethics as emphasising the 
outcome/consequence, as opposed to the initial intent of the individual behaviour.  
Ethical research theories seem to suggest that there are many more classifications of 
teleological theories in the literature. This research however, is only focused on the 
three main categories namely ethical egoism, act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. 
Ethical egoism considers an act moral or immoral purely on the basis of achieving its 
objectives. It is important to note that ethical egoism may consider the interest of others 
but not as the main goal. It considers others as medium through which the ethical 
egoist’s welfare could be maximised (Shaw and Post, 1993).  
An act is therefore deemed ethical only if the results of the act are more advantageous 
than those of any other alternative behaviour (Hunt and Vitell, 1986). Quinton (1989), 
however, viewed utilitarianism as two principles namely: the consequentialist principle 
and hedonist principle. Consequentialist principle tends to classify an act as right or 
wrong purely as to whether the consequences are good or bad. Alternatively, the 
hedonist approach seems to suggest that only pleasure is basically good and only pain 
is basically bad. Frankena (1973) looking at the ethical view of hedonist suggested that 
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what is right or wrong is basically determined to create the greatest overall weighing of 
good over evil.   
Regan (1980) considers act utilitarianism to be an evaluation of behaviour in relation to 
its potential to produce the greatest amount of good for the largest number of people. 
One can therefore conclude that act utilitarianism seems to advocate the principle of 
utility. That is by attempting to evaluate which option is expected to result in the highest 
level of good as oppose to the evil in the universe (Frankena, 1973). Furthermore, act 
utilitarianism is therefore considered as independent of any rules. However, rules may 
serve as a guide in act utilitarianism but not necessarily form part of the ethical 
decision. 
Rule utilitarianism according to Rallapalli et al (1998), however, assumes that 
individuals conform to rules and act in ways that provides the highest degree of good 
for the largest number of people. In this case, it is desirable to depend on a set of rules 
for a swift action (Quinton, 1989). These rules it is noted must be chosen, upheld and 
modified/replaced as required on the sole basis of their utility. Furthermore, the maxim 
of utility remains the only criterion and applies in terms of rules instead of specific 
evaluations (Aronson, 2001).   
Ethics of virtues (and vices) tend to elaborate on the process of personal moral 
character development. Garofalo (2003) suggested that the morality of an act is 
determined by the character traits that it demonstrates. Thus the object of moral 
evaluation is not the act itself but the character of the actor.  
Thomas (2001, p.101) commenting on the ethic of virtues: 
proposes that managers add an attention to the virtues and the vices of human 
character as a full complement to moral reasoning according to a deontological 
focus on obligations to act and a teleological focus on consequences (a balance 
tripartite approach).  
This point also echoed by Whetstone (2001). Furthermore, the author argued that an 
interactive tripartite approach is a more effective system aimed at meeting the 
complicated requirements of an applied ethic a point also echoed by Garofalo (2003). 
On the contrary, Donaldson and Werhane (1999) argued that some philosophers were 
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indeed less eager to accept the human nature method mainly because they believed 
that consequentialism and deontology exhaust all possible modes of ethical reasoning. 
It is important to note that these three ethics perspectives have distinct differences in 
terms of primary focus and in relation to what constitutes a right action. In terms of 
primary focus consequentialist teleology tend to focus on consequences; cost versus 
benefits – of the act. While deontology focuses on duties: moral obligations – re the 
act. It does not look beyond the act itself in assessing its moral worth (Brady, 1999). 
Finally, virtue ethics focus on character development – for the person (Brady, 1999). In 
relation to what constitutes a right of action consequentialist teleology promotes the 
best consequences in which happiness is maximised. Deontology, in contrast, 
advocates for the right action to be in accordance with the moral principle required by 
God, natural law or rationality (Thomas, 2001). A right action in relation to virtue 
however, is one that a virtuous agent is disposed to make in the circumstances in order 
to flourish or live well (Thomas, 2001). 
To fully understand what constitutes a virtuous act, Aristotle (1976) set out three 
conditions. The first condition is that the act must fit its appropriate purpose. Secondly, 
the act must be virtuous and finally, the act must result in a steady state of character 
disposition not a one off or impulsive act. Thomas (2001, p.104) summarise a virtuous 
act as:  
a rational act based on a wise, purposeful assessment of the factual situation, 
chosen for a pure motive and consistent with a steady disposition of the actors’ 
character.  
Critics of the virtue ethic points out its cultural relativism in that different people and 
cultures can consider different character traits as virtues (Hursthouse, 1997, Donaldson 
and Dunfee; 1999; Velazquez, 2000). On a final note, one can argue that ethical 
problems are thus resolved most effectively by employing the teleological, 
deontological and virtues points of view simultaneously.  
Woller (1998) suggested that people are neither entirely deontological nor entirely 
teleological in their moral points of view, because human behaviour is motivated by 
principles of right and wrong and the concern for consequences. Thus, one of the 
greatest strengths of Kant's theory, is that it does not play favourites nor make 
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exceptions. The same fundamental rules of morality apply to everyone regardless of 
class, colour, caste, race, creed and gender. One other advantage of this approach to 
morality is that it looks more closely at the individual and his choices, rather than the 
actual consequences of what he does (which, after all, he has no control over). 
8.4  Limitations of the literature linking CI and corporate governance 
CI is not without its weaknesses (Hursthouse, 1997; Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; 
Velazquez, 2000). Below are some of those limitations identified in the literature that 
should be addressed. Kant's greatest weakness may be found by way of close 
examination of one of his greatest strengths: CIs. Kant’s theory presupposes the ability 
for all humans to universally arrive at the CI. Further, Kant allows no possibility for 
morality to derive from other motivating factors (empathy? compassion?), or cultural 
distinctions, dismissing these as anthropological rather than innate (Hursthouse, 1997; 
Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; Velazquez, 2000). Thus, the main problem with the CI is 
its rigidity. 
Hutchins (1992) argued that the moral value of a particular behaviour should be 
separated from the outcome because the certainty of the outcome is questionable at 
the time of the decision to act. Grisez (1983) also objected to Kant’s moral philosophy 
arguing that it is entirely too permissive, allowing morally horrendous maxims to pass 
muster. Furthermore, other critics argue that it commands us to do as we should be 
done by but failed to answer/address the question of how we should be done by.  
In addition, critics of Kant’s virtue ethic points out its cultural relativism in that different 
people and cultures can consider different character traits as virtues (Hursthouse, 
1997; Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; Velazquez, 2000). On a final note, one can argue 
that ethical problems are thus resolved most effectively by employing the teleological, 
deontological and virtues points of view simultaneously. Woller (1998) suggested that 
people are neither entirely deontological nor entirely teleological in their moral points of 
view, because human behaviour is motivated by principles of right and wrong and the 
concern for consequences. These limitations are shared in the literature linking CI to 
corporate governance research as mentioned above.  
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Following an evaluation of how relevant CI is to study corporate governance research 
and the subsequent review of the limitations. One can therefore conclude that CI is 
well-suited to explore the findings of the substantive theory due to reasons mentioned 
above.  
CI also covers most of the substantive theory findings. Thus, linking CI to the 
substantive theory can overcome the shortcomings evident in CI literature by linking CI 
to various cultural distinctions, employing deontological, teleological and virtue points of 
view simultaneously because human behaviour is motivated by principles of right and 
wrong and the concern for consequences. Furthermore, taking in account empathy and 
compassion and finally, separating a particular behaviour with the outcome because 
the certainty of the outcome is questionable at the time of the decision to act. 
8.5  Exploring the substantive theory within the framework of CI 
This particular section is aimed at discussing the findings of the substantive theory 
presented in chapter seven in relation to the CI framework. As previously mentioned CI 
does cover most of the findings of the substantive theory. This can be shown as 
follows: 
I. Analysing human factors as a phenomenon of bank corporate governance in 
The Gambia 
The substantive theory has presented human factors (lack of accountability and trust) 
as the core phenomenon of this study. The substantive theory shows that human 
factors calls for regulatory compliance and ethical practices (procedures, directing and 
monitoring) to restore public confidence in the banking system in the absence of 
mandatory corporate governance regulatory framework. However, human factors are 
indeed obstructed by culture, environment and policies that exist in The Gambian 
banking system. As such, from a CI point of view, ethics in one form or another, is 
grafted onto the corporate body as a preventative or remedial measure to help combat 
corruption, promote obedience to laws and procedures, and increase trust between 
citizens and institutions (Garofalo, 2003; Garofalo and Geuras, 1999). Furthermore, 
Garofalo (2003) also sets out three formulations namely: firstly, do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you. Secondly, treat human beings as ends in themselves 
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and never as means only. Finally, to paraphrase, each rational and autonomous being 
must be considered a legislator in a kingdom of ends. Wicks (1998) added that CI 
forms the basis for developing a moral theory which applies to all rational beings. 
Rallapalli et al. (1998) commented that human beings act ethically according to their 
norms. Furthermore, Aronson (2001) added that people are required to behave 
towards others in a particular manner because they are human. It is therefore, 
incumbent for one to consider their rights and dignity regardless of the consequences. 
Hence, the concern is for a moral inherent in the action itself (White, 1998). Rallapalli et 
al (1998) argued that individuals conform to rules and act in ways that gives the highest 
degree of good for the largest number of people. Thomas (2001) commenting on the 
ethic of virtues proposes that managers add an attention to the virtues and the vices of 
human character as a full complement to moral reasoning, a point also echoed by 
Whetstone (2001).   
Woller (1998) suggested that people are neither entirely deontological nor entirely 
teleological in their moral points of view, because human behaviour is motivated by 
principles of right and wrong and the concern for consequences. Brady (1999, p.318) 
argued that “neither profit, nor stock price, nor size, nor power can alone serve as the 
criterion for an organisation well run”. The author suggested that “where organisations 
come to gain public respect and community approval, they have accomplished far more 
than a return on their investment”. The substantive theory recognises the need to 
address human factors in The Gambia as a preventative or remedial measure to help 
combat corruption, promote obedience to laws and procedures, and increase trust 
between citizens and institutions (Wicks, 1998; Donaldson and Werhane, 1999; 
Garofalo and Geuras, 1999; Thomas, 2001; Garofalo, 2003). 
II. Regulatory compliance within in The Gambian banking system 
The substantive theory shows that human factors in The Gambian banking system 
reinforce the obstacles (culture, environment and policies). Thus, calls for regulatory 
compliance aimed at protecting stakeholders. Regulatory compliance is a process 
required by The Central Bank of The Gambia (regulator) as set out in the Banking Act 
of 2009. However, this process is also indirectly driven by international organisations 
(World Bank and the Basle committee on banking supervision). Currently The 
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Gambia’s corporate governance approach can be best described as a legislative 
approach to bank governance due to the Banking Act of 2009. This particular Act does 
not require banks in The Gambia to follow a mandatory corporate governance 
framework as part of the regulatory process. The legislative approach makes it clear 
that the World Bank and the Basle committee on banking supervision are only 
secondary and do not have the same power as the Central Bank of The Gambia.  
Alexander (2006, p.33) suggested that an:  
efficient corporate governance framework should rely less on a strict application of 
statutory codes and regulatory standards, and more on the design of flexible, 
internal compliance programmes that fit the particular risk level and nature of the 
bank’s business.  
The regulator is therefore compelled to play an active role with bank management in 
designing internal control systems and risk management practices that seek to achieve 
an optimal level of protection for shareholders, stakeholders and the economy. 
Khadaroo and Shaikh (2007) conducted a study of corporate governance reform and 
concluded that the corporate governance reform was regulations based. Deo et al 
(2007) also studied the role of corporate governance rules and regulations in assisting 
banks to maintain their legitimacy and public image during crisis.  
Within the context of CI and on the basis of evaluating the literature on governance, 
regulation, CSR and ethics suggests the need for accountability, responsibility, 
transparency and trust if the financial institutions are to regain public trust and investor 
confidence (Labelle, 2009). Corporate governance it is argued is a driver of investor 
confidence and managerial decisions (OECD, 2004 and Chalhoub, 2009). 
Furthermore, Monks and Minow (1996) suggested that corporate governance is of 
national importance because an effective governance system is a necessary 
precondition for commercial competitiveness. Wolfensohn (1999) added that corporate 
governance is all about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and accountability. 
Whilst Kaur and Mishra (2010) suggested that corporate governance recently gained 
momentum the world over due to corporate failures, unethical business practices, 
insufficient disclosure and transparency.   
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Holland (2002) argue that adherence to accountability, responsibility, transparency and 
trust will significantly reduce the probability of adverse media coverage, damaging 
litigation or unfavourable regulatory changes which could undermine shareholder 
value. It is important to note that areas of responsibility are not only limited from the 
organisational and legal points of view, but also from the ethical point of view (Enderle, 
1987). Griffin (2010) added that transparency is an important prerequisite for 
accountability because transparency enables evaluation after the event, whereas, 
accountability enables appraisal before or during decisions. Accountability is not only 
restricted to corporations but applies to all decision making institutions, including 
governments, private sector and civil society organisations. Therefore, these 
organisations must be answerable to a public who may not be present during decision 
making (Griffin, 2010).  
Yandle (2010) suggested that the 2007 financial crisis was a result of the sudden 
breakdown of assurance mechanisms – the generators of trust (independently 
determined credit rating, international accounting standards and credit default swaps) - 
rather than actions taken or not, by misguided central bankers. Barker (2009) added 
that the fundamental threat faced by the banking industry despite the losses, power 
struggle and increased regulation is the destruction of trust. Furthermore, Yandle 
(2010, p.343) commented that “trust is the most fragile human sentiment (rooted in 
individuals) and practically all markets transactions depend on some degree of trust”. 
The author also argued that without trust, transacting parties cannot afford enough 
police and regulators to induce honest behaviour among ordinary people.  
Fakuyama (1995) argued that trust is a mechanism or social norm that facilitates 
economic growth to occur beyond the limits of small groups. Yandle (2010) further 
added that the financial crisis will lead to permanent expansion of regulations, thereby, 
replacing market driven trust devices. Forster and Nilakant (2005) commenting on the 
role of trust in privatisation focusing on the transformation of the electricity utility in The 
Gambia concluded that:  
organisational factors such as trust generation may be as critical as economic 
factors in ensuring the success of deregulation and privatisation in less developed 
countries (Forster and Nilakant, 2005, p.348).  
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Trust it is argued involves an assumption or expectation that vulnerability will not be 
taken advantage of by the other (Nilakant, 2005).  
Gordon Brown commented in the Financial Times (2009, p.5) that: 
combined failure of corporate governance, of responsibility, and accountability by 
banks and bankers, of credit rating agencies and domestic and international 
regulatory authorities were the reasons of the recent financial crisis.  
Furthermore, he suggested that any solution must incorporate the principles of 
transparency, sound banking, responsibility, integrity, global standards and 
supervision. Therefore, one can conclude that in terms of theoretical exploration the 
term corporate governance is relatively new, but the practice and issues surrounding 
the need for regulatory compliance is ancient (Causey, 2008). The quote below and the 
date supports the need for regulatory compliance. Smith (1827 p. 311) argued that:  
the directors of companies, however, being managers rather of other people’s 
money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Negligence and profusion therefore must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.  
It is clear from the quote above that the debate surrounding corporate governance 
recently is not new. Therefore, regulatory compliance is necessary to protect and 
enhance shareholder wealth (Causey, 2008). 
8.6  More formal substantive theory  
Following the previous discussion, one can now restate the substantive theory in a 
more formal way with a CI underpinning as follows: 
 The substantive theory has indicated that human factors call for regulatory 
compliance and ethical practices to restore public confidence in the banking 
system, in the absence of mandatory corporate governance regulatory 
framework. However, human factors are indeed obstructed by culture, 
environment and policies that exist in The Gambian banking system. Thus, 
ethics is grafted onto the corporate body as a preventative or remedial measure 
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to assist combat corruption, promote obedience to laws and procedures, and 
increase trust between citizens and institutions (Garofalo and Geuras, 1999; 
Garofalo, 2003).  
 It is about how human behaviour is motivated by principles of right and wrong 
and the concern for consequences. Therefore neither profit, nor stock price, nor 
size, nor power can alone serve as the criterion for an organisation efficiently 
operated. Thus, organisations come to gain public respect and community 
approval, they have accomplished far more than a return on their investment 
(Brady, 1999). 
 The substantive theory is bank management designing internal control systems 
and risk management practices that seek to achieve an optimal level of 
protection for shareholders, stakeholders and the economy. 
 It is about the need for accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust if the 
financial institutions are to regain public trust and investor confidence 
(Fakuyama, 1995; Monks and Minow, 1996; Wolfensohn, 1999; Holland, 2002; 
OECD, 2004; Forster and Nilakant, 2005; Nilakant, 2005; Chalhoub, 2009; 
Labelle, 2009; Griffin, 2010; Kaur and Mishra, 2010; Yandle, 2010). 
  The substantive theory is about ensuring the principles of transparency, sound 
banking, responsibility, integrity, global standards and supervision in bank 
corporate governance. 
8.7  Conclusion 
This chapter identified human factors as the main substantive theory presented in the 
previous chapter in light of CI. The CI is outlined and discussed as an alternative 
theoretical framework that can underpin corporate governance discussions rather than 
the shareholder and or stakeholder theories. The chapter also revisits the relevance of 
CI to discuss corporate governance phenomenon and summarises the reasons of such 
relevance. Glaser and Strauss (1967) explained substantive theory in terms of existing 
formal theory such as CI suggested that it is not meant to turn the substantive to formal 
theory; but to make it formal substantive theory.  
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The substantive theory was interpreted in terms of CI from two main perspectives: it 
interprets that human factors call for regulatory compliance and ethical practices to 
restore public confidence in the banking system in the absence of mandatory corporate 
governance regulatory framework. However, these human factors are indeed 
obstructed by culture, environment and policies that exist in The Gambian banking 
system. As such, ethics in one form or another is grafted onto the corporate body as a 
preventative or remedial measure to help combat corruption, promote obedience to 
laws and procedures, and increase trust between citizens and institutions (Garofalo 
and Geuras, 1999; Garofalo, 2003). 
The second perspective explains that human factors in The Gambian banking system 
reinforces the obstacles (culture, environment and policies). Thus, calls for regulatory 
compliance aimed at protecting stakeholders. Regulatory compliance is a process 
required by The Central Bank of The Gambia (regulator) as set out in the Banking Act 
of 2009. However, this process is also indirectly driven by international organisations 
(World Bank and the Basle committee on banking supervision). It demonstrates the 
need for accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust if the financial institutions 
are to regain public trust and investor confidence (Labelle, 2009). Wolfensohn (1999) 
added that corporate governance is all about promoting corporate fairness, 
transparency and accountability. Holland (2002) added that adherence to 
accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust will significantly reduce the 
probability of adverse media coverage, damaging litigation or unfavourable regulatory 
changes which could undermine shareholder value. 
Furthermore, Yandle (2010, p.343) commented that “trust is the most fragile human 
sentiment (rooted in individuals) and practically all markets transactions depend on 
some degree of trust”. The author also argued that without trust transacting parties 
cannot afford enough police and regulators to induce honest behaviour among ordinary 
people (Yandle (2010). Forster and Nilakant (2005) commenting on the role of trust in 
privatisation focusing on the transformation of the electricity utility in The Gambia 
concluded that organisational factors such as trust generation may be as critical as 
economic factors in ensuring the success of deregulation and privatisation in less 
developed countries (Forster and Nilakant, 2005). 
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Finally, the next chapter brings this research to an end. The chapter is focused on the 
conclusion of the research followed by contributions to knowledge, research limitations 
and directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER NINE: 
CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
9.0  Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to carry out an empirical investigation of bank corporate 
governance regulation in The Gambia. The research identified human factors (lack of 
accountability and trust) as the main substantive theory. The substantive theory shows 
that human factors calls for regulatory compliance and ethical practices to restore 
public confidence in the banking system in the absence of a mandatory corporate 
governance regulatory framework. However, these human factors are obstructed by 
culture, environment and policies that exist in The Gambian banking system. This 
research is based on a combination of social constructionist and interpretative 
paradigms of enquiry. Through the application of grounded theory methodology this 
research therefore aims to build a substantive theory of corporate governance 
regulation within The Gambian banking system through systematic data collection and 
analysis. Finally, this research will present the final conclusion of the thesis, 
contributions and direction for possible future research.  
9.1  Conclusion of the thesis 
This research has accomplished its objective of building a substantive theory of bank 
corporate governance regulation in The Gambia using the CI framework. Thus, 
enabling the researcher to ascertain and understood the human factor phenomenon 
that exists within The Gambian banking system and how this phenomenon interacts 
with obstacles, regulatory compliance and ethics. As such, from a CI point of view, 
ethics in one form or another, is grafted onto the corporate body as a preventative or 
remedial measure to help combat corruption, promote obedience to laws and 
procedures, and increase trust between citizens and institutions (Geuras, 1999; 
Garofalo, 2003; Garofalo).  
This thesis also demonstrated that it is possible to use non-traditional theoretical 
frameworks such as CI in understanding corporate governance within a banking 
system. Primary data for this research was collected in two main stages namely semi-
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structured interviews and focus group discussion in addition to secondary data. The 
researcher adopted the Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) method of grounded theory 
development which focuses on open coding, axial and selective coding (see chapter 
six and seven). As a result, the substantive theory is grounded in the data reflecting the 
views of bank managers, regulators, regulatory and compliance officers. Finally, using 
the CI theoretical framework the thesis constructed a formal grounded theory 
summarised below:  
 The substantive theory has indicated that human factors calls for regulatory 
compliance and ethical practices to restore public confidence in the banking 
system in the absence of mandatory corporate governance regulatory 
framework. However, human factors are indeed obstructed by culture, 
environment and policies that exist in The Gambian banking system. Thus, 
ethics is grafted onto the corporate body as a preventative or remedial measure 
to help combat corruption, promote obedience to laws and procedures, and 
increase trust between citizens and institutions (Garofalo and Geuras, 1999; 
Garofalo, 2003).  
 It is about how human behaviour is motivated by principles of right and wrong 
and the concern for consequences. Therefore neither profit, nor stock price, nor 
size, nor power can alone serve as the criterion for an organisation well run. 
Thus, organisations come to gain public respect and community approval, they 
have accomplished far more than a return on their investment (Brady, 1999). 
 The substantive theory is about bank management designing internal control 
systems and risk management practices that seek to achieve an optimal level of 
protection for stakeholders, enhance accountability and confidence in the 
banking system. 
 It is about the need for accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust if the 
financial institutions are to regain public trust and investor confidence 
(Fakuyama, 1995; Monks and Minow, 1996;  Wolfensohn, 1999; Holland, 2002; 
OECD, 2004; Forster and Nilakant, 2005; Nilakant, 2005; Chalhoub, 2009; 
Labelle, 2009; Griffin, 2010; Kaur and Mishra, 2010; Yandle, 2010). 
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 The substantive theory is about ensuring the principles of transparency, sound 
banking, responsibility, integrity, global standards and supervision in bank 
corporate governance. 
9.2  Contribution to knowledge  
This thesis made a number of contributions at methodological, theoretical and empirical 
levels. These contributions are summarised below: 
Following the background reading and subsequent literature review undertaken in this 
thesis (see chapter two) a gap in the knowledge was identified. It was clear from the 
literature review that corporate governance regulation with particular emphasis to The 
Gambian banking system is an area that is not well researched. Furthermore, 
considering the growing number of financial institutions in The Gambia recently, the 
gap in knowledge that exists in this area, the 2007 financial crisis and its consequences 
on world economies and global markets. It is therefore prudent for one to examine and 
analyse this area in depth. This is mainly because a developing country like The 
Gambia does not simply have the resources and capacity to maintain its banks in a 
financial crisis. Indeed, the failure of Continental Bank Gambia Limited in 1992 is a 
clear demonstration of this point leading to the loss of trust in The Gambian banking 
system. This event highlights the need for more effective regulation and governance of 
banks in The Gambia. Given The Gambia’s inability to bail the banks in a financial 
crisis as a developing country, the impact and the consequences for the stakeholders 
and the economy would be far greater than in the developed world. Ross and Crossan 
(2012) commenting on the social implications of the 2007 banking crises concluded 
that governments across the world are currently cutting public spending in an extreme 
fashion and this is, partly, due to the banking crises. It is therefore evident that poor 
governance in the banking sector is leading to massive social problems in the real 
world as governments cut services (ibid). 
The literature review also highlighted the weakness of the shareholder and stakeholder 
theories in understanding corporate governance phenomena. The use of CI framework 
to address The Gambia’s corporate governance phenomena serves as an alternative 
theoretical attempt to address this weakness. The development of a substantive theory 
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within The Gambian banking system using the CI also serves as an alternative 
theoretical underpinning a research purely designed to focus on The Gambia banking 
context. Furthermore, the study outlines a proposed ethical code of conduct for The 
Gambia. The proposed code of conduct will influence future behaviour and 
subsequently improve the robustness of the banking system. The study will inform the 
development of tighter controls procedures in the oversight and supervision which will 
be useful for board members, managers and regulators. Thus, the findings of this 
research can be considered a starting point for futures researchers within the banking 
industry.  
This research also adds to the few corporate governance studies using grounded 
theory to examine a phenomenon namely: Nwanji, 2006; Sorour, 2011; Boadu, 2013; 
Ibrahim, 2013. Furthermore, there has never been an examination and analysis of 
corporate governance regulation on the financial sector organisation in The Gambia 
using the grounded theory methodology.  
The combination of interpretative and social constructivist paradigms enabled the 
researcher to achieve the research objectives. This research therefore extended 
grounded theory research by utilising it as a methodology relevant to explore the 
phenomena of corporate governance regulation within an unexplored content of The 
Gambian banking system. The collection of data through semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups and analysis using grounded theory methodology enabled the 
development and identification of human factors as the substantive theory using the CI 
theoretical framework. This research will therefore serve as a significant contribution to 
regulators and stakeholders in The Gambian banking industry.  
The bank corporate governance regulatory framework currently existing in The Gambia 
is inconsistent and not standardised. Hence, it can be best described as a “fractured 
independent corporate governance regulatory framework”. As a result, most banks in 
The Gambia have developed voluntary corporate governance codes and frameworks 
for internal use in response to the phenomenon of lack of accountability and trust. In 
some cases, these practices have been imposed on them by their parent body as part 
of their internal control mechanisms. The consequence of these strategies is that banks 
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are likely to be accountable and ethical thereby enhancing supervision, compliance and 
trust. These will ultimately protect the interest of shareholders.  
Corporate governance regulation of countries and organisations are uniquely affected 
by a number of factors including legal, regulatory, human, organisational and cultural 
factors. Therefore, this thesis in unveiling the human factor model as the core 
phenomenon with emphasis on corporate governance regulation is in line with the 
empirical corporate governance research  such as Berle and Means (1932); Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazuraa (2004); Enrione et al  (2006); Deo et.al. (2007); Khadaroo and 
Shaikh (2007); Zattoni and Cuomo (2008); Yandle (2010).  
Combining corporate governance, grounded theory and CI to explore a phenomenon in 
an unexplored context makes this research the first to combine all three areas together. 
Thus, providing a new approach to corporate governance understanding which will 
benefit key stakeholders, improving the overall efficiency of The Gambian banking 
system. This will ultimately inform and improve corporate governance practice. The 
thesis will also provide some practical contributions to regulators, bank managers and 
other stakeholders in The Gambian banking system. The identification of the 
substantive theory will help key stakeholders such as investors, management and 
regulators to address the challenges including obstacles that are impeding the 
development of corporate governance as part of the regulatory framework. Thus, 
minimising the risk of bank failures and improving corporate governance regulation 
framework.   
9.3  Limitations of the study  
The sample size for the research was limited to five out of potential of 13 banks that 
exist in The Gambia. Willingness of participants with the requisite knowledge and 
experience to make meaningful contribution due to high illiteracy levels also had an 
impact on the sample size. The requirements of participants for this research narrowed 
down the scope of respondents. Furthermore, due to the nature of corporate 
governance as a process, as well as the underpinning theories, the wider application of 
the substantive theory in terms of generalisability may be limited as no two situations 
are the same. Thus, the substantive theory should not be assumed to constitute 
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concrete and objective reality but rather an interpretation constructed by the researcher 
through set procedures and analysis.  
The selection criteria was based on individuals involved in the day-to-day 
management, regulatory oversight and those affected by the governance process. 
However, only a limited number of these individuals were able and willing to participate 
due to time constraint and lack of financial resources to conduct such a large scale 
research. The extent of paranoia and fear in The Gambia exacerbated by the arbitrary 
arrest, detention and disappearance of individuals makes accessibility much more 
challenging.  
The climate of fear combined with poor record keeping also inhibits data accessibility.  
Finally, there was limited time available in which to commence the data collection in the 
field. Due to the shortage of time and resources it was not possible to venture far 
outside the boundaries of this research parameter. The study was also limited to the 
scope of the research questions and any findings falling outside the scope of the 
objectives were coincidental.  
9.4  Directions for future research  
The purpose of this research is to carry out an empirical investigation of bank corporate 
governance regulation in The Gambia. Through the application of grounded theory 
methodology this research aims to build a substantive theory of corporate governance 
regulation within The Gambian banking system. Therefore, the substantive theory 
developed in this thesis only reflects corporate governance phenomenon in The 
Gambian banking context underpinned by opinions of those included in the research. 
As a result, the substantive theory of human factors does not necessarily constitute an 
upgrade of the theory into formal theory. This can only be achieved by conducting 
research based on human factors within many substantive areas. Therefore, future 
researchers can explore the human factor model further in different banking 
jurisdictions to explore how credibly it offers explanations of bank corporate 
governance and possibly develop a formal theory.  
Another potential area of research as a result of the findings of this thesis is to carry out 
a quantitative research using econometric modelling to test the significance of the 
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variables highlighted in the human factor model. Finally, one can conclude that this 
thesis does offer useful directions for regulators, bank executives and investors to 
minimise the effects of human factors and develop strategies aimed at addressing the 
obstacles  faced  in  developing  a  corporate  governance  requirement  as part  of  the 
regulatory framework in The Gambia.  
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APPENDIX I:  The Four Major Approaches to Ethics. 
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DEONTOLOGICAL 
VIRTUE  
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(Teleological) 
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Act  
Deontology 
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APPENDIX II: Banking and Finance in The Gambia 
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APPENDIX III: The focus and level of Analysis of the literature 
pertaining to the regulation of Corporate Governance 
of Banks in The Gambia 
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APPENDIX IV: The four-level regulatory approach under the 
Lamfalussy process (2005) 
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APPENDIX V: Likert Scale Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a senior lecturer and the MBA Programme Manager at Holborn College (London) 
in association with the University of Wales. I am also reading for a PhD Corporate 
Governance at the University of Plymouth, UK. I am conducting a study on corporate 
governance regulation on the financial sector organisations in The Gambia.  This 
questionnaire is required to generate data for analysis on the subject matter of study. 
Kindly fill the questionnaire in accordance with given guidelines.  Please be assured 
that the information derivable from this questionnaire will be treated with deserved 
confidence. 
Thank you. 
 
Sainey Faye Cert, BA (Hons), MSc (City)  Banking and Finance  
Plymouth Business School 
University of Plymouth 
United Kingdom 
  
PhD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Survey questionnaire on corporate governance regulation on financial 
sector organisations in a developing country: The Gambia 
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please tick one answer only: 
(1) Strongly-agree (2) Agree (3) Don’t know (4) disagree (5) strongly-disagree  
Position:    Please tick one:      Bank Customer ( )    Bank Employee (  )  
1) Corporate governance regulation strengthens the financial performance of financial 
sector organisations in The Gambia? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
2) The governance of financial sector organisations has a positive effect on the 
services they provide to their stakeholders? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
3) Corporate governance regulation is designed to protect and enhance shareholder 
value? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
4) The current corporate governance system within the financial sector organisations in 
The Gambia is effective? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
5) The current corporate governance system within the financial sector organisations in 
The Gambia is ineffective? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
  
                            
284 
6) Corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides accountability of 
management to stakeholders?  
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
7) An effective corporate governance system in the financial sector organisation is 
necessary in order to meet the needs of its stakeholders? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
8) Good governance makes corporate organisations more socially responsible and 
ethical? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
9) The bank management always considers the ethical consequences of their 
decisions on stakeholders before making decisions? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
10) There is conflict of interest between shareholders and stakeholders in relation to 
corporate social responsibility policies? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
11) Corporate social responsibility and ethics are aimed at providing accountability, 
responsibility, transparency and trust? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
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12) Your bank is accountable to all the stakeholders? 
Ans.        1                        2                          3                     4                      5 
 
I sincerely appreciate your time and co-operation in completing this form. 
Confidentiality is assured. Personal details will not be included in any part of the 
research or made public.  
 
Thank you  
 
 
Sainey Faye      
email: sainey.faye@plymouth.ac.uk                                                                                                                                                         
University of Plymouth, UK 
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APPENDIX VI: Tabular Analysis of Results of Likert Scale Questionnaire 
 
Customer  Responses
Strongly 
Agree
Agree
Don’t Know 
Disagree
Strongly 
Disagree
   Total
1.Corporate governance regulation strengthens the financial performance of financial
sector organisations in The Gambia? 
43 55 21 15 6 140
2.The governance of financial sector organisations has a positive effect on the services
they provide to their stakeholders? 
26 68 27 16 3 140
3. Corporate governance regulation is designed to protect and enhance stakeholder
value?
39 50 31 16 4 140
4. The current corporate governance system within the financial sector organisations in
The Gambia is effective?
15 54 30 31 10 140
5. The current corporate governance system within the financial sector organizations in
the Gambia is  ineffective?
18 43 38 26 15 140
6. Corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides accountability of
management to stakeholders?
18 51 43 17 11 140
7. An effective corporate governance system in the financial sector organisations is
necessary in order to meet the needs of stakeholders?
42 47 34 6 11 140
8. Good governance makes corporate organisations more socially responsible and
ethical?
45 49 29 6 11 140
9. The bank management always considers the ethical consequences of their decisions
on stakeholders before making decisions? 
28 36 37 20 19 140
10. There is conflict of interest between shareholders and stakeholders in relation to
corporate social responsibility policies? 
28 47 47 11 7 140
11. Corporate social responsibility and ethics are aimed at providing accountability,
responsibility, transparency and trust?
28 59 32 10 11 140
12. Your bank is accountable to all the stakeholders? 32 41 46 13 8 140
Employee Response
Strongly 
Agree
Agree
Don’t Know 
Disagree
Strongly 
Disagree
   Total
1.Corporate governance regulation strengthens the financial performance of financial
sector organisations in The Gambia? 
40 62 11 13 4 130
2.The governance of financial sector organisations has a positive effect on the services
they provide to their stakeholders? 
36 64 16 10 4 130
3. Corporate governance regulation is designed to protect and enhance stakeholder
value?
38 55 23 7 7 130
4. The current corporate governance system within the financial sector organisations in
The Gambia is effective?
9 58 32 23 8 130
5. The current corporate governance system within the financial sector organizations in
the Gambia is  ineffective?
15 31 35 29 20 130
6. Corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides accountability of
management to stakeholders?
28 62 18 16 6 130
7. An effective corporate governance system in the financial sector organisations is
necessary in order to meet the needs of stakeholders?
30 53 30 8 9 130
8. Good governance makes corporate organisations more socially responsible and
ethical?
48 41 18 11 12 130
9. The bank management always considers the ethical consequences of their decisions
on stakeholders before making decisions? 
28 40 30 17 15 130
10. There is conflict of interest between shareholders and stakeholders in relation to
corporate social responsibility policies? 
21 44 39 16 10 130
11. Corporate social responsibility and ethics are aimed at providing accountability,
responsibility, transparency and trust?
33 59 21 12 5 130
12. Your bank is accountable to all the stakeholders? 40 41 25 14 10 130
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APPENDIX VII: Bar Chart Analysis of Results of Likert Scale 
Questionnaire 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the analysis of the survey questionnaire results collected from 
bank customers and employees in The Gambia using a set of twelve statements on 
bank corporate governance regulation. Data for the thesis were collected in three 
stages, namely survey questionnaires (mainly to gain access and informing the semi-
structured interview questions); semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions. In terms of grounded theory analysis only the semi-structured interviews 
and focus group discussions were used. The responses from the survey questionnaires 
were analysed through creating bar charts to give overviews of how employees and 
customers in The Gambia perceive bank corporate governance regulation. The 
analysis of the bar charts were based on likert scale ranging from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. It is important to note that a total of 140 survey questionnaires 
completed by bank customers and a 130 was completed by bank employees. Given 
that the difference is only 10 between the two sets of data. The researcher therefore 
intends to ignore this small difference. Furthermore, all the figures have been rounded 
up to aid clarity.  
 
All the 12 survey questionnaire statements such as the one shown in Q1 will be 
analysed. These are the first of three primary data collected from stakeholders groups 
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Chart 1: Q1 Corporate governance regulation 
strengthens the financial performance of financial 
sector organisations in The Gambia?  
Customers
Employees
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from The Gambia. A total of 400 (200 questionnaires for bank customers and 200 for 
bank employees) survey questionnaire statements were hand delivered to bank 
customers and employees by the researcher with the help of two Gambian bankers. 
140 Gambian bank customers fully completed the survey forms which is a success rate 
of 70%. In addition 130 Gambian bank employees completed the employee survey 
form which is a success rate of 65%. If the two sets of data named above are 
combined success rate will be 68%.  
The issue of bank corporate governance regulation and its effects on the financial 
performance forms the bases of survey statement one. As shown in the chart 1, 70% of 
bank customers and 79% employees either strongly agree or agree with statement one 
that corporate governance regulation strengthens the financial performance of banks in 
The Gambia. This suggests that bank employees and customers think regulation 
benefits the banking sector organisation in The Gambia. However, some of the 
participants did not support statement one, as shown in the chart above 13% to 15% of 
the respondents disagree around a third of which strongly disagree with the view that 
corporate governance regulation increases the financial performance of banks.   
 
An evaluation relating to the governance of financial sector organisation and its effect 
on the services they provide to stakeholders forms the bases of survey statement two. 
Chart 2 shows 19% of bank customers and 28% of bank employees strongly agree that 
the governance of financial sector organizations has a positive effect on the services 
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Chart 2: Q2 The governance of financial sector organisations 
has a positive effect on services they provide to their 
stakeholders? 
Customers
Employees
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they provide to their stakeholders. The difference may be down to the fact that bank 
employees may be better placed and knowledgeable to judge the governance of 
financial sector organisations more than the customers who are not directly involved in 
day to day running of these firms. Furthermore, 49% of bank customers and employees 
agree with statement two that the governance of financial sector organizations has a 
positive effect on services they provide to their stakeholders. Therefore majority of the 
respondents (68% of bank customers and 77% of bank employees) either strongly 
agree or agree with statement two. 
This strongly suggests that the governance of financial sector organizations has a 
positive effect on the services they provide to their stakeholders. However, some of the 
participants did not support statement two, as shown in the chart 2 19% of bank 
customers and 12% of employees had no view on the issue while 11% of the bank 
customers and 8% bank employees disagree with the statement and further 2% of 
customers and 3% of employees strongly disagree with the view that governance of 
financial sector organisations has a positive effect on the services they provide to their 
stakeholders.Based on the analysis above it is clear that the majority of the participants 
support statement two as shown in the chart above. 
An evaluation of corporate governance regulation aimed at protecting and enhancing 
shareholder value forms the bases of survey statement three. As shown in chart 3: 
64% of bank customers and 71% of bank employees either strongly agree or agree 
that corporate governance regulation is designed to protect and enhance shareholder 
value.  
These strongly appear to suggest that corporate governance regulation is designed to 
protect and enhance stakeholder value.  
On the other hand, some of the participants did not support statement three, as shown 
in the chart above with 22% of bank customers and 18% of employees had no view on 
the issue while 11% of the bank customers and 5% bank employees did not agree with 
the statement and further 3% of customers and 5% of employees strongly-disagree 
with the view that corporate governance regulation is designed to protect and enhance 
stakeholder value. If you consider participants with no view to strongly disagree 36% of  
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customers and 28% of employees did not support the view that corporate governance 
regulation is designed to protect and enhance stakeholder value.  
 
An examination of how effective the current corporate governance system is within the 
financial sector organisations in The Gambia forms the bases of survey statement four. 
As shown in chart 4 exactly 50% of bank customers and 52% of bank employees either 
strongly-agree or agree that the current corporate governance system within the 
financial sector organizations in The Gambia is effective. An evaluation of statement 4  
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Chart 3: Q3 Corporate governance regulation is 
designed to protect and enhance shareholder 
value? 
Customers
Employees
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Chart 4: Q4 The current corporate governance 
system within the financial sector organisations in 
The Gambia is  effective 
Customers
Employees
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and statement 5 gives us an indication, level of understanding and current state of 
corporate governance system in The Gambia with 46% of respondents stating that they 
don’t know how effective the current corporate governance system within the financial 
sector is. Furthermore, statements 4 and 5 enable us to understand the degree of 
variance on how effective or ineffective the current corporate governance system in 
The Gambia is. It is important to note that corporate governance is not part of the 
regulatory framework required by the Central Bank of The Gambia. This would help to 
explain why such a high percentage of participants don’t know how effective the current 
corporate governance system in The Gambia is. 
A closer examination of the data above appears to suggest that the current corporate 
governance system within the financial sector organizations in The Gambia is indeed 
effective. On the contrary, some of the participants did not support statement four, as 
shown in the chart above with 46% of respondents had no view on the issue while 29% 
of the bank customers and 24% bank employees either did not agree or strongly 
disagree with the statement that the current corporate governance system within the 
financial sector organizations in The Gambia is effective. 
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Chart 5: Q5  The current corporate governance system within 
the financial sector organisations in The Gambia is 
ineffective 
Customers
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From the analysis above it is evident that the majority of the participants support 
statement four as shown in chart 4, therefore at this level the current corporate 
governance system within the financial sector organizations is effective. 
This particular analysis mainly focus on how ineffective the current corporate 
governance system within the financial sector organisations in The Gambia. As shown 
in chart 5 44% of bank customers and 36% of bank employees either strongly-agree or 
agree that the current corporate governance system within the financial sector 
organisations in The Gambia is ineffective. An evaluation of statement 4 and 5 (above) 
gives us a clear indication of how confused the participants are in determining how 
effective or ineffective the current corporate governance system in the financial sector 
is. Furthermore, it demonstrates a clear lack of understanding and uncertainty 
surrounding the current state of affairs when it comes to corporate governance in The 
Gambia with 27% of customers and employees stating that they don’t know how 
ineffective the current corporate governance is. 
However, a closer examination of the data above suggests that the current corporate 
governance system within the financial sector organizations in The Gambia is 
ineffective. 44% of bank customers either strongly agree or agree that the current 
system is ineffective against 30% who either disagree or strongly disagree. On the 
other hand, 36% of bank employees strongly agree or agree that that the current 
corporate governance within the financial sector is ineffective against 37% who either 
disagree or strongly disagree. 
Furthermore, if we compare the figures in chart 4 against chart 5 one can deduce the 
following observations. Initially, 13% of customers strongly agree that the current 
corporate governance system is ineffective against 11% who initially said it’s effective. 
Similarly, 12% of employees strongly agree that the current corporate governance 
system is ineffective against 7% who share the view that it’s effective. In addition, 31% 
of customers agree that the current corporate governance system is ineffective against 
39% who agree that it’s effective. On the same token, 24% of employees agree that the 
current corporate governance system is ineffective against 45% who agree that it’s 
effective. 19% of customers disagree that the current corporate governance system is 
ineffective against 22% who believe it is effective. Furthermore, 22% of employees 
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disagree that the current corporate governance system is ineffective against 18% who 
disagree its effective.  
Finally, 11% of customers strongly disagree that the current corporate governance 
system is ineffective versus 7% who strongly disagree that it’s effective. On the other 
hand, 15% of employees strongly disagree that the current corporate governance is 
less effective against 6% who strongly disagree that the current corporate governance 
system is effective. This analysis appear to suggests that when it comes to evaluating 
how effective the current corporate governance system in the financial sector 
organisation in The Gambia is, the simply is inconclusive.  
 
An evaluation of corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides 
accountability of management to stakeholders forms the bases of survey statement six. 
Chart 6 shows that 49% of bank customers and 70% of bank employees either strongly 
agree or agree that corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides 
accountability of management to stakeholders. It is important to note the difference 
even though both are stakeholders. It appears that employees seem more positive to 
think that corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides 
accountability of management to stakeholders. The number of customers who don’t 
know (31%) whether corporate governance in the financial sector organisations 
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Chart 6: Q6 Corporate governance in the financial 
sector organisations provides accountability of 
management to stakeholders? 
Customers
Employees
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provides accountability of management to stakeholders. This suggests a degree of 
uncertainty regarding management accountability. Overall, these figures strongly 
suggest that corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provides 
accountability of management to stakeholders. On the contrary, some of the 
participants did not support statement six, as shown in the chart 6 with 45% of 
respondents had no view on the issue while 20% of bank customers and 17% of 
employees either did not agree or strongly disagree with the statement that corporate 
governance in the financial sector organisations provides accountability of 
management to stakeholders. 
 
An evaluation of an effective corporate governance system in the financial sector 
organisation is necessary in order to meet the needs of stakeholders forms the bases 
of survey statement seven. Chart 7 reads that 64% of both bank customers and 
employees either strongly-agree or agree that an effective corporate governance 
system in the financial sector organisations is necessary in order to meet the needs of 
stakeholders. 
A closer examination of the data above appears to suggest that an effective corporate 
governance system in the financial sector organisations is necessary in order to meet 
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Chart 7: Q7 An effective corporate governance system 
in the financial sector organisations is necessary in 
order to meet the needs of stakeholders? 
Customers
Employees
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the needs of stakeholders. On the contrary, some of the participants did not support 
statement seven, as shown in the chart above with 47% of respondents had no view on 
the issue. 12% of the bank customers and 13% bank employees either did not agree or 
strongly disagree with the statement that an effective corporate governance system in 
the financial sector organisations is necessary in order to meet the needs of 
stakeholders. 
 
An evaluation of good governance makes corporate organisations more socially 
responsible and ethical forms the bases of the survey statement eight. Chart 8 reads 
that 67% of bank customers and 69% of bank employees either strongly-agree or 
agree that good governance makes corporate organisations more socially responsible 
and ethical. 
These clearly demonstrate that good governance is perceived by bankers and 
customers that make corporate organisations more socially responsible and ethical.  
On the other hand, some of the participants did not support statement eight, as shown 
in the chart above with 35% of respondents had no view on the issue while 12% of the 
bank customers and 17% bank employees either did not agree or strongly disagree 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Strongly
Agree
Agree Don’t 
Know  
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
R
e
sp
o
n
se
  %
 
Chart 8: Q8 Good governance makes corporate 
organisations more socially responsible and ethical?   
Customers
Employees
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with the statement that good governance makes corporate organisations more socially 
responsible and ethical.  
A close scrutiny that bank management always consider the ethical consequences of 
their decisions on stakeholders prior to making decisions forms the bases of survey 
statement nine. 
 
Chart 9 reveals that 46% of bank customers and 53% of bank employees either 
strongly agree or agree that bank management always considers the ethical 
consequences of their decisions on stakeholders before making decisions. The number 
of participants who stated that they don’t know whether or not bank management 
always consider the ethical consequences of their of their decisions on stakeholders 
before making decisions is considerably high when compared against bank customers 
and employees who strongly support this view. 
These would suggest that bank management consider the ethical consequences of 
their decisions on stakeholders before making decisions. On the other hand, some 
participants failed to support statement nine, as shown in the chart above where 49% 
of respondents had no view on the issue while 28% of the bank customers and 25% 
bank employees either disagree or strongly disagree with the view that bank 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Strongly
Agree
Agree Don’t 
Know  
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
R
e
sp
o
n
se
  %
 
Chart 9: Q9 The bank management always considers the 
ethical consequences of their decisions on stakeholders 
before making decisions?  
Customers
Employees
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management always consider the ethical consequences of their decisions on 
stakeholders before making decisions. 
 
An evaluation of whether there is conflict of interest between shareholders and 
stakeholders in relation to corporate social responsibilities policies corporate forms the 
bases of the survey statement ten. As shown in chart 10 54% of bank customers and 
50% of bank employees either strongly agree or agree that there is conflict of interest 
between shareholders and stakeholders in relation to CSR policies. Furthermore, 34% 
of customers and 30% of bank employees failed to support the view that there is 
conflict of interest between shareholders and stakeholders in relation to CSR policies.   
Based on the data above, it would appear to suggest that there is conflict of interest 
between shareholders and stakeholders in relation to CSR policies with some degree 
of uncertainty. In addition, 13% of the bank customers and 20% bank employees either 
did not agree or strongly disagree with the view that there is conflict of interest between 
shareholders and stakeholders in relation to CSR policies. 
An evaluation of CSR and ethics aimed at providing accountability, responsibility, 
transparency and trust forms the bases of the survey statement eleven. Chart 11 reads 
that 62% of bank customers and 70% of bank employees either strongly agree or  
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Chart 10: Q 10 There is conflict of interest between 
shareholders and stakeholders in relation to corporate social 
responsibility policies?  
Customers
Employees
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agree that CSR and ethics are aimed at providing accountability, responsibility, 
transparency and trust. 
These evaluations appear to suggest that CSR and ethics are aimed at providing 
accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust. Some of the participants did not 
support statement eleven, as shown in the chart above with 39% of respondents had 
no view on the issue while 15% of the bank customers and 13% bank employees either 
disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that CSR and ethics are aimed at 
providing accountability, responsibility, transparency and trust. 
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Chart 11: Q11 Corporate social responsibility and 
ethics are aimed at providing accountability, 
responsibility, transparency and trust? 
Customers
Employees
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Chart 12: Q12 Your bank is accountable to all the 
stakeholders?  
Customers
Employees
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An evaluation of bank accountability to all the stakeholders forms the bases of survey 
statement twelve.  Chart12 reads that 52% of bank customers and 63% of bank 
employees either strongly agree or agree that their bank is accountable to all the 
stakeholders. It is interesting to note that 33% of customers don’t know whether or not 
their bank is accountable to all the stakeholders a figure which is rather high. In fact, 
the figure of 33% is higher than the number of employees and customers who either 
strongly agree or agree individually.   
These strongly appear to suggest that banks are accountable to all the stakeholders. In 
addition, 15% of the bank customers and 19% bank employees either did not agree or 
strongly disagree with the statement that their bank is accountable to all the 
stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX VIII: Semi-structured Interview Questions 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a senior lecturer and the MBA Programme Manager Holborn College (London) in 
association with the University of Wales. I am also reading for a PhD Corporate 
Governance at the University of Plymouth, UK. I am conducting a study on corporate 
governance regulation on the financial sector organisations in The Gambia.  This 
questionnaire is required to generate data for analysis on the subject matter of study. 
Kindly fill the questionnaire in accordance with given guidelines.  Please be assured 
that the information derivable from this questionnaire will be treated with deserved 
confidence. 
 
Thank you. 
Sainey Faye Cert, BA (Hons), MSc Banking and Finance (Cass Business School – City University) 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Name of Manager (optional)………………………………………………………………….. 
Name of Bank…………………………………………………………………………………… 
Total number of customers……………………………………………………… 
How long have you been working with the bank………………………………………… 
Total number of employees working for the bank…………………………………………… 
 
PhD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Semi-structured interview on corporate governance regulation on 
financial sector organisations in a developing country: The Gambia 
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1) To what extent does corporate governance regulation affect the financial 
performance of financial sector organisations?------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------- 
 
2) What was the rationale for the introduction of corporate governance regulation in the 
financial service sector in The Gambia?---------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------- 
 
3) How does the governance of financial sector organisations affect the services you 
provide to your stakeholders?----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
 
4) How effective is the current corporate governance system within the financial sector 
organisations?------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
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5) How can effective corporate governance in the financial sector organisation provide 
management accountability to stakeholders? -------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------ 
6) How vital is effective corporate governance system in the financial sector 
organisations necessary to meet the needs of its stakeholders? -------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
7) Would you prefer a voluntary code of governance or the current legislative approach 
(please give your reasons)?  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
8) What are the key contributors/factors of good governance? ---------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
9) Does good corporate governance in the financial sector organisations enhance 
corporate social responsibility and ethics (please give your reason)? -------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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10) Do you see yourself as accountable to shareholders only or stakeholders generally 
(please give reasons)? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
11) Do you consider the ethical consequences of your decisions on your stakeholders 
(if so why)?  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
12) How will increase emphases on business ethics (legislative or voluntary) affect 
financial performance the financial sector organisations? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
I sincerely appreciate your time and co-operation in completing this form. 
Confidentiality is assured. Personal details will not be included in any part of the 
research or made public.  
 
Thank you.  
Sainey Faye     
email: sainey.faye@plymouth.ac.uk 
University of Plymouth, UK. 
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APPENDIX IX: Focus Group Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a senior lecturer and the MBA Programme Manager Holborn College (London) in 
association with the University of Wales. I am also reading for a PhD Corporate Governance at 
the University of Plymouth, UK. I am conducting a study on the effects of corporate governance 
regulation on the financial sector organisations in The Gambia.  This questionnaire is required 
to generate data for analysis on the subject matter of study.  Please be assured that the 
information derivable from this questionnaire will be treated with deserved confidence. 
Thank you. 
Sainey Faye Cert, BA (Hons), MSc Banking & Finance (Cass Business School – City 
University) 
1. How do corporate governance regulations affect financial sector organisation 
2. How does the governance of financial sector organisations affect the services they 
provide to their stakeholders 
3. How effective is the corporate governance system within the financial sector 
organisation in The Gambia 
4. Can corporate governance in the financial sector organisations provide accountability 
by management to stakeholders 
5. How does being public organisation (Central Bank) affect the governance mechanism, 
the institutional ethics and the code of conduct of such organisation 
6. How does the current governance structure affect the regulation of the financial sector 
organisations 
 
I sincerely appreciate your time and co-operation in taking part in this discussion forum. 
Confidentiality is assured. Personal details will not be included in any part of the research or 
made public.  
Thank you  
 
Sainey Faye      
email: sainey.faye@plymouth.ac.uk 
University of Plymouth, UK.  
PhD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Focus group discussion on corporate governance regulation on 
financial sector organisations in a developing country: The Gambia 
